The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

the former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to the good ; since in sensibles also, the solar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends as far as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it. But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun, each of them according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illumination. These things, therefore, will be sufficient to recall into the

1 For wno to i, it is necessary to read aim to or.

* This sentence is very erroneous in the original, m will be evident from comparing it with the above translation.

p. 110

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK IT.

memory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary to the exempt transcendency of the one.

If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testimonies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary that the multitude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not, should be suspended from the one being, [i. e. from being characterized by the one ;] but that the one being itself should be suspended from the one. For when we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being, we do not denominate each of these as the same with being itself. For if permanency were being itself, motion would not be being ; or, if motion were such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of being. But it is evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion, and to every multitude of beings from one thing which is primarily being. This very thing, therefore, which is the cause of essence to all things, and which is participated by all other things, is a participant of this one, and on this account, as it is being alone,' so also it is primarily being.' It is, however, being itself indeed, and is not allotted to &e, from participation ; but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is passive to the one. But it is being* primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to the one a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in wholes is supposed by him to transcend beings, how is it possible that being should not be posterior to the owe, since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated one ?

Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing to those who arc able to know wholes from parts,

, how is it possible that being should not be posterior to the owe, since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated one ?

Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing to those who arc able to know wholes from parts, viz. that intellect has not the same order as the first cause of all. Investigating, therefore, the good of the human soul and its end, of which participating in every respect sufficiently it will reap the fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature, he -in the first place removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after this intellect, because neither is this replete with all the elements of the

• For it it is necessary to read «».

* Here also o» must be substituted for n.

CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. ll7

r good. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of the first intellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined according to this alone, is it not necessary that in wholes also, the cause of good must be established above intellectual perfection ? For if that which is primarily good subsisted according to total intellect, in us also and all other [intellectual natures,] self-sufficiency and appropriate good would be present through the participation of intellect. Our intellect, indeed, is disjoined from the good, and is indigent, and on this account requires pleasure in order to the attainment of human perfection. But a divine intellect always participates of the good, and on this account is divine. For it is boniform through the participation of good ; but divine, as being suspended from the first deity. It is the same reasoning, therefore, which infers that the good is exempt from the first intellect, and which defines felicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in the all-perfect presence of the gootl. For the intellectual form of energy is itself by itself defective with respect to blessedness. And why is it requisite to be prolix? For Parmenides teaches us most clearly the difference of the one from essence and being, and shows that the one is exempt from all other things and from essence ; for this he evinces of the one at the end of the first hypothesis. But how is it possible that the cause of essence, and which is exempt from it through supreme transcendency, should not also be beyond the intellectual order? For intellect is essence.

ence ; for this he evinces of the one at the end of the first hypothesis. But how is it possible that the cause of essence, and which is exempt from it through supreme transcendency, should not also be beyond the intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in intellect there is permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates that the one transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to the ineffable cause of all things, which is prior to every intellect? And if every intellect is converted to itself, and is in itself, but the one is demonstrated to be neither in itself, nor in another, how can we any longer consider intellect as the same with the first cause of all ? In what respect, also, will the one which is prior to being differ from the one being, which is the subject of the second hypothesis, if intellect is the best of things, and the first principle of all ? For the one being participates of the one ; but that which participates is secondary to that which is participated. That the one, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect and essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK II.

CHAPTER V.

Ik the next place, if the one is neither intelligible nor intellectual, nor in short participates of the power of being, let us survey what will be the modes of leading us to it, and through what intellectual conceptions Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to his familiars, the ineffable and unknown transcendency of the first. I say then, that at one time he unfolds it through analogy, and the similitude of secondary natures ; but at another time he demonstrates itg exempt transcendency, and its separation from the whole of things, through negations. For in the Republic, indeed, he indicates the ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of the good, through analogy to the sun ; but in the Parmenides, he demonstrates the difference of the one with respect to all things posterior to it through negations. But he appears to me through one of these modes to unfold the progression from the first cause of all other things, and prior to other things, of the divine orders. For on this account the first cause is exempt from all the natures produced by it, because every where cause is established above its effects ; and on this account the first is nothing of all things, because all things proceed from him. For he is the principle of all things, both of beings, and at the same time of non-beings.