The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

on after it, should give a greater extent to their productions ; but that such things as are more separated from their primary monad should neither pervade in a similar manner through all things, nor extend their efficacious energies to far distant progressions. And again, as similar to this, it is necessary that the nature which gives subsistence to the greatest number of effects, should be arranged next to the monad its principle ; and that the nature generative of a more numerous progeny, because it is more similar to the supplying cause of all things than that which is generative of a few, must be arranged nearer to the monad, according to hyparxis. For if it is more remote, it will be more dissimilar to the first principle ; but if it is more dissimilar, it will neither possess a power comprehending the power of similar natures, nor an energy abundantly prolific. For an abundant cause is allied to the cause of all. And universally, that which is generative of a more abundant, is more naturally allied to its principle than that which is productive of a less numerous progeny. For the production

CHAP. I.

OF PLATO.

p. 151

of fewer effects is a defect of power ; but a defect of power is a diminution of essence ; and a diminution of essence becomes redundant on account of dissimilitude to its cause, and a departure from the first principle.

Again therefore, in addition to what has been said, we sball assert this which possesses the most indubitable truth, that prior to the causes which are participated, it is every whe re necessary that imparticipable causes should have a prior subsistence in the whole of things. For if it is necessary tbat a cause should have the same relation to its progeny as the one to all the nature of beings, and that it should naturally possess this order - towards things secondary ; but the one is imparticipable, being similarly exempt from all beings, as unically producing all things ;— if this be the case, it is requisite that every other cause which imitates the transcendency of the one with respect to all things, should be exempt from the natures which are in secondary ranks, and which are participated by them. And again, as equivalent to this, it is requisite that every imparticipable and primary cause should establish monads of secondary natures similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. I say, for instance, it is requisite that one soul should distribute many souls to different natures ; and one intellect participated intellects to many souls.

cause should establish monads of secondary natures similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. I say, for instance, it is requisite that one soul should distribute many souls to different natures ; and one intellect participated intellects to many souls. For thus the first exempt genus will every where have an order analogous to the one. And secondary natures which participate kindred causes will be analogous to these causes, and through the similitude of these will he conjoined with their imparticipable principle. Hence prior to the forms which are in other things, those are established which subsist in themselves ; exempt causes prior to such as are co-ordinate ; and imparticipable monads prior to such as are participable. And consequently (as that which is demonstrated at the same time with this) the exempt causes are generative of the co-ordinate, and imparticipable natures extend participable monads to their progeny. And natures which subsist from themselves produce the powers which are resident in other things. These things therefore being discussed, let us consider how each of the divine genera subsists through analogy,' and survey following Plato himself, what are the first and most total

' For ■mAotn* it U neceMWy to mdmmXoymf.

p. 152

ON THE THEOLOGY-

BOOK lit.

orders of the Gods. For having discovered and demonstrated this, we shall perhaps be able to perceive the truth concerning these several orders.

It is necessary therefore, from the before-mentioned axioms, since there is one unity the principle of the whole of things, and from which every hyparxis derives its subsistence, that this unity should produce from itself, prior to all other things, a multitude characterized by unity, and a number most allied to its cause. For if every other cause constitutes a progeny similar to itself prior to that which is dissimilar, much more must the one unfold into light after this manner tilings posterior to itself, since it is beyond similitude, and Me one itself must produce according to union things which primarily proced from it. For how can the one give subsistence to its progeny except unically ? For nature generates things secondary to itself physically, soul psychically, and intellect intellectually. The one therefore is the cause of the whole of things according to union, and the progression from the one is uniform.

e to its progeny except unically ? For nature generates things secondary to itself physically, soul psychically, and intellect intellectually. The one therefore is the cause of the whole of things according to union, and the progression from the one is uniform. But if that which primarily produces all things is the one, and the progression from it is unical, it is certainly necessary that the multitude thence produced should be self-perfect unities, most allied to their producing cause. Farther still, if every monad constitutes a number adapted to itself, as was before demonstrated, by a much greater priority must the one generate a number of this kind. For in the progression of things, that which is produced is frequently dissimilar to its producing cause, through the dominion of difference : for such are the last of things, and which are far distant from their proper principles. But the first number, and which is connascent with the one, is uniform, ineffable, superessential, and perfectly similar to its cause. For in the first causes, neither does difference intervening separate from the generator the things begotten, and transfer them into • another order, nor docs the motion of the cause effecting a remission of power, produce into dissimilitude and indefiniteness the generation of the whole of things ; but the cause of all things being unically raised above all motion and division, has established about itself a divine number, and has united it toits own simplicity. The one therefore prior to beings has given subsistence to the unities of beings.

For again, according to another mode [of considering the subject] it is.

CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 1.53

necessary that primary beings should participate of the first cause through their proximate unities. For secondary things are severally conjoined to the natures prior to them through similars ; bodies indeed to the soul which ranks as a whole, through the several souls [which they participate] ; but souls to universal intellect through intellectual monads ; and first beings, through unical hyparxes to the one. For being is in its own nature dissimilar to the one. For essence and that which is in want of union externally derived, are unadapted to be conjoined with that which is superessential, and with the first union, and are far distant from it. But the unities of beings, since they derive their subsistence from the imparticipable unity, and which is exempt from the whole of things, are able to conjoin beings to the one, and to convert them to themselves.