The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

. For being which is produced from these, and which is not the one itself, but uniform, possesses its progression indeed from the one, through the power which produces and unfolds it into light from the one; but its occult union from the hyparxis of the one. This one therefore which subsists prior to power, and first presubsists from the imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things, Socrates in the Philcbus calls bound, but he denominates the power of it which is generative of being, infinity. But he thus speaks in that dialogue, " God we said has exhibited the bound, and also the infinite of beings."

The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated by him God ; because each of the second Gods is participated by being, and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as being exempt ' from the whole of beings, is God, defined according to the ineffable itself, the unical alone, and superessential. But the bound and the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown and imparticipable cause ; bound indeed, being the cause of stable, uniform, and connective deity ; but the infinite being the cause of power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied, and in short, being the leader of every generative distribution. For all union and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures, are suspended* from the first bound. But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, derive their subsistence from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we

' For (floral it it necessary to read rfafmjTiti.

* Here alio it it neceuary for iftpfrai to read fftfnrrat.

p. 168

say that each of the divine orders abides ' and at the same time proceeds, we must confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but proceeds according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has unity and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle of bound, but the latter from that of infinity. And in short, of all the opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the more excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity. For from these two principles all things have their progression into being, even as far as to the last of things. For eternity itself participates at once of bound and infinity ; so far indeed, as it is the intelligible measure, it participates of bound ; but so far as it is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of infinity.

last of things. For eternity itself participates at once of bound and infinity ; so far indeed, as it is the intelligible measure, it participates of bound ; but so far as it is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of infinity. And intellect, so far indeed as it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures, so far it is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it produces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eternity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity. And soul indeed, in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and periods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the cause of bound ; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity. The whole of this heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order of its periods, and the mcasores of its restitutions, is bounded. But according to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing revolutions of its orbs, it participates of infinity. Moreover, the whole of generation, in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation, is similar to bound. But again, in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms, it is the image of infinity. And in addition to these things, every natural production, according to its form indeed, is

' furu* U (Knitted in the original.

CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. 169

similar to bound, but according to its matter, resembles infinity. For these are suspended in the last place ' from the two principles posterior to the one, and as far as to these the progression of their productive power extends. Each of these also is one, but form is the measure and boundary of matter, and is in a greater degree one. Matter however is all things in capacity, so far as it derives its subsistence from the first power. There, however, power is generative of all things. But the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative ' of all things according to energy.

l things in capacity, so far as it derives its subsistence from the first power. There, however, power is generative of all things. But the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative ' of all things according to energy. Very properly therefore is it said by Socrates that all beings are from bound and infinity, and that these two intelligible principles primarily derive their subsistence from God. For that which congregates both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds itself into light through all beings is the one prior to the duad. And union indeed is derived to all things through that which is first ; but the division of the two orders of tilings is generated from these primary causes, and through these is extended to the unknown and ineffable principle. Let it therefore be manifest through these things, what the two principles of beings are, which become proximately apparent from the one, according to the theology of Plato.

CHAPTER IX.

In the next place let us show what the third ' thing is which presents itself to the view from these principles. It is every where therefore called that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence from bound and infinity. But if bound is the bound of beings, and the infinite is the infinite of beings, and beings are the things which have a subsistence from both

' For 13^ straw it is necessary to read tv^antf.

• The word ynmrnxq; u omitted in the original.

* TfiTn is onutted in the original.

Proc. Vol. I.

Y

p. 1

these, as Socrates himself clearly teaches us, it is evident that the first of things mingled, is the first of beings. This, however, is nothing else than that which is highest in beings, which is being itself, and nothing else than being. My meaning is, that this is evident through those things by which we demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that hfe is triadic vitally, and intellect intellectually ; and also that these three things being life and intellect are every where. But all things presubsist primarily and essentially in being. For there essence, life and intellect subsist, and the summit of beings. Life however is the middle centre of being, which is denominated and is intelligible life. But intellect is the boundary of being, and is intelligible intellect. For in the intelligible there is intellect, and in intellect the intelligible.