The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ore, comprehends all the undeBled life of divine souls, and the temporal blessedness of partial souls. And it guards the former indeed intelligibly, but measures the latter by the vision of intelligible goods. And thus much concerning Adrastia.

CHAPTER XVIII.

With respect to what remains therefore, we shall summarily say, that the supercelestial place is the first triad of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, possessing three peculiarities, the unfolding into

■ Far xvvyp«n, it U requiutc to read x^uyfMi u.

CHAP. XIX.

OF PLATO.

p. 261

light, the collective, and the defensive. It likewise comprehends all these intelligibly, and in an unknown manner, conjoining indeed intellectuals to intelligibles, but calling forth the prolific powers of intelligible*, receiving in itself the plenitude of forms from the intelligible paradigms, and producing its own meadow from the fontal summit which is there. But from the one intellect it gives subsistence to the three virtues, perfects all itself by intelligible impressions, and in its ineffable bosomB receives the whole of intelligible light. At one and the same time also it abides in the occult nature of the intelligible Gods, and proceeds intelligibly from thence, shines forth to the view of intellectuals, and converts and draws upward by ineffable powers all the images of its proper union which it has disseminated in every thing. To this place likewise it is necessary that we should mystically approach, leaving in the earth all the generationproducing life, and the corporeal nature, with which on coming hither we were surrounded as with a wall, but exciting alone the summit of the soul to the participation of total truth, and the plenitude of intelligible nutriment.

CHAPTER XIX.

After this intelligible and unknown triad however, which presides over all the intellectual ' genera, let us survey the triad which connectedly contains the bond of them, intelligibly and at the same time intellectually. For it is necessary that prior to intellect and the intellectual Gods, the - cause of connectedly containing should be in these Gods ; and that this being established in the middle of the intelligible and intellectual order, should extend to all the divine multitudes, all the genera of beings, and

' For it ia necessary to read n,f>«».

p. 262

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK IV.

all the divisions of the world. For what is it which primarily connects tilings ? If, as some say, the nature of spirit and local motion, body itself which is connective of other things will require connexion.

read n,f>«».

p. 262

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK IV.

all the divisions of the world. For what is it which primarily connects tilings ? If, as some say, the nature of spirit and local motion, body itself which is connective of other things will require connexion. For every body according to its own composition is dissipable and divisible ; which also the Elean guest indicating to those who make corporeal principles, says that the essence which is so much celebrated by them, is broken and dissipated. Body therefore, is not naturally adapted to be connective of other things, nor even if a power of this kind pertained to bodies, would spirit be able to afford us this power, because it is always defluous and dissipated, and diffusing itself beyond that which bounds<it. But if we suppose that habits and connective forms which are divided about bodies illuminate their subjects with connexion, it is perfectly necessary that they should effect this by being present with them ; but how will these habits and forms connect themselves ? For it is difficult to devise how this can be effected. For these being distributed about material bulks, and divided together with their subjects, require a boundary and connexion. But they are not naturally adapted to be bounded or connected from themselves; because they have not an essence self-begotten and self-subsistent. That however, which neither produces nor perfects itself, cannot connect itself. And moreover, every habit, and every material form is alter- motive, and depends on another more ancient cause, and on this account is inseparable from subjects, not being able to verge to itself.

But if abandoning these, we should assert that souls which are incorporeal and self-begotten, are the first efficient causes of connexion, where shall we place the partible and at the same time impartible nature of souls, that which is mixed from the partible and impartible, that which participates of the genera of being, and that which is divided into harmonic reasons ? For souls indeed, connect bodies and natures, because they participate of an impartible peculiarity ; but they are in want of another connective nature which may impart the first principle of mixture to the genera, and of connexion to divided reasons. For the self-motive nature of souls being transitive, and extended to time, requires that which may connect its one life, and may render it total and indivisible. For the whole which is connective of parts, exists prior to parts ; since the whole

CHAP. XIX.

OF PLATO.

ouls being transitive, and extended to time, requires that which may connect its one life, and may render it total and indivisible. For the whole which is connective of parts, exists prior to parts ; since the whole

CHAP. XIX.

OF PLATO.

which consists of parts receives connexion introduced from something different from itself. But if proceeding with the reasoning power beyond souls, we survey intellect, whether the intellect which is participated, or if you are willing, that which is imparticipable and divine, and in short, if we survey at once the intellectual genus of the Gods, if this is primarily connective of beings, we shall find also in this all-various multitude, divisions of genera, and as Socrates says, many and blessed visions, and discussive energies. For the separation of divine natures, and the variety of forms, present themselves to the view in intellectuals, and also fabulous sections and generative powers. How therefore, can that which connects be primarily here, where the divisive genus shines forth? And how is it possible that intellectual multitude should not refer to another more ancient cause the participation of its proper connexion ? For intellectual multitude is that which is primarily connected (since it is that which is primarily divided, and that which requires connexion is divisible, but the indivisible itself is beyond the connective hyparxis), but it is not that which primarily connects. For every thing which is connected, is connected by another thing which primarily possesses the power of connexion. It is evident therefore, from what has been said, that the connective order of beings is established prior to the intellectual Gods.

The intelligible indeed, and occult hyparxis, is ihe supplier of union to all things, as proximately subsisting after the one, and being indivisible and uniform. But connexion is the contraction of multitude into impartible communion ; on which account it subsists as secondary to intelligibles. For the medium which was there was intelligible, and the united primarily-efficient cause of connexion. The connective however, of intelligibles and intellectuals, imitates the unific power of intelligibles. For there the three triadic monads were the unions of wholes ; one of them indeed according to transcendency; another according to the middle centre ; and another according to conversion. But in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders, these three triads arc the second after those unions, and are con nascent with multitude.