The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

be in another thing. If the one however alone has an existence, it is not possible for any thing to appear to be in something else. I^ence it is not possible for any being to be changed. But every .thing which stands still is necessarily in the same thing. And that which is in the same is in a certain same thing. The one however is in no same thing. For that which is in a certain thing, is either in itself, or in something else. But it has been demonstrated, that it is neither in itself, nor in another. Hence neither is it in a certain same thing. Neither therefore does any being stand still.

Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or different from any thing. For if there is nothing besides the one itself, there is not any thing which will be either the same with, or different from another thing. For there will not be any other being. And the one itself will not be different from itself ; for it would be many and not one. Nor will it be the same with itself. For this thing which is same is in another, and same is not the one itself. For the one is simply one, because it is not many. But that which is same is the same with another thing. Again, neither is it possible for any thing to be similar or dissimilar to any thing. For every thing similar suffers a certain same passion ; but every

'* For wT>i it 1» neceWarj to read

CHAP. I.

OF PLATO.

p. 97

thing dissimilar a certain different passion. The one, however, "cannot suffer any thing, nor can this he the case with any thing else besides the one ; since no tiling else has any existence whatever, if the one alone has a subsistence.

Farther still, in addition to these things we say that neither is it possible for any thing to be touched, nor to be separate, if there is nothing else besides the one. For how can things which have no existence be separate, or conic into contact with any thing? But neither can the one either be separate from itself, or touch itself. For it would thus be passive to the being touched, and the being separate. But the one suffers no other tlung besides itself. It is likewise requisite that no one thing should either be equal or unequal to any thing. For that which is equal to another thing, is said to be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be said of that which is unequal. Another thing, however, has no existence, if the one alone has a subsistence. But neither can the one be equal or unequal to itself.

qual to another thing, is said to be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be said of that which is unequal. Another thing, however, has no existence, if the one alone has a subsistence. But neither can the one be equal or unequal to itself. For if unequal, there will be one thing in it as greater, but another as less ; so that it will be two things and not one. And if the one is equal to itself, the one will measure itself. This however is impossible. For the one will measure and be measured by itself, so that it will not be the one itself. Neither therefore will there be any equality or inequality in beings. If however these things are impossible, neither can any being come into contact with another, and be separate, nor be similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different, nor again, stand still, or be moved, or in short be in any thing, or have figure, or be a whole, or have parts, if the om alone has a subsistence which is void of multitude, and is without all these things. Neither however, i3 it possible for the many alone to have a subsistence, as was before demonstrated. And hence it is necessary that every being should be both many and one.

If this however is the case, either the many must participate of the one, or the one of the many, or both must participate of each other, or neither of each other; but the many indeed must, be separate, and the one must also be separate, in order that the many and the one may subsist, as reason evinces. If, therefore, neither the one participates of the many, nor the many of the one, the same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in Proc. Vol. I. N

p. 93

ON THE 'IDEOLOGY

HOOK II.

the hypothesis of the many alone having a subsistence. For again there will be the many separate from the one. For if the one subsists by itself, and the many do not in any respect participate of the one, the many will be infinitely infinite, they will be similar and dissimilar, same and different, moved and stable, and there will neither be any number nor any knowledge of the many. For the absence of the one compels all thc»e consequences to be apparent in the many. It is impossible therefore, that neither the many should participate of the one, nor the one of the many.

If however, the one participates of the many, and the many of the one, and both these are in each other, itis necessary that there should be another nature besides these, which is neither one nor many.

ould participate of the one, nor the one of the many.

If however, the one participates of the many, and the many of the one, and both these are in each other, itis necessary that there should be another nature besides these, which is neither one nor many. For both these being mingled in each other, it is necessary that there should be a cause of their mixture which conjoins multitude to the one, and the one to multitude. For it is necessary that every thing that is mingled, should have a cause of the mixture. For in short, if the one and multitude participate of each other, neither the one is the cause of essence to multitude, nor multitude to the one, but a certain third thing is the cause of essence to both, and which is prior to these. For what will that be which makes this to be multitude, and that to be one ? And what is the cause of this communication and association with each other, the one so far as it is one never having any communication with the many ? For the many so far as many, and the one so far as one arc different from each other. And so far as neither is from neither, they have no sympathy with each other. What therefore is it which collects these into one, since they fly from and are unmingled with each other? For being thus discordant with each other, they cannot desire each other, or if they did their congress must be fortuitous. For if this should happen to be the case, there was a time when these were separate from each other, since now also they subsist together casually. It is however impossible for the many to subsist separate from the one. The mixture therefore is not casual. But neither is the mixture from the. many, if neither the one is the cause of the many, nor the many of the one. What, therefore is this more excellent thing [which is the cause of the mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But if indeed, it is the one itself, we must again inquire concerning this, whether it participates ofp. 99 multitude or of nothing. For if this participates, it is evident tbat some other thing prior to this, will for the same reason present itself to the view, and this will be the case to infinity. But if a thing of this kind is entirely roid of multitude, again that which was asserted at first will not be true, viz. that the many do not participate of the one, nor the one of the many. I mean however that which is the most principal and primarily one.