The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

as the middle centre in these Gods, or a termination converting the end of these divinities to their beginning, the one is similarly beyond every triple distribution. For the one would have parts, and would be many, if it participated of things of this kind. But it has been demonstrated that the one unically subsists prior to the many, and to wholeness together with its parts, as the cause of them. And you see how Parmenides indeed exhibits to us one negation of the highest order, but two negations of the middle, and three of the last order. Besides this also, he shows that the one has no extremity.

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BOOK 11.

But the infinite is a thing of this kind. And separately from this he likewise shows that the one is unreceptive of all figures.

Again therefore, after these triple orders we must direct our attention to the intellectual Gods subsisting from these, and receiving a tripartite division, and must demonstrate that the one transcends these also. For such is the one, says Parmenides, since it is neither in itself, nor in another. For if it were in another, it would be on all sides comprehended by that in which it is, and would every where touch that which comprehends it. But in this case, it would have a figure, would consist of parts, and on this account would be many and not one. And if it were in itself * it would entirely comprehend itself in itself. But comprehending and at the same time being comprehended, it will be two, and will be no longer primarily one. The discourse therefore proceeds to the same conclusion, and evinces that the one will not be one, by the summit of the intellectual order, if any one endeavours to mingle it with other things. Hence the one being perfectly exempt from this summit also, gives subsistence to it, this summit at one and the same time participating of the third of the Gods placed above it, but being produced from the second of these Gods, and being perfected from the first, and entirely established in it.

Moreover, the one likewise generates the second intellectual order, being unmingled with it. For the one neither stands still, nor is moved. It participates therefore of neither of these ; but being similarly exempt from both, it at the same time transcends the middle orders of the intellectual progression of the Gods. For if it were moved, it would be moved in a twofold respect, viz. either according to a change in quality, or local motion.

but being similarly exempt from both, it at the same time transcends the middle orders of the intellectual progression of the Gods. For if it were moved, it would be moved in a twofold respect, viz. either according to a change in quality, or local motion. But it is not possible that the one can be changed in quality ; for being thus changed it will be not one, and will fall off from a unical hyparxis. Nor can it be locally moved. For it is impossible that it should be moved in a circle, because it would have parts, viz. middle and extremes. And if it changed one place for another it would be partible. For it would be necessary that it should neither be wholly in that place to which it is moved, nor in that whence it begins to be moved. For if it were wholly in either of them, it would be immoveable, in consequence of partly not yet being moved, and partly having now ceased

CHAP. XII. OP PLATO. 143

its motion. But if the one stands still, it is certainly necessary that it should abide in the same thing. But it has been demonstrated that the one is no where. Hence it is neither in itself, nor in another thing. In no respect therefore is the one moved, or does it stand still, which things [viz. motion and permanency] particularly belong to the middle order of intellectuals, as will be evident from the second hypothesis. For the first God produces this order also, being exempt from it.

In the third place, we may survey through what next follows, the last order of intellectuals, proceeding from the one, and subordinate to it. For in,this order sameness and difference subsist unitedly. But at the same time the one subsists prior to both these. For different is said to be different both from itself and from other things. And in a similar manner same is the same with itself, and with other things. But the one is not indeed different from itself, because that which is different from the one will be not one. And it is not the same with other things, lest becoming the same with them, it should latently pass into their nature. Moreover, neither is the one different from other things. For it would be at the same time one, and would have as an addition the power of difference. For so far as it is different it will not be one; since difference is not the one. Hence being one and different, it will be many and not the one. Nor is the one the same with itself. For if the one and the same differ only in name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness with each other.

erence is not the one. Hence being one and different, it will be many and not the one. Nor is the one the same with itself. For if the one and the same differ only in name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness with each other. For it is impossible that the many should become one by participating of the many. But if the one and sameness are essentially different, that which is primarily one does not participate of sameness, lest by receiving sameness in addition to the one, it should become a passive one, and not that which is primarily one. If however the extremity of intellectuals is characterized by this tetrad, it is evident that the one existing beyond this also supernally unfolds it into light, and places over the wholes of the universe a tetradic monad, the source of ornament to all secondary natures. For from hence other things primarily receive a communication with the one which are also indeed produced and connectedly contained by the one.

But after the intellectual Gods, the ineffable transcendency of the one

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK If.

arranges the extent of the supermundane divinities, the one in the mean time, being occultly exempt from its supermundane progeny. And this extent indeed proximately subsists from the intellectual Gods, but uniformly receives its hyparxis from the first God. This, therefore, Parmenides produces through similitude and dissimilitude, from the deity which encloses the boundary of the intellectual monads. For the similar is that which is passive to sameness, in [the same manner as dissimilitude is that which is passive to difference. Parmenides therefore demonstrates that the one transcends according to one simplicity such a peculiarity of the Gods also as this. For that which is established above the power of same and different, in a much greater degree transcends the genera which are allotted a subsistence according to similitude and dissimilitude.

What therefore remains after this ? Is it not evident that it is the multitude of the mundane Gods ? But this also is twofold, the one being celestial, but the other sublunary. Of these, therefore, the genus which revolves in the heavens, proceeds together with the equal, the greater and the less. But in the sublunary genus the equal is allotted a difference in multitude from the celestial equality, but the unequal is again divided by the power of the more and the less.