The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

es supernally as far as to the last dependencies ; yet it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.

My reasoning is also the same about each of the whole spheres, and about the bodies they contain. For all these imitate the whole heaven, since these likewise have a perpetual allotment; and with respect to the sublunary elements, they have not entirely an essential mutation, but they abide in the universe according to their wholenesses, and contain in themselves partial animals. For every wholeness has posterior to itself more partial essences. As, therefore, in the heavens, the number of the stars proceeds together with the whole spheres, and as in the earth the multitude of partial terrestrial animals subsists together with their wholeness, thus also it appears to me to be necessary that in the wholes which have

• For atxt ivtgytta, read, etfi cur mgytia.

* The sense requires lliat f.MU should be here wpplied.

CHAP. XIII.

OF PLATO.

an intermediate subsistence, each element should be filled up with appropriate numbers. For how in the extremes can wholes which subsist prior to parts, be arranged together with parts, unless there is the same analogy of them in the intermediate natures ?

But if each of the spheres is an animal, and is always established after the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, as possessing life indeed, it will always primarily participate of soul, but as preserving its own order immutable in the world, it will be comprehended by intellect, and as one and a whole, and the leader and ruler of its proper parts, it will be illuminated by divine union. Not only the universe, therefore, but each also of its perpetual parts is animated and endued with intellect, and as much as possible is similar to the universe.' For each of these parts is a universe with respect to its kindred multitude. In short, there is indeed one corporeal-formed wholeness of the universe, but there arc many others under this, depending on this one ; there is one soul of the universe, and after this, other souls, together with this disposing in an orderly manner the whole parts of the universe with undefiled purity ; one intellect, and an intellectual number under this, participated by these souls ; and one god who connectedly contains at once all mundane and supermundane1 natures, and a multitude of other gods, who distribute intellectual essences, and the souls suspended from these, and all the parts of the world.

nder this, participated by these souls ; and one god who connectedly contains at once all mundane and supermundane1 natures, and a multitude of other gods, who distribute intellectual essences, and the souls suspended from these, and all the parts of the world. For it is not to be supposed that each of the productions of nature is generative of things similar to itself, but that wholes and the first of mundane beings should not in a much greater degree extend in themselves the paradigm of a generation of this kind. For the similar is more allied, and more naturally adapted to the reason of cause than the dissimilar, in the same manner as the same than the different, and bound than the infinite. These things, however, we shall accurately survey in what follows. But we shall now direct our attention to the second of the things demonstrated in the Laws, viz. that the Gods providentially attend at once to wholes and parts, and shall summarily

' Instead of tftam fu] xmra. luittftn, it is necessary to read k%% xora fc/vapir rtf veam tfvm», ts both, the sense of the whole sentence and the version of Portus require.

' It seems requisite to supply here the word uxi'jx$&fmt> sii in ill© trails mi ion.

p. 43

OH THE THEOLOGY

BOOK L

discuss the irreprehensible conception of Plato -about the providence of the Gods.

CHAPTER XIV.

Fhom what has "been said, therefore, it is evident to every one, that the Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and vivific, according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic power. But others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very being all secondary* natures to the perfection of life, according to the fountain and principle of all second and third progressions of motion. And others are unical, or characterized by unity, deifying by participation all the whole genera of themselves, according to a primary, all-perfect, and unknown power of energy, and who are the leaders of one kind of motion, but are not the principle of another. But again others supply to secondary natures motion according to place or quality, but arc essentially the causes of motion to themselves. For every thing which is the cause of essence to other things is much prior to this the cause to itself of its own proper energies and perfection.

secondary natures motion according to place or quality, but arc essentially the causes of motion to themselves. For every thing which is the cause of essence to other things is much prior to this the cause to itself of its own proper energies and perfection. Farther still, that which is self-motive is again the principle of motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to every thing in the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds of motion, but the progression into being is from soul, and by a much greater priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life of self-motive natures and precedes according to cause all temporal energy. And in a still greater degree do motion, being, and life proceed from a unical hy pant is, which connectedly contains intellect and soul, is the source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the last of things. For of life iudecd, not all the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor of intellect and a gnostic power ; but of the one all things participate, as far

• For bvrffw read fevnga.

p. 49

as to matter itself, both wholes and parts, things which subsist according to nature, and the contraries to these ; and there is not any thing which is deprived of a cause of this kind, nor can any thing ever participate of being, if it is deprived of the one. If, therefore, the Gods produce all things, and contain all things, in the unknown comprehensions of themselves, how is it possible there should not be a providence of all things iu these comprehensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most partial natures ? For it is every where fit that offspring should enjoy the providential care of their causes. But all alter-motive are the progeny of self-motive natures. And things which subsist in time, cither in the whole of time, or in a part of it, are the effects of eternal natures ; because that which always is, is the cause of that which sometimes exists. And divine and unical genera, as they give subsistence to all multiplied natures, precede them in existence. In short, there is no essence, or multitude of powers, which is not allotted iu generation from the one. It is necessary, therefore, that all these should be partakers of the providence of preceding causes, being vivified indeed from the psychical gods, and circulating according to temporal periods ; and participating of sameness and at the same time a stable condition of forms from the intellectual gods ;' but receiving into themselves the presence of union, of