The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

st hyparxes are united to that which is first, and always participate of its exuberant fulness ; and this not so far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cause of all disseminated in all things impressions of his own all-perfect transcendency, and through these establishes all things about himself, and being exempt from the whole of things, is ineffably present to all things. Every thing therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature, finds there the symbol of the father of all. All tilings too naturally venerate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate mystic impression, divesting themselves of their own nature, and hastening to become his impression alone, and to participate him alone, through the desire of

CHAP. IX.

OF PLATO.

p. 133

his unknown nature, and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cause, tlicy become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the desire which all things naturally possess of goodness unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and transcendent] v full. But that what is here said is concerning the first God, and that Plato in these conceptions leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other causes, has been, I think, sufficiently evinced.

CHAPTER IX.

Let us in the next place consider each of the dogmas, and adapt them to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these we may comprehend by a reasoning process, the scope of the whole of Plato's theology. Let then one truth concerning the first principle be especially that which celebrates his ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature ; which establishes all things about him, but does not assert that he generates or pro* duces any thing, or that he presubsists as the end of things posterior to himself. For such a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is established above all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short, does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which subsist after him.

ion, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short, does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which subsist after him.

Such then being this indication of the first God, and such the manner in which it venerates the ineffable, the second to this is that which converts all the desires of things to him, and celebrates him as the object of desire to and common end of all things, according to one cause which precedes all other causes. For the last of things subsists only for the sake of something else, but the first is that only for the sake of which all other things subsist : and all the intermediate natures participate of these t

p. 134

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK U.

two peculiarities. Hence they genuinely adhere to the natures which surpass them, as objects of desire, but impart the perfection of desires to subordinate beings.

The third speculation of the principle of things is far inferior to tlie preceding, considering him as giving subsistence to all beautiful things. For to celebrate him as the supplier of good, and as end preceding tlie two orders of things, * not very remote from the narration which says, that all causes are posterior to him, and derive their subsistence from him, as well those which ace paternal, and the sources of good, as those that are the suppliers of prolific powers. But to ascribe to him a producing and generative cause, is still more remote from the all-perfect union of the first. For as it cannot be known or discussed by language, by secondary natures, it must not he said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of beings, but we should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly causeless cause which is prior to all causes. If, however, as we endeavour to ascribe to him the good and the one, we in like manner attribute to him cause, and that which is fin*l or paternal, we must pardon the parturition of the soul about this ineffable principle, aspirin? to perceive hkn with the •eye of intellect, and to speak about him ; but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency of the one which is immense, must be considered as surpassing an indication of this kind. From these things therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order* adapted to things themselves.

but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency of the one which is immense, must be considered as surpassing an indication of this kind. From these things therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order* adapted to things themselves. And we may say that the first part of this sentence sufficiently indicates the simplicity,* transcendency, ami in short the uncoordination with all things of the king of alL For the assertion that all things -subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things second, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any connexion with things posterior to it But the second part celebrates the cause of all the Gods* as prearranged in the order of end. For that which is the highest of aU causes, is immediately conjoined with that which is prior to cause; but of this kind is the final cause, and that for the sake of which

• For *fa$ iv, k is necessary to read t«£ w.
' For t>)( aiXffTi^r»{ I read T^t ««Xvn]ra.
3 For tw liov, it is necessary to read tmf 9»«r.

CHAP. IX.

OF PLATO.

all things subsist This part therefore is posterior to the otW, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Platonic doctrine.

Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a species of cause 1 inferior to the final. Whence also Plotmus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first God the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is the good. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about the good, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of eause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed the good ineffable, as it Is fit it should, but from the habitude of things- posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause : for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of the goodr it excites in us the conception of the communion andi co-ordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that the good is the cause of alh beautiful things.