The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

is established above opinion, as Timaeus informs us, and not Timaeus only, but likewise the daemoniacal Aristotle, who, discoursing on a power of this kind, exhorts us to make our investigations, ueitber about things perfectly unapparent to us, nor about such as are more known.

It is far therefore from being the case, that Parmenides, who places the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those who rank sense before intellect, should introduce doxastic knowledge to an intellective nature, since a knowledge of this kind is dubious, various, and unstable ; or that he- should speculate true being with this doxastie

■ For nurrcXoi, it if uecxttuj to read rr<0»A«f.

wisdom, and inane discussion. For a varioiw fnrm ~f i , , not harmonise' with th*r *,hi,h " • ?^ rf knofW8« docs

., ,a\ Umt whlch *« simple, nor the multiform with t)„ un.fonn, nor the doxastic with the intelligible lth

But still further, nor must this be omitted, that such » mnA ^ course i, perfectly foreign from the discussion of discourses about all beings and deliver, the order of *ZT\u

Does it not therefore appear, *a Plato nZ £ Z ant hypothesis to Parme^es, if it ^ 8aTd th^ L^"^ * dUcorfexercise through opposite arguments, and tha^ tLTkl of T* ^ employed in this exercise, he excites the- whole of ^ evil IT"

attributes hypotheses to each of the pWIosonhenLaL**^ bar tenets. Thus to TW»* _ jg}LL^flVnio their pecu- Sf^T-atp^diMtf ^^^^p^^P^ffffT^TiTthp. doctrine about nature ; to Republic; to the Elean guest, that about being ; and to the priestess Diotiraa, that respecting love. Afterwards, each of the other dialogues confines itself to those arguments which are adapted to the writings of the principal person of the dialogue. But Parmenides alone will appear to us wise in his poems, and in his diligent investigation of true being, but in the Platonic scene, he will be the leader of a juvenile muse. This opinion, therefore, accuses Plato of dissimilitude of imitation, though he himself condemns the poets, for ascribing to the sons of the Gods a love of money, and a life subject to the dominion of the passions. How, therefore, can we refer a discussion of doxastic and empty arguments to the leader of the truth of beings ?

But if it be necessary that omitting a multitude of arguments, we should make Plato himself a witness of the proposed discussion, we will cite if you please what is written in the Thcaetetus and Sophista ; for from these dialogues what we assert will be apparent In the Tbesetetus 2that omitting a multitude of arguments, we should make Plato himself a witness of the proposed discussion, we will cite if you please what is written in the Thcaetetus and Sophista ; for from these dialogues what we assert will be apparent In the Tbesetetus then Socrates being excited by a young man to a confutation of those who assert that being is immoveable, attacks among these an opinion of this kind

■ For pm* cLfiuHrnot, it is necemry to rod t»k$

entertained by Parmenides, and at the same time assigns the cause. " I blush," says he, " for Parmeoides, who is one of these, more than for all the rest ; for I, when very young, was conversant with him when ■he was very elderly, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profundity perfectly generous. 1 am afraid therefore, lest we do not understand what, has been asserted, and much more am I fearful that we fall short of the meaning of Parmenides." With great propriety therefore do we assert, that the proposed discussion does not regard a logical exercise, and make this the end of the whole, but that it pertains to the science of the first principles of things. For how could Socrates using a power of this kind, and neglecting the knowledge of things, testify that the discourse of Parmenides possessed a depth perfectly generous P And what venerableness can there be in adopting a method which proceeds doxastically through opposite reasons, and in undertaking such an invention of arguments ?

Again, in the Sophista, exciting the Elean guest to a perspicuous evolution of the things proposed by him, and evincing that he was now Accustomed to more profound discourses : " Inform me," says he, " whether it is your custom to give a prolix discussion of a subject which you are able to demonstrate to any one by interrogations ; I mean such discussions as Parmenides himself formerly used, accompanied with all-beautiful reasons, and of which I was an auditor when I was very young, and he was very elderly ?" What, reason then can be assigned, why we should not believe Socrates, when he asserts that the arguments of Parmenides were all-beautiful, and possessed a generous profundity, and why we should degrade the discussion of Parmenides, hurl it from essence and being, and transfer it to a vulgar, trifling, and empty contest, neither considering that discourses of this kind are alone adapted to youth, nor regarding the hypothesis of being characterized by the «n«, nor any thing else which opposes such an opinion ?

But I likewise think it is proper 3gar, trifling, and empty contest, neither considering that discourses of this kind are alone adapted to youth, nor regarding the hypothesis of being characterized by the «n«, nor any thing else which opposes such an opinion ?

But I likewise think it is proper that the authors of this hypothesis, should consider the power of dialectic, such as it is exhibited by Socrates in the Republic ; — how, as he says, it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and elevates those that use it, to the good itself, and Proc. Vol. I. D

■p. 36 the first unities, purifies the eje of the soul, establishes it in true being*, and the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is no longer hypothetical. For if the power of this dialectic is so great, and the end of this path so mighty, it is not proper to confound doxastic arguments, with a method of this kind. For the former regards the opinions of men, but the latter is called garrulity by the vulgar. And the one is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science, but the other is the defensive enclosure of such sciences, and the passage to it is through these. Again, the doxastic method of reasoning has for its end * the apparent, but the dialectic method endeavours to arrive at the one itself, always employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and at last, beautifully ends in the nature of the good.

By no means therefore, is it fit that we should draw down to doxastic arguments, a method which is established among the most accurate sciences. For the merely logical method which presides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and is alone pleased with contentious discussions ; but our dialectic, for the most part, employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and as imitating the progres* sion of beings from the one, and their conversion to it again. But it likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method, and the dividing method prior to this. On the contrary, the doxastic method is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of demonstration. Is it not, therefore, necessary that these powers must be separated from each other, and that the discussion of Parmenides, winch employs our dialectic, must be free from the empty variety of mere argument, and must fabricate its reasonings with a view to being itself, and not to that which is apparent? And thus much may suffice in answer to those who reprobate our hypotheses.