The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

t all things are for the sake of the goodr it excites in us the conception of the communion andi co-ordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that the good is the cause of alh beautiful things. But this to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and- not to abide in the conceptions of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. Pork is not possible to say any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from' all things, and at another from the best of things : for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, and unfolds its own separate union through the peculiarities of these. We ascribe to it therefore the one and the good, from the donation which pervades to all things from it. For of those' things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But the about which (™ npi «,) the

' For muty it u ocewwry to rtad «ur»<j.

■

!36 ON THE THEOIX)GY BOOK II.

on account of which (to h, o *), and the from which (n a^'ov,) particularly subsist in the intelligible Gods : and from these they are ascribed to the first God. For whence can we suppose the unical Gods derive their peculiarities, except from that which is prior to them ? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term about is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term on account of which pertains to the middle order of intelligibles : for all things subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis perfectly entire. And the term from which is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles : for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly. These things, therefore, we shall indeed make more known in the doctrine which will shortly follow concerning the intelligible Gods.

CHAPTER X.

In the next place, let us finish the discussion concerning the first God, with the theory of Parmcnidcs, and unfold the mystic conceptions of the first hypothesis as far as pertains to the present purpose. For we shall refer the reader for the most perfect interpretation of them to our commentaries on that dialogue.

the first God, with the theory of Parmcnidcs, and unfold the mystic conceptions of the first hypothesis as far as pertains to the present purpose. For we shall refer the reader for the most perfect interpretation of them to our commentaries on that dialogue. In the first place therefore, it is requisite to determine this concerning the first hypothesis, that it comprehends as many conclusions negatively, as the hypothesis which follows it does affirmatively. For this latter demonstrates all the orders proceeding from the one ; but the former evinces that the one is exempt from all the divine genera. From both these hypotheses however, it is obvious to every one how it is necessary that the cause of the whole of things should transcend his productions. For because the one is the cause of all the Gods, he

• For fc- du it is necessary to read If o i since the former denotes the inttrumtntal, but the latter HbgJhuU cause.

CHAP. X.

OF PLATO.

p. 137

transcends all things. And because he is exempt from them through transcendency, on this account he gives to all things their hypostases. For through being expanded aboveaall things he causes all things to subsist. Since in the second and third orders also of beings, causes which are entirely exempt from their effects, more perfectly generate and connect their progeny than those causes do which are coordinate with their effects. And the one by ineffably producing all the divine orders, appears to be unically established above all. For in the productions posterior to it, cause is every where different from the things caused. And on this account nature indeed being incorporeal, is a cause which transcends bodies ; but soul being perfectly perpetual, is the cause of things generated ; and intellect being immoveable is the cause of every thing that is moved. If, therefore, according to each progression of beings effects are denied of their causes, it is certainly necessary to take away all things similarly from the cause of all.

In the second place, I think it is necessary that the order of the nega» tions should be defined by those who receive theology according to the intention of Parmenides ; and that it should be admitted that they proceed indeed from the monads which subsist primarily in the divine genera, and that Parmenides takes away from the one all second and third natures, according to an order adapted to each. For that which transcends more principal causes must in a much greater degree subsist prior to those that are subordinate.

ly in the divine genera, and that Parmenides takes away from the one all second and third natures, according to an order adapted to each. For that which transcends more principal causes must in a much greater degree subsist prior to those that are subordinate. Parmenides, however, does not begin his negations from the Gods that are united to the first: for this genus is with difficulty distinguished from the one : because being arranged naturally [immediately] after it, it is most unical and occult, and transcendency similar to its pro* ducing cause. Parmenides therefore beginning where prior to all other things division and multitude are apparent, and proceeding regularly through all the second orders as far as to the last of things, again returns to the beginning, and shows how the one differs from the Gods that are most similar to it, and which primarily participate of it, according to one ineffable cause.

In the third place, in addition to what has been said, I determine concerning the mode of negations, that they are not privative of their sub- Proc. Vol. I. S

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK II.

jects, but generative of things which are as it were their opposites. For because the first principle is not many, the many proceed from it, and because it is not a whole, wholeness proceeds from it, and in a similar manner in other things. And in thus determining, I speak conformably to Plato, who thinks it proper to abide in negations, and to add nothing to the one. For whatever you add, you diminish the one, and afterwards evince that it is not the one, but that which is passive to [or participates] the one. For it is thus not one only, but in addition to this possesses something else also by participation. This mode therefore of negations is exempt, unical, primary, and is a departure from the whole of things, in an unknown and ineffable transcendency of simplicity. It is likewise necessary, having attributed such a mode as this to the first God, again to exempt him from the negations also. For neither does any discourse, nor any name belong to the one, says Parmenides. But if no discourse belongs to it, it is evident that neither does negation pertain to it. For all things are secondary to the one, things knowable and knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge, and after a manner that which is impossible presents itself at the end of the hypothesis. For if nothing whatever can be said of the one, neither is this discussion itself adapted to the one.