The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ogle

CHAP. XIII.

OF PLATO.

p. 251

intellectual perceptions adhesions. We should not therefore be carried from things first to things last, nor compare the highest order of intellectuals with the last of beings, above which both soul and nature are established. For in so doing we shall err, and shall not attend to Plato, who exclaims that it is boldness to assert these things concerning it. For where is the boldness, and what the unknown power transcending our conceptions, in contemplating the truth of sensible colours, figures, and contacts. For an hypostasis of this kind is known by physiologists, and not by the sons of theoiogists. Such therefore is the power possessed by the negations through which Plato celebrates the supercelestial place.

CHAPTER XIII.

Again then, let us in the next place survey the affirmations, how they exist according to the participation of the first intclligiblcs themselves. The supercelestial place therefore, is said to be essence which truly is, because it participates of that which is primarily being. For to be, and truly to be are present to all things, as the progeny of the intelligible essence. For as the one is from the first principle which is prior to intelligibles, so the nature of being is from intelligibles. For there the one being subsists, as Parmcnides a little before taught us. But the supercelestial place is beheld by the governor of the soul, because it is allotted an intelligible transcendency with respect to the other intellectual Gods. Hence the intelligible good of it is rendered manifest from its being known by intellect. This intelligible therefore, in the same manner as that which is truly being, arrives to it from the unical Gods. For they are primarily and impnrticipably intelligibles, and the first efficient causes of all intelligibles. These things also concur with each other, viz. that which is truly being, and the intelligible. For everyp. 552 intelligible is truly being, and every thing which is truly being is intelligible. For intellect is intelligible according to the being which is in it ; but according to its gnostic power it is intellect. Hence also every intellect is the supplier of knowledge ; but every intelligible is the supplier of essence. For that which each is primarily, it imparts by illumination to tbe secondary orders.

CHAFfER XIV.

In tbe third place therefore, the genus of true science is said to be established about tbe superceleslial place. For these two things ascend to the contemplation of that essence, viz.

primarily, it imparts by illumination to tbe secondary orders.

CHAFfER XIV.

In tbe third place therefore, the genus of true science is said to be established about tbe superceleslial place. For these two things ascend to the contemplation of that essence, viz. intellect the governor of the soul (but this is a partial intellect established indeed above souls, and elevating them to their paternal port) and true science which is the perfection of the soul. This therefore energies about that place, as transitively revolving in harmonic measures about being. But intellect contemplates it, as employing simple intellection. Farther still, the science which is in us is one thing, but that which is in the supercelestial place another. And the former indeed is true, but the latter is truth itself. What therefore is it, and whence does it subsist ? It is indeed a deity which is the fountain of all intellectual knowledge, and the 6rst efficient cause of undented and stable intelligence.' But it shines forth in the first triad of intellectuals, because this is perfective of all other things and likewise of divine souls. For these ascending to this uniform power of all knowledge, perfect their own knowledge. For each of the undefined souls, says Socrates, revolving together with Jupiter and tbe heaven, surveys justice, temperance and science. Hence, these three fountains are there, being intelligible deities, and the fountains of the ' - «

1 For nM»{ it i* neewsary to read r*y«>ip. 253intellectual virtues, and not being, as some think they are, intellectual forms. For Plato is accustomed to characterize these by the term itself, as for instance science itself and justice itself; and this Socrates says somewhere in the Phaedo. But here when he says justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself, he appears to unfold 10 us certain self-perfect and intelligible deities, which have a triadic subsistence. And of these scienee indeed is the monad ; but temperance has the second order ; and justice the third. And science indeed is the supplier of undefiled, firm and immutable intelligence ; but temperance imparts to all the Gods the cause of conversion to themselves ; and justice imparts to them the cause of the distribution of the whole of good according to desert.

And science indeed is the supplier of undefiled, firm and immutable intelligence ; but temperance imparts to all the Gods the cause of conversion to themselves ; and justice imparts to them the cause of the distribution of the whole of good according to desert. Aud through science indeed, each of the Gods intellectually pcrceives the natures prior to himself, and is filled with intelligible intelligence ; ' but through temperance he is converted to himself, and enjoys a second union, and a good coordinate to the conversion to himself ; and through justice he rules over the natures posterior to himself, in a silent path, as they say, measures their desert, and supplies a distribution adapted to each. These three fountains therefore contain all the energies of the Gods. And science indeed proceeds analogous to the first triad of intelligibles. And as that triad imparts essence to all things, so this illuminates the Gods with knowledge. But temperance proceeds analogous to the second triad of intelligibles. For temperance imitates the connective and measuring power of that triad ; since it measures the energies of the Gods, and converts each of them to itself. And justice proceeds analogous to the third triad of intelligibles. For it also separates secondary natures according to appropriate desert,* in the same manner as that triad separates them intelligibly by the first paradigms.

• Here also it is requisite to adopt the same reading as before, p. 258.

* Instead of xtera tv xyw)x»uc<cy nuirj, ft seems requisite to read k«t« m» wftvuxarjeay

2.54

ON THE THEOLOGY

CHAPTER XV.

BOOK IV.

After these things therefore, we may survey another triad preexisting in this place, which also Socrates celebrates, viz. the plain of truth, the meadow, and the nutriment of the Gods. The plain of truth therefore, is intellectually expanded to intelligible light, and is splendid with the illuminations that proceed from thence. For as the one emits by illumination intelligible light, so the intelligible imparts to secondary natures a participation productive of essence. But the meadow is the prolific power of life, and of all-various reasons, is the comprehension of the first efficient causes of life, and is the cause of the variety, and generation of forms. For the meadows also which are here are productive of all-various forms and reasons, and bear water which is the symbol of vivification.