The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK I

CHAPfER XVII.

That therefore, which has the hyparxis of itself, and the whole of its essence defined in the good, and which by its very being produces all things, must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no evil. For if there was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps some one might say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that he does not impart to beings every good. If, however, not only every God is good, but that which is primarily boniforra and beneficent is God, (for that which is primarily good will not be the second after the Gods, because every where, things which have a secondary subsistence, receive the peculiarity of their hyparxis from those that subsist primarily)— this being the case, it is perfectly necessary that divinity should be the cause of good, and of all such goods as proceed into secondary descents, as far as to the last of things, lor as the power which is the cause of life, gives subsistence to all life, as the power which is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as well tl>e beauty which is in words, as that which is in the phenomena, and thus every primary cause produces all similars from itself and binds to itself the one hypostasis of things which subsist according to one form,— after the same manner I think the first and most principal good, and uniform hyparxis, establishes in and about itself, the causes and comprehensions of all goods at once. Nor is there any thing good which does not possess this power from it, nor beneficent which being converted to it, does not participate of this cause. For all goods are from thence produced, perfected and preserved ; and the one series and order of universal good, depends on that fountain. Through the same cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers of all good, and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsistence to every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment contrary to itself; since that which is productive of life, is not the cause of the privation of life, and that which is the source of beauty is exempt from the nature of that which is void of beauty and is deformed, and from

CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 5g

the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny ; but the nature of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform.

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CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 5g

the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny ; but the nature of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform.

And the divine cause indeed of goods is established eternally in itself, extending to all secondary natures, an unenvying and exuberant participation of good. Of its participants, however, some preserve the participation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good in undented bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess inevitably an allotment of goods adapted to them. But those natures which are arranged in the last of the whole of things, entirely indeed enjoy according to their nature the goodness of the Gods ; for it is not possible that things perfectly destitute of good should either have a being, or subsist at first ; but receiving an efflux of this kind, they neither preserve the gift which pervades to them, pure and unmingled, nor do they retain their proper good stably, and with invariable sameness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material, and filled with the privation of vitality of their subject, they exhibit to order indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue, the contrary to it, vice. And with respect indeed to the natures which rank as wholes,' each of these is exempt from a perversion of this kind, things more perfect in them always having dominion according to nature. But partial natures through a diminution of power always diverging 1 into multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed the participation of good, but substitute the contrary in the mixture with good, and which is van. quished by the combination. For neither here is it lawful for evil to subsist / unmingled, and perfectly destitute of good ; but though some particular thing may be evil to a part, yet it is entirely good to the whole and to the universe. For the universe is always happy, and always consists of perfect parts, and which subsist according to nature. But that which is preternatural is always evil to partial natures, and deformity, privation of symmetry, perversion, and a resemblance of subsistence are in these. For that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from its proper perfection, but to the universe it is incorruptible and indestructible.

' For aM«n it is necessary to read o\x*.
1 For rfifiaiKirrst read txfbuwna.

CO ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.

, is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from its proper perfection, but to the universe it is incorruptible and indestructible.

' For aM«n it is necessary to read o\x*.
1 For rfifiaiKirrst read txfbuwna.

CO ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.

And every thing which is deprived of good, so fur indeed- as pertains to itself, and its own subsistence, is deprived of it through imbecility of na-

\ turc ; but it is good to the whole, and so far as it is a part of the universe' For it is not possible that either a privation of life, or deformity and imy moderation, or in short privation can be inserted in the universe ; but its whole number is always perfect, being held together by the goodness of wholes. And life is every where present, together with existence, and the being perfect, so far as each thing gives completion to the whole. Di. vinity therefore, as we have said, is the cause 1 of good ; but the shadowy subsistence of evil does not subsist from power, but from the imbecility of the natures which receive the illuminations of the Gods. Nor is evil in wholes, but in partial natures, nor yet in all these. For the first of partial natures and partial intellectual genera are eternally boniform. But the media among these, and which energize according to time, connecting the participation of the good with temporal mutation and motion, are incapable of preserving the gift of the Gods immoveable, uniform and simple; by their variety obscuring* the simplicity of this gift, by their multiform its uniform nature, and by their commixture its purity and incorruptibility. For they do not consist of incorruptible first generar v.ox have they a simple essence, nor uniform powers, but such as arc composed of the contraries to these, as Socrates somewhere says in the Phaedrus. And the last of partial natures and which are also materia), in a much greater degree pervert their proper good. For they are mingled with a privation of life, and have a subsistence resembling that of an image, since it is replete with much of non-entity, consists of things hostile

I to each other, and of circumstances which are mutable and dispersed through the whole of time, so that they never cease to evince in every thing that they are given up to corruption, privation of symmetry, deformity, and all-various mutations, being not only extended in their energies, like the natures prior to them, but being replete both in their powers and energies with that which is preternatural, and with material imbecility.