The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

lescing into the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the

CHAP. IX.

OF PLATO.

p. 173

uniform from bound, but the generative, and in short, occult multitude from infinity. For it is all things occultly, and on this account, is the cause of all beings ; which also the Elcan guest indicating to us, calls being the first power, as subsisting according to the participation of the first power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power from infinity. Afterwards however, the Elcan guest defines being to be power, as prolific and generative of all things, and as being all things uniformly. For power is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power indeed being the cause of occult multitude : but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude. Through this cause therefore, I think, that every being, and every essence has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity. -And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being is one many. The many however subsist occultly and without separation in the first natures ; but with separation in secondary natures. For by Bow much being is nearer to the one, by so much the more does it conceal multitude, and is defined according to union alone. It appears to me also that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form ' as analogous to the one, and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter. And if indeed they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they appear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it. But being consists of both these, as not only standing in the one, but receiving a multitude of unities and powers which are mingled into one essence.

' For w\tfti in the original it is necessary to read

p. 174

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK If I

CHAPTER X.

That therefore which is primarily being is through these things denominated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude of it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity.

is necessary to read

p. 174

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK If I

CHAPTER X.

That therefore which is primarily being is through these things denominated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude of it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity. And the infinite indeed in this is imperfect power; but the bound in it is form and the morphe of this power. On this account we establish this power to be matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to be bounded by something else. We no longer however say that it is lawful to call the power of being matter, since it is generative of energies, produces all beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers in beings. For the power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly imitates the power of being; and becoming multitude in capacity, it expresses the parturition of multitude in the power of being." Moreover, the form of matter imitates ultimately bound, since it gives limits to matter, and terminates its infinity. But it is multiplied and divided about it. It is also miugled with the privation of matter, and represents the supreme union of the hyparxis of being, by its essence always advancing to existence, and always tending to decay. For those things which subsist in the first natures according to transcendency, are in such as are last according to deficiency. For that also which is primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of infinite life, and is the cause of it. But that which consists of the last ' of forms and the first matter, is in its own nature void of life ; since it possesses life in capacity. For there indeed generative causes subsist prior to their progeny, and things perfect prior to such as are imperfect. But here things in capacity are prior to such as are in energy, and concauses

' The punctuation in the latter part of this sentence in the original is erroneous : for instead of x<u tv «v fwnjrotf nXt)twf «W Suwfui ynw/MHj, re »Xi{<0f «*«x<w*T», it should be xcu n]» n txtivp tow wfcjfotff o£i»* Sowifif i yoojWKfl to »Xi]»of , owuxau-aro.

* For wgonw here, it is necessary to read Tot in this place, Froclus is speaking of body.

CHAP. X.

OF PLATO.

p. 175

are subject to the things which are produced from them. This however, I think, happens naturally, because the gifts of the first principles pervade as far as to the last of things, and not only generate more perfect natures, but also such as have a more imperfect subsistence.

e things which are produced from them. This however, I think, happens naturally, because the gifts of the first principles pervade as far as to the last of things, and not only generate more perfect natures, but also such as have a more imperfect subsistence. And on this account that which is mixed is the cause of generation, and of the nature which is mingled here. The bound and infinity however, which are prior to being, are not only the causes of this nature, but also of the elements of it, of which that which is mixed is not the cause, so far as it is mixed. For bound and infinity are twofold. And one kind of these is exempt from the things mingled, but another kind is assumed to the completion of the mixture. For I think it is every where necessary that prior to things that are mingled, there should be such as are unmingled, prior to things imperfect, such as are perfect, prior to parts, wholes, and prior to things that are in others, such as are in themselves ; and this Socrates persuades us to admit not in one thing only, but also in beauty and symmetry, and in all forms. If therefore the second and third genera of being and forms subsist prior to their participants, how can we assert that bound and infinity which pervade through all beings have their first subsistence as things mingled ? It must be admitted therefore, that they are unmingled and separate from being, and that being is derived from them, and at the same time consists of them. It is derived from them indeed, because they have a prior subsistence ; but it consists of them, because they subsist in being according to a second progression.

The genera of being also are twofold ; some of them indeed being fabricative of beings, but others existing as the elements of the nature of each being. For some of them indeed presubsist themselves by themselves, as possessing a productive power ; but others being generated from these* constitute each particular being. Let no one therefore any longer wonder, how Socrates indeed in the Fhilebus establishes that which is mingled, prior to bound and infinity, but we on the contrary evince that bound and infinity are exempt from that which is mixed. For each is twofold, and the one indeed is prior to being, but the other is in being ; and the one is generative, but the other is the element of the mixture. Of this kind also, are the bound and infinity of the mixed life, each being the

p. 176

ON THE THEOLOGY

HOOK III.

element of the whole of felicity. Hence also each is indigent of each.