The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor
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discourse, however, suspends all things after the above mentioned manner from the good, and the first unity. "For if indeed the sun connects every thing sensible, but the good produces and perfects every thing intelligible, and of these, the second monad [i. e. the sun] is denominated the offspring of the good, and on this account causes that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills it with good, because it imitates the primogeuial cause of itself, — if this be the case, all things will thus participate of the good, and will be extended to this one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine of beings without a.medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun.]
Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in this extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle. For he suspends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful itself, all good things from the good, and all equal things from the equal itself. And again, he considers some things as intelligibles, but others as sensibles ; but the summits of them ait; uniformly established in intelligibles. Again, from these intelligible forms he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater degree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends
CHAP. VII.
OF PLATO.
p. 125
that nil intelligibles, and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad - uncoordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with intelligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their divine hyparxis.
IiCt not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same order of the good in intelligible forms, as there is prior to intelligibles. But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the forms which are in intelligibles. For the first good, which by conjoining the article with the noun we are accustomed to call royals* or the good, is admitted to be something superessential, and more excellent than all beings both in dignity and power ; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all the things which we then very re excellent than all beings both in dignity and power ; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all the things which we then very properly considered as many. Again, particularly considering each thing as being one, we denominate each thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading us from sensible tilings that arc beautiful and good, and in short from things that are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied, to the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences, from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing beautiful and good. For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader of many beautiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things beautiful, as Plato elsewhere says ; and " all things are for its sake, and it is the cause of every thing beautiful."
For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but the good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above all knowledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection ; but (he latter is the supplier, of good to the Gods so far as they arc Gods, and is
ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
generative of goods which are prior to essences. We must not therefore apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle the good, from the name of idea, that he dkectly calls it the intelligible goodness ; but though the first principle is superior to all language and appellation, we permit Socrates to call it the cause of every thing beautiful and good, transferring through the things which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it. For this I think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says about the good, that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known, and likewise beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the ,un. And after a certain admirable manner be presents us with an epitome of the negations of the one in the Parmeaides. For the assertion that the good is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one and the same time separates it from the supereaseotial unities, and every s of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and from every psychical subsistence.
tion that the good is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one and the same time separates it from the supereaseotial unities, and every s of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and from every psychical subsistence. But these axe the first things, and through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from the principle of the whole of things.
Moreover, neither when he celebrates the good the leader of the divine orders as the most splendid of being, does he denominate it most splendid as participating of light. For the first light proceeds from it to intelligibles and intellect, but he gives it this appellation as the cause of the light which is every where diffused, and as the fountain of every intelligible, or intellectual, or mundane deity. For this light is nothing else than the narticipation of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become boniform through participating of the good, and are filled with the illuminat.on pro. ceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are pnmanly beings are deiform • and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual essences become divine through the participation. of deity. Looking therefore to all that has been said, we shall preserve the exempt transcendency of the good with reference to all beings and the divine orders Bu aga.n ,n each order of beings, we must grant that there is a monad analogous to it, not onlv in sensibles, as Plato says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane natures and in the genera of Gods arranged from the good prior to these. For it is evident that the natures which are nearer to the first cause and
CHAP. VII.
OF PLATO.
which participate of it in a greater degree, possess a greater similitude to it. And as that is the cause of all beings, so these establish monads which are the leaders of more partial orders. And Plato indeed arranges the multitudes under the monads ; but extends all the monads to the exempt principle of the whole of things, and establishes them uniformly about it. It is necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfolded conformably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions about it should be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with other things.
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