The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ne will be passive ; for at the same time it will be one and not one, and will not be that which is one [only.] It is necessary, however, in each genus of things, that there should be that which is unminglcd with

' in, which are multitude only without any participation of the one.

CHAP. IV.

OF PLATO.

p. 113

an inferior nature, in order that there may be that which is mingled, in the same manner as we say respecting forms. For from the equal itself, things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal, though they are filled with a contrary nature ; and from that which is primarily being, that which is mingled with non-being is derived, and which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where th6 simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which through remission are mingled with the privations of themselves. The one therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude ; and that which is one, and at the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended ' from that which is primarily one ; through the principle, indeed, participating of the one, but through the diminution arising from multitude, now manifestly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation.

CHAPTER IV.

•

That the one therefore is the principle of all things, and the first cause, and that all other things are posterior to the one, is I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpreters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom, but do not venerate the ineffable transcendency of the one, and its hyparxis which surpasses the whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder that tliis should have been the case with Origen, who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinus. For Origen ends in intellect and the first being, but omits the one which is beyond every intellect and every being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things. But if he

1 For c£]pi|T«i it U necessary to read ffcymrraj. The punctuation also of the text in this place, tnust be altered agreeably to the translation.

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p. 114

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK If.

cordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things. But if he

1 For c£]pi|T«i it U necessary to read ffcymrraj. The punctuation also of the text in this place, tnust be altered agreeably to the translation.

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p. 114

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK If.

omits it because the one is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any subsistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot assent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and connumerate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innovation. If you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against this dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and we will strenuously contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that according to him the first cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt from all beings, as Plotinus and Porphyry, and all those who have received the philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert. *

We. shall begin, therefore, from the Republic ; for here Socrates clearly shows that the good is established above being, and the whole intellectual order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the sun. For if, as the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing visible, and to all visive natures according to the power generative of light, so it is necessary the good should be with reference to intellect and intelligibles, according to a cause productive of truth, — if this be the case, we must say that the sun is exempt at one and the same time from visive and visible natures, and must admit that the good transcends the natures which are always intellective, and also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, however, to hear the Platonic words themselves: " You may say that the sun not only imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that he is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being himself generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which are known, have not only this from the good that they are known, but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst the good itself is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power." Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how the good and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent,

, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power." Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how the good and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent, and essence itself, according to union, in the same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all visible natures, and perfects and generates all things by his light. How,

CHAP. IV.

OF PLATO.

p. 115

therefore, following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things, and the cause of all things ? How can we assert that being itself* and essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all the divine progressions ? For essence and intellect are said to subsist primarily from the good, to have their hyparxis about the good, to be filled with the light of truth proceeding from thence, and to obtain the participation which is adapted to them from the union of this light, which is more divine than intellect itself and essence, as being primarily suspended from the good, and affording in beings a similitude to that which is first For the light which is emitted from the sun causes every thing visible to be solar-form. And the participation of the light of truth renders that which is intelligible boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through a light which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself, and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual participates of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light being appropriately imparted to it.* And in short, every divine nature is that which it is said to be, on account of this light, and is through it united to the cause of all beings. By no means, therefore, is the first good to be considered as the same with intellect, nor must it be admitted that the intelligible is more ancient than all the hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even subordinate to the light proceeding from the good, and being perfected by this light, is conjoined according to its own order with the good itself. For we must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the same manner as the light [of truth ;] but the latter through continuity with the good is established in it without a medium ; while the former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to the good ; since in sensibles also, the solar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends as far as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it.