The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

intelligibles. And as he is intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has established in himself, and constituted about himself, the one summit of the inflexible Gods. Id the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God appears to us to be a pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect, being extended to the intelligible place of survey, and on this account being in another, so far as he is wholly established in it. But again, because he is pure and immaterial, being converted to himself, and shuttiug in himself aH his own powers. For the parts of this wholeness, are more partial powers, which hasten indeed to a progression from the father, but are on all sides established and -comprehended by the wholeness. And the wholeness itself is a deity, connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts, toeing parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things stably, and again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and us the more tragical fables say* absorbiug and depositing them in itself. For the progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed -into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it •through the first unpolluted monad ; but others proceeding according to the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union of the

' for sauToniTi read rarontrt. * For ik^t** teU «**4«,nfwu

Proc. Vox. I. 3 G

p. 418

father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order therefore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Th£ second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of ihe intellectual Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being.

ween intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, the one is the object of desire, but being aspires after the participation of the one, and power collects being to the participation of the one, and the one to a communion with being, (for the one here is notimparticipable, and exempt from all power) so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but iuteUect is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, call the one and hyparxis intelligible. But that which is primarily being, they call' the first intellect, conformably to this analogy. Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in the same manner as power subsists between the one and being. And all these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles ;

' For anOuorrts, it is necewary to read «i«x«cAowmf.

CHAP. XXX VIII.

OF PLATO.

p. 419

but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and according to a third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is according to essence ; for there intellect is primarily according to cause. But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore, life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hvparxis; and an intellectuals,' according to participation, it is indeed necessary that the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself. The one therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because it has the most excellent life. The. first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved.

use it has the most excellent life. The. first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intellectuals, but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and that which is moved. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that the one in this order is moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals. Hence also, Socrates in the Phaedrus calls this middle triad Heaven ; for the whole of it is life and motion. Hut that which is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i. c from the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;.] since eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however, the middle is life according to cause ; but in intellectuals, it is life according to participation ; and in the order between these, it is life

• la the original, alter n U wi* m/Toi; mi it it nemury to supply *mf vwmtfir, rv I, nif

»«ip»S, *. r. X.

ON THE THEOLOGY

boor r.

according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Par men ides also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the ' wholeness in intelligibies is different from that which is in intelligibles and intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this, intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to the circulation of the Heaveu, and to intellectual and -intelligible life:

Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not one certain genus of being,. as neither is motion. For beings indeed are naturally adapted to participate of the genera > of being; but the superessential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, ■ therefore, Parmenides here* assuming the one itself by itself, surveys in this motion and permanency, he evidently does not attribute the elements of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate* all-perfect, and transcending wholes* And thus asserting that Me owe is moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivifie hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading cause of all things.