The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ts of all of them will not be one. But if each of the parts participates of something of this kind, and there is something which is the same in all of them, a thing of this kind must necessarily be incorporeal, and impartible according to its own nature. For if this also is itself corporeal, it is either wholly in each of the parts, or not wholly. If therefore, it is indeed wholly in each, it will itself be separated from itself. For the parts in which it is are separate from each other. But if it is not wholly in each of the parts, this also will be divisible, aud will have parts after the same manner as the above mentioned parts ; and there will again be the same inquiry concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something common, or nothing ; since if there is nothing common, we shall place the many separate from the one.

Let us however consider the whole ; for every body is a whole, and has parts. What therefore will that be which is connective of the parts, since they are many ? For it is necessary to say either that the whole is unific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that some third thing prior to both, which is neither a whole, nor has any part, connects and unites the whole with its parts, and the parts with the whole. But if the whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole will be incorporeal and impartible. For if it is a body, this also will be partible, and will be indigent of a nature which is capable of connecting the parts ; and this will be the case to infinity. But if the parts are connective of the whole, how can the many be connective of 'Ac one ; and things divided, of that which consists from them? For on the contrary, it is necessary that the one should have the power of uniting the many, and not the many of uniting the one. And if that which connects both, is neither a whole nor has parts, it will be perfectly impartible. But being impartible, itis also necessarily without interval. For every thing which has interval has parts, and is divisible. But being without interval it is incorporeal ; for every body possesses interval.

Farther still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual ; for every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that the principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant that

CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 103

this may be corrupted, there will be no beiug incorruptible.

very being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that the principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant that

CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 103

this may be corrupted, there will be no beiug incorruptible. For the principle being destroyed, it will neither be itself generated from any tiling, nor will another thing be generated from it. For it can neither be able to generate itself (since it is not, if it is not perpetual) nor can another thing be abje to generate it, if it is the principle of all things. But if it is incorruptible, it will have the power of not being corrupted, and this* power will be infinite, in order that it may exist to infinity through the whole of time. For every finite power of existence pertains naturally to that which is corruptible. But an infinite power pertains to perpetual natures, the existence of which continues to infinity. This infinite therefore, I mean the infinite according to power, is either impartible or partible. But if it is partible indeed, there will be the infinite in a finite body. For the principle is finite ; since if it were infinite, there will be nothing else besides itself. But if it is impartible, the power of infinitely existing will be incorporeal. And the principle of beings is incorporeal,' so far as it is this power through which the subject of it always is. That it is impossible therefore, the principle of beings can be corporeal is from these things evident.

If however it is incorporeal, it must either be separate, or inseparable from bodies. But if inseparable indeed, it will have all its energies in bodies, and subsisting about them. For that is inseparable from body which is not any where naturally adapted to energize except in and with bodies. But if the principle is a thing of this kind, it is evidently necessary that none of the things which subsist according to it should be more powerful, or possess greater authority than the principle of all beings. If however, nothing is more excellent in bodies than the power which subsists in and energizes about bodies, and a corporeal essence, there will not any where be intellect and the power which energizes according to intellect. For every such like motion, [i, e. energy] proceeds from a power, which is entirely in its energies independent of body. But it neither was, nor is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes. For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary natures,

' The words aavyjrtoi i<rn are omitted in the original.

its energies independent of body. But it neither was, nor is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes. For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary natures,

' The words aavyjrtoi i<rn are omitted in the original.

p. 104

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK II.

and the latter are the lords of the essence of the former. If therefore, the principle of beings is able to generate intellect and wisdom, how is it possible it should not generate it, on account of and in itself ? For one of two things is necessary, either that intellectual perception pertains in no respect to beings, or that it is inferior to them ; and that if •it exists it acts in bodies only. These things however, it is impossible to assert. But if that which is the first of beings, and which is the principle of all things is separate from bodies, it is perfeotly necessary to admit that it is either immoveable or moved. And if indeed it is moved, there will be something else prior to it, about which it is moved. For every thing which is moved, is naturally adapted to be moved about something else which is permanent. And farther still, besides this, it is moved through desire of another thing. For ift is necessary indeed that it should be moved in consequence of desiring a certain thing ; because motion itself by itself is indefinite. But the end of it is that for the sake of which it subsists. It desires however, either something else, or itself. But every thing which desires itself is immoveable. For why should any thing that is present with itself want to be in another thing? For of things which are moved, the motion of that is less to which the good is nearer, but the motion is greater of that to which the good is more remote. But that which possesses good in itself, and for the sake of which it subsists, will be immoveable and .stable ; siuce being always in itself, it is in good. That however which is in itself is in same ; for each thing is the same with itself. But of that which is in itself we say indeed that it stands still and is immoveable ; while that which is not immoveable, is not in itself but in another, is moved towards another thing, and is perfectly indigent of good.