The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor
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g to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the intelligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things in a more divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity. Immediately therefore, in the beginning of the fabrication in the Timaeus, the demiurgus calls himself father, " Of which works I am the demiurgus and father." But shortly after he unfolds his power, " Imitating my power in your generation." This therefore is also wonderful, that he lias delivered to us the most theological conception concerning power. For in the first place indeed, he calls it the power of the father, when he says, " Of which works I am the demiurgus and father," and that the power is his, [is evident from the words,] " Imitating my power :" so that according to Plato power is of the lather. And in the next place, he ascribes to this power a peculiarity generative of the whole of things ; for this is evident from the words " In your generation." Power therefore is the cause of generation and of the progression of beings. And in the last place, he delivers the intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. " Having thus spoke, again into the former crater in which he had tempered the
CHAP. XXI.
OF PLATO.
p. 203
soul of the universe, lie poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture.* For to pour, to mingle, mixture* and to be productive of soul, pertain to intellect. Though what necessity is there for asserting these things, since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect. A Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived by the dianoctic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for this universe to contain." Hence the demiurgu« is father, and power and intellect. And he possesses these things as much as possible on account of intelligiblcs. For he is a God as father, on account of them. He is also power, and the generator of wholes, and knows beings intellectually, on account of them. For in them intelligible knowledge first subsists. Much more therefore are father, power and intellect in intelligibles ; from which also the demiurgus being filled, participates of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously. For as the paternal triad in intelligibles gives subsistence to intelligible eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of which he is the father.
- urgus being filled, participates of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously. For as the paternal triad in intelligibles gives subsistence to intelligible eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of which he is the father. And as in intelligibles, eternity proceeding according to all power generates intelligible animal itself, so the demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are perpetual and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which is generative of mortal animals. That any one therefore may assume these names from Plato is evident from what has been said.
Since however, being has an hypostasis triply in intelligibles, one is primarily being and prior to the eternal ; but another is secondarily being, and the first eternity ; and another is being ultimately, and is intelligible and eternal intellect. And here indeed there is being, but there eternity, and there intellect. And eternity is more comprehensive than intellect; but being than eternity. For every intellect is eternal, but not every thing eternal is intellect. For soul according to its essence is eternal, and every thing which participates of eternity, participates also by a much greater priority ot being. For with perpetuity of existence, existence is entirely consubsistent. But that which participates of existence is not universally eternally being. For bodies also participate in a certain respect of the nature of existence, but they are not eternal. Intellect therefore constitutes an intellectual essence only, so far as it is intellect ; since
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ON THE THEOLOGY
book nr.
so far as it is also life and being it constitutes uil things. But eternity constitutes both the intellectual and psychical essence. For the mixture [in the second triad] was intelligible life. But being constitutes the intellectual, the psychical, and the corporeal life. For matter also is being [most obscurely,] and is capacity indeed, but formless being, and non-being, falling offfrom the participation of being. If, however, some one should say that it is being in power or capacity, yet it has this power from being. For capacity is the forerunning participation of energy. And thus much concerning these things.
But what sufficient argument of division does Socrates afford us in tlio Fbttdrus, concerning these intelligible triads ? And how from what it delivered by him may we recur to the conception of the hypostasis of the most principal Gods ? Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being inspired by the Nymphs, celebrates every thing divine as beautiful, ning these intelligible triads ? And how from what it delivered by him may we recur to the conception of the hypostasis of the most principal Gods ? Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being inspired by the Nymphs, celebrates every thing divine as beautiful, wise and good, and 6ays that by these the aoul is nourished. But if every thing divine is a thing of this kind, this is the case with the intelligible by a much greater priority. And all these indeed are every where, but in the first triad, the good principally subsists ; in the second the wise ; and in the third the beautiful. For in this there is the most beautiful of intelligible*. But in the second triad truth and the first intelligence subsist. And in the first there is the commensurate, which we say is the same as the good. But Socrates in the Plnlebus says that the clement of the good is the deal ruble, the sufficient, and the perfect. The desirable therefore pertains indeed to bound ; for it is the union and goodness of all the triad, and the triad converges about it. But the sufficient pertains to infinity. For sufficiency is a power capable of pervading to all things, and of being present to all things without impediment. And the perfect pertains to dint which is mixed. For this is that which is primarily triadic ; since every mixture has its coalition from the triad. The elements therefore of the good unfold to us the fir*t triad ; and the elements of intelligible wisdom, the second triad. But every thing wise is full of being, is generative of truilt, and is convertive of imperfect natures to their perfection. The full Uterefore pertains to the second bound ; for this is uniformly filled with the participation of the natures prior to itself. For the full is every
CHAP. XX1L
OF PLATO.
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where adapted to bound, just as that which cannot be fitted is adapted to the infinite. But the prolific pertains to the second power, and to infinity. For that which does not abide in the fulness of itself, but is prolific and generative of other things, is especially indicative of divine infinity. And the convertive pertains to that which is mixed. For this as being allotted the end of the triad, converts every thing imperfect to the full, and unite* itself prior to other things to the bound of the whole triad.
CHAPTER XXII.
Moft£OT£m, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the third triad of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed, the lovely, the delicate, and the splendid.
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