The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor
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igibles, and causes them to be one, as deriving its subsistence from the one) if this be the case, the deity proceeding from the first is participable, and all the multitude of unities is participable. And that indeed which is truly supercssential is the one. But each of the other Gods, according to his proper hyparxis, by which he is a superessential God, is similar to the first ; but they are participated by essence and being. According to this reasoning therefore, the Gods appear to us to be unities, and participable unities, binding indeed all beings to themselves, but conjoining through themselves to the one which similarly transcends all things, the natures posterior to themselves.
Since therefore each of the Gods is indeed a unity, but is participated by some being, whether shall we say that the same being participates of each of the unities or that the participants of some of the unities are more, but of others less numerous ? And if this be the case either the participants of the superior unities must be more, but of the inferior must be fewer in number, or vice versa. For it is necessary that there should be an order of the unities, in the same manner as we see that of numbers some are nearer to their principle, but others more remote from it. And that some are more simple, but others more composite, and exceed indeed in quantity, but suffer a diminution in power. But it is well that we have mentioned numbers. For if it is necessary to survey the order of the first monads with respect to each other, and their progression about beings, from these as images, in these also the monads which are nearer to the one will be participated by things which arc more simple in essence, but those which are more remote from it, will be participated by more composite essences. For thus the participation will be according to the analogous ; first monads being always participated by the first beings, but second monads by secondary beings. For again, if the first is exempt
■ oirr<«{ U omitted in the original.
CHAP II.
OF PLATO.
p. 157
from all things, and is imparticipable, but that which is connascent with the most simple nature and the one is more similar to the imparticipable than that which is connascent with a more various and multiform nature, and which has more powers suspended from it, — if this be the case, it is perfectly obvious, that the unities which are nearer to the one are necessarily participated by the first and most simple essences ; but that those which are more remote are participated by more composite essences, which from it, — if this be the case, it is perfectly obvious, that the unities which are nearer to the one are necessarily participated by the first and most simple essences ; but that those which are more remote are participated by more composite essences, which are less in power, but are greater in number and multitude. For in 6hort, additions in these unities are ablations of powers ; and that which is nearer to the one, which surpasses the whole of things by an admirable simplicity, is more uniform, and is consubsistent with more total orders. And it happens according to the ratio of power, that the simplicity of the first unities is transcendent. For those things which arc the causes of a greater number of effects, imitate as much as possible the cause of all things, but those which are the causes of fewer effects, have an essence more various than the natures that are prior to them.' For this variety distributes inio minute parts and diminishes the power which abides in one. Moreover, in participated souls also, such as are first and most divine subsist in simple and perpetual bodies. Others again are connected with bodies that are simple, but in conjunction with these with material bodies also. And others are connected at one and the same time with simple, material and composite bodies. For the celestial souls indeed rule over simple bodies, and such as have an immaterial and immutable subsistence. But the souls that govern the wholes of the elements, are at the same time invested with etherial garments, and at the same time through these are carried in the wholes of the elements, which as wholes indeed are perpetual and simple, but as material receive generation and corruption, and composition from dissimilar natures. And the souls that rank in the third order, are those which proximately inspire with life their luciform * vehicles, but also attract from the simple ele-
1 Instead of n jut yaf *A«i»w»* out**, xcu rat wctvno* mrrmi xarct Tip ivra+ur rant *f* avrwr *«miX«ri{an> xmret tij» owiav tow, it U necessary to read ra pr, yaf *X|ior»» cutix, xcu raw wairaw """!«» xarm fovofuv pyuvno*, T« ttrwv i\atr<ronov toi> wjg xvtwy ireixiA»Tff« xot« nf» cv»mw ten*.
1 For avTMifarir it if requisite to read j^miW*p. 158 ment material vestsmeuts, pour into these a secondary life, and through these communicate with composite and multiform bodies, and sustain through this participation another third life.
For avTMifarir it if requisite to read j^miW*p. 158 ment material vestsmeuts, pour into these a secondary life, and through these communicate with composite and multiform bodies, and sustain through this participation another third life.
If, however, you are willing to survey the intellectual orders, some of these are arranged in the souls which rank as wholes, and in the most divine of mundane souls, which also they govern in a becoming manner. But others being arranged in the souls of the more excellent genera, are proximately participated by the rulers that are in them ; and are participated secondarily by more partial essences. But again they arrange third intellectual orders in partial souls. And according as the power which they are allotted is diminished, in such proportion is participation in them more various, and far more composite than the participation of the natures that, are prior to them. If, therefore, this is the mode of participation in all beings, it is certainly necessary that of the Gods also those that are nearer to the one, should be carried in the more simple parts of being, but that those which have proceeded to a greater distance should be carried in the more composite parts of being. For the participations of second genera are divided after this manner according to a similitude to them.
Again therefore, we may summarily say, that after the one principle of the whole of things, the Gods present themselves to our view as self-perfect monads, participated by beings.' How many orders therefore there are of beings we shall afterwards unfold, and show what beings are allotted a more simple, and what a more various hyparxis. Of all beings then, the last is that which is corporeal. For this derives its being, and all its perfection from another more ancient cause, and is neither allotted simplicity nor composition, nor perpetuity, nor incorruptibility from its own power. For no body is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten ; but every tiling which is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from cause, is incorporeal and impartible. And in short, that which is the cause of hyparxis to itself, imparts also to itself an infinite power of ex-
• In the original here, about a line and a half is so defectire, that not being able to supply the deficiency, I hare not attempted to translate it.
CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 15g
istence. Tor never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or depart from its own subsistence.
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