The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ch thing is the same with itself. But of that which is in itself we say indeed that it stands still and is immoveable ; while that which is not immoveable, is not in itself but in another, is moved towards another thing, and is perfectly indigent of good. If therefore the principle of beings is moved, but every thing which is moved is moved through the want of good, and towards another thing which is the object of desire to it, there will be something else which is desirable to the principle of beings besides itself, and about which possessing a sameness of subsistence, wc must say it is moved. This however is impossible. For the principle is that for th<- sake of which all thiugs subsist, which all things desire, and which is indige nt ol nothing. For if it were in want of something, it would be entirely subordinate to

CHAP. II.

OF PLATO.

p. 105

that of which it is iu want, and to which ib energy is directed as the object of desire. But if the principle is immoveable (for this is what remains,) it is necessary that it should be one incorporeal essence, possessing an eternal sameness of subsistence. After what manner, however, docs it possess the one ? And how is it one essence I For if essence and the one are the same, it must be admitted that the principle of beings is essence. But if essence is different from the one, it must be granted that to be the one is not the same thing as to be essence. And if, indeed, essence is better than the one, according to this it must be said to be with the principle. But if the one is better than essence and beyond it, the one is also the principle of essence. And if they are co-ordinate to each other, the many will be prior to the one.1 This, however, is impossible as we have before demonstrated. It is evident, indeed, that essence is not the same as the one. For it is not one and the same thing to say one, and that essence is one ; but the former is not yet a sentence, and the latter is. To which may be added, that if essence and the one are the same, multitude will be the same as that which has no existence, and which is not essence. This, however, is impossible. For in essence the many are contained, and in tliat which is not essence is the one. But if essence and the one arc not the same, they will not be co-ordinate to each other ; for if they were co-ordinate there will be some other tiling prior to them, if ii is necessary that all things should subsist from one principle.

ssence is the one. But if essence and the one arc not the same, they will not be co-ordinate to each other ; for if they were co-ordinate there will be some other tiling prior to them, if ii is necessary that all things should subsist from one principle. And if one of these is better than the other, either the one is prior to essence, or essence is prior to the one. But if the one indeed is prior to essence, this and not essence is the principle of all things. For it is necessary that nothing should be better than the principle. And if essence is prior to the onet the one will be passive to essence, and not essence to the one. But if the one is passive to essence, it is necessary that the one and essence should be every thing, and that all such things as arc one should be essence, but not that all such things as arc essence should be one. There will, therefore, be a certain essence deprived of the one. If, however, this be the case, it

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' For essence and the one being two things will participate of the many, i. e. of the firtt mauy, or two.

Proc. Vol. I. O

p. 106

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK n.

will be nothing. For that which is deprived of the one is nothing. Hence the one is prior to essence.

But if that which is first is something which is not essence, it is absurd to assert that it is subordinate to essence. For the principle is that which has the greatest power and the most absolute authority, and is most sufficient to itself, and is not that which is most ignoble, and indigent of the many. And, in short, it is necessary that no secondary nature should be belter than the principle ; for it is requisite that beings should not be governed badly. But if, indeed, the principle has an order subordinate to the things which proceed from it, and the things proceeding from it are better than it, all things will be badly confounded, nor will the principle according to nature be any thing else than something which is not the most excellent of things, nor will things which proceed from the principle possess from it a power of ruling over their principle. The principle of beings, therefore, will indeed be fortuitous, and also the beings which' arc its progeny. But this is impossible. For things which are fortuitous (if to have a fortuitous subsistence is this, not to exist according to intellect, nor with a view to a definite end) are disorderly, infinite, and indefinite, and are all of them things which have a less frequency of subsistence.

things which are fortuitous (if to have a fortuitous subsistence is this, not to exist according to intellect, nor with a view to a definite end) are disorderly, infinite, and indefinite, and are all of them things which have a less frequency of subsistence. But the principle is invariably principle, and other things proceed from it. If however, that which is not essence is better than all essence, it will either be participated by it, or it will be entirely imparticipable. If, however, essence participates of the principle, of what will it be the principle ? And how will it be the principle of all beings? For it is necessary that the principle of beings should be no one of beings ; since if it were any one of them, it is necessarily not the principle of all beings. But every thing which is participated by another thing is said to be that by winch it is participated, and in which it primarily is. The principle, however, is separate, and belongs in a greater degree to itself than to other things. Besides, every thing which is participated proceeds from another more excellent cause; since that which is imparticipable is better than that which is participate. It is not, however, possible to conceive any thing better than that which is most excellent, and which we call the principle. For it is not lawful to assert that things secondary to the principle, and which

CHAP. III.

OF PLATO.

p. 107

proceed from it, arc in auy respect better than tlieir principle. The cause therefore of all beings is above all essence, is separate from every essence, and is neither essence, nor has essence as an addition to its nature. For such an addition as this is a diminution of simplicity, and of that which is one.

CHAPTER III.

See, therefore, the third argument after these, leading us to the same conclusion with the former arguments. For it is necessary that the cause of all beings should be that of which all beings participate, to which they refer the subsistence of themselves, and which separates itself from nothing that in any respect whatever is said to have an existence. For this alone is the object of desire to beings, which primarily, or in some other way, is itself the cause of their subsistence. And it is necessary that every thing which is produced with reference to, and on account of it, should have a certain habitude with relation to it, and through this also, a similitude to it.