The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor
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hat is pleasing and painful. And in short, the orcctic powers every where are lives, and the images of the whole of life* and the last productions of life ; but they are of themselves destitute of intellect and without any participation of the gnostic power. Hence also, they are of themselves indefinite, and deprived of all knowledge.
Again therefore, all animals indeed receive a portion of being, and different animals a different portion, according to their respective natures; but all beings are not similarly able to participate of life ; since we say that qualities and all passions, and the last of bodies, receive the ultimate effective energy of being, but we do not also say that they participate of life. Being therefore is more ancient than life ; life than intellect ; and Proc. Vol. I. Xp. 162 intellect than soul. For it is necessary that the causes of a greater number of effects being more ancient and according to order more principal, should preside over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer effects. Very properly therefore, does Plato in the Timeeus give subsist- * ence to soul from intellect, as being secondary to it according to its own nature. But in the Laws he says that intellect is moved similarly to a sphere fashioned by a wheel.' For that which is moved, is moved by participating of life, and is nothing else than real life about motion. And in the Sophista he exempts being from all the total genera of things, and from motion. For being, says he, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither stands still nor is moved, is beyond eternal life.
These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence, vis. essence, life, intellect and soul, soul indeed participates of all the causes prior to itself, being allotted reason from its own peculiarity, but intellect, life and being, from more ancient causes. Hence it gives subsistence to things posterior to itself in a fourfold manner. For according to its being indeed, it produces all things as far as to bodies ; according to its life, all things which arc said to live, even as far as to plants ; according to its intellect, all things which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the most irrational natures; and according to its reason, the first of the natures that are able to participate of it.1 But intellect being established beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns all things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination the power of the intellectual the first of the natures that are able to participate of it.1 But intellect being established beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns all things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination the power of the intellectual peculiarity to all gnostic beings, but supplying the participation of life to a still greater number, and of being to all those to whom primary being imparts itself. But life being arranged above intellect, presubsists as the cause of the same things in a twofold respect, vivifying secondary natures indeed, together with intellect, and filling from itself with the rivers of life, such things as are naturally adapted to live, but together with being supernally producing essence in all things. But being itself which is primarily being generates all things by its very exist-
' For flrrsMi; it is necessary to read sv npwic. * For «urw{ read avnjf.
C
CHAP. II.
OF PLATO.
p. 163
ence, all lives, and intellects and souls, and is uniformly preseot to all things, and its exempt from the whole of things according to one cause which gives subsistence to all things. Hence it is the most similar of all things to the one, and unites the comprehension of beings in itself to the first principle of the whole of things, through which all beings, and non-being, wholes and parts, forms and the privations of forms subsist, which privations do not necessarily participate of being, but it is entirely necessary that they should participate of the one.
These things as it appears to me persuaded the Elcan guest in the Sophista, when discussing that which is perfectly being, to admit that not only being is there, but also life, intellect and soul. For if true and real being is venerable and honorable, intellect is there in the first place, says be. For it is not lawful for that which is of itself venerable and immaterial to be without intellect. But if intellect is in that which is perfectly being, intellect will entirely be moved. For it is not possible for intellect ever to subsist, either without motion or permanency. But if intellect is moved and stands still, there are in being both life and motion. Hence, from what has been said, three things become apparent, viz. being, life and intellect. Moreover, soul also in the next place is discovered through these things. For it is necessary, says lie, that life and intellect which before were by themselves, should also be in soul.
s been said, three things become apparent, viz. being, life and intellect. Moreover, soul also in the next place is discovered through these things. For it is necessary, says lie, that life and intellect which before were by themselves, should also be in soul. For every soul is a plenitude of life and intellect, participating of both, which the Elean guest indicating adds, " Shall we say that both these are inherent in it, but yet it does not possess these in soul ?" For to possess, as some one says in a certain place, is secondary to existing. And soul indeed participates of each of these according to the peculiarity of itself; but it mingles the rational form of its own hyparxis, with the intellectual vivific power. But both intellect and life subsist prior to soul, the former as being moved and standing still at one and the same time, and the latter as being motion and permanency. These four monads also, soul, intellect, life and being are not only mentioned by Plato here, but in many other places. And as in soul all things subsist according to participation, so in intellect the things which are prior to it subsist, and in life that which is prior to life. For we say that life exists, or has a being. Or how could i*be said to be arranged in being unless it participated of being? We
1G4
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
likewise say that intellect is and lives. For it is moved, and is a portion of being. Hence it is the third of the more comprehensive monads. Prior however to beings which are participated, it is every where necessary that imparticipable causes should subsist, as was before demonstrated, conformably to the similitude of beings to the one. Being therefore which is primarily being, is imparticipable ; but life first participates of being, yet is imparticipable, being exempt from intellect. And intellect is filled indeed from being and life; but is imparticipable in souls, and in the natures posterior to itself. Intellect also presides over soul, imparting to it by illumination the participation of life and being; but being imparticipable subsists prior to bodies. The last order of beings therefore is that to which bodies are annexed ; celestial bodies indeed primarily, but sublunary bodies with the addition of material [vestments.] This therefore is the progression of beings, through life, intellect and soul, ending in a corporeal nature.
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