The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

sition in them, through composition ; that which is simple, through variety ; and that which is united, through multitude ; and thus fashioning names, ultimately exhibits images of divine natures. For it generates every name as if it were a statue of the Gods. And as the theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth the exuberant and unenvying goodness of the Gods into the illumination of artificial statues, thus also the intellectual science of divine concerns, by the compositions and divisions of sounds, unfolds the occult essence of the Gods. Very properly therefore, does Socrates in the Pbilebus say, that on account of his reverence of the Gods, he is agitated with the greatest fear respecting their names. For it is necessary to venerate even the ultimate echos of the Gods, and venerating these to become established in the first paradigms of them. And thus much concerning divine names, which at pre* sent may be sufficient for the purpose of understanding the theology of Plato. For wc shall accurately discuss them when we speak of partial powers.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

The most proper beginning however of the theory proposed by us is that from which we may be able to discover the first cause ' of all beings. For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having our conceptions purified respecting it, we shall with greater facility be able to distinguish other things. About these things therefore we must speak from the beginning as follows : It is necessary that all beings, and all the natures of beings should either be many only, there being no one in them, neither in each, nor in all of them ; or that they should be one only, there being no multitude, but all things being compelled into one and the same power of existence ; or it is necessary that they should be both one and many, and that being should be one in order that neither multitude itself by itself may vanquish beings, nor that we may be forced to bring together into the same thing all things and their contraries at once. These things therefore being three, which of them shall we chuse ? And to which of the above mentioned assertions shall we give our suffrage. It is necessary therefore severally to discuss the absurdities which attend these positions, and thus to survey after what manner the truth subsists.

♦

* For ewr.«r it u Decenary to read arnca.

ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If.

assertions shall we give our suffrage. It is necessary therefore severally to discuss the absurdities which attend these positions, and thus to survey after what manner the truth subsists.

♦

* For ewr.«r it u Decenary to read arnca.

ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If.

If then beings are many, and in such a manner many, as we have mentioned from the Ijcginning, so that the one is not any where to be found, many absurdities will hap|>en to be the result, or rather all the nature of beings will at once from the first be destroyed, as there will immediately be nothing which is capable of participating the one. For it must be admitted that every being is either one certain thing, or nothing. And that indeed which is a certain being, is also one ; but that which is not even one being, has not any existence whatever. Hence, if many things have a subsistence, each of the many is something or a certain one. But if each of them is nothing, or not even one thing, neither is it possible for the many to exist ; for the many are many so far as each individual of the multitude exists. If, therefore, the many alone have a subsistence, and the one in no respect is, neither will the many exist. For things which are in no respect one have not any existence whatever. But if the one is not, by a much greater priority neither have the many an existence. For it necessarily follows that none of the things from which the many consist will have a subsistence.

Farther still, if the many aloue have a subsistence (as has been said) art things will be infinitely infinite ; and if you receive any one of the infinites whatever, this also will be immediately infinite. And with respect to the things from which this consists and which are infinite, each of these likewise will be infinite. For let something of the many be assumed* which we say is not one, this therefore will be multitude according to its own nature, since it belongs to beings, but is not nothing. If however it is multitude, this also will consist of many things, and will be many. And if you assume something of these manys, this will immediately appear to you not to be one, but many. There will likewise be immediately the same reasoning in these, and in a similar manner each, (because we falsely speak of each) will be multitude in energy. And each, as I may say, will be infinite, or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing which will not be something of this kind ; since a part is many, and in a similar manner the part of a part ; and this to infinity.

multitude in energy. And each, as I may say, will be infinite, or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing which will not be something of this kind ; since a part is many, and in a similar manner the part of a part ; and this to infinity. For multitude proceeding will never stop, nor infinity, in consequence of being deprived of the nature of the one. To make beings however, to be infinitely infinite, is impossible both with respect to truth, and to the thing proposed by us.

CHAP. I.

OF PLATO

For if being is infinitely infinite, being can neither be known, nor discovered ; since the infinite is entirely incomprehensible and unknown. If also being is infinitely infinite, there will be something more infinite than the infinite. But if that something is more infinite, this will be less infinite. That, however, which is less infinite, since it is not perfectly infinite, will evidently be finite, so far as it falls short of the nature of the infinite. If, therefore, there is something which is itself according to multitude more infinite than that which is infinite in multitude there will be something more than the infinite, and the infinite will be less, yet not according to multitude. This however is impossible. Hence there is not the infinitely infinite.

Again therefore, according to this hypothesis, the same things will be according to the same, similar and disimilar. For if all the manys are not one, and each thing according to all things is not one, that which is not one will evidently suffer the same passion in consequence of the privation of the one. All things therefore being deprived of the one, after the same manner, they will on this account subsist similarly with respect to caeh other. But things which subsist similarly, so far as they thus subsist, are evidently similar to each other. Hence the many will be similar to each other, so far as they are deprived of the one. They will likewise according to this privation of the one be perfectly dissimilar. For it is necessary that things which are similar should suffer the same passion ; so that things which do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be similar. But things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also one thing. Hence things which arc deprived of every one, will not suffer any thing that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and dissimilar according to the same. But this is impossible. Hence it is im- )K>ssible for the many to exist which are in no respect one.