The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ce is the image of himself. And according to this reasoning the demiurgus is not only a God, but he contains in himself the intelligible, and true being, and antecedently comprehends not only the final cause of mundaoe natures, but also the paradigmatic cause. But again, in the third place, Timseus celebrates the demiurgic power, and the principle which abolishes every thing disorderly and indefinite, and prepares the beautiful alone and the good to have dominion in wholes. For the assertion that the demiurgus to the utmost of bis power suffered nothing evil and vile to exist, indicates his unconquerable power, which adorns things material in an unpolluted manner, and imparts by illumination bound to indefinite, and order to disorderly

In which part of the Tiro feus, likewise, this dogma of Plato will appear to you to be admirable, that matter is generated from some one of the Gods situated above the demiurgus. For the demiurgus receiving matter occupied by the vestiges of forms, thus himself introduces into it all the perfection of ornament and arrangement. Matter, therefore, and the whole of that which is the subject of bodies, proceed supernally from the first principles, which on account of their exuberance of power, are able to generate even the last of beings. But the demiurgus of the universe, imparts by illumination, order, bound, and ornament, and the whole world is fabricated an image of intelligible*, through the communication of forms.

Ia the fourth place,, therefore, let us survey how Timacus unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect. " By a reasoning process," says he, " the demiurgus discovered from the things which are visible according to nature, that no work which is destitute of intelligence can ever become more beautiful than that which possesses intellect." What therefore is this reasoning ? What is the discovery, and whence does it originate ?

p. 356

Reasoning, therefore, is indeed distributed intellection, looking to itself, and in itself investigating good. For every one who reasons, passes from one thing to another, and being converted to himself, searches after good. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, in adorning and arranging the universe subsists analogously to him who reasons ; for he emits the divided causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly in intelligibles. For those things which intelligible intellect constitutes uniformly and excmptly, these intellectual intellect separating, distributing into parts, and as it were fabricating by itself, generates.

causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly in intelligibles. For those things which intelligible intellect constitutes uniformly and excmptly, these intellectual intellect separating, distributing into parts, and as it were fabricating by itself, generates. Reasoning therefore is the being filled with the intelligible, and an all-perfect union with it. By which also it is evident that it is not fit to think this reasoning [of the demiurgus] is either investigation or doubt, or a wandering of divine intellect, but tliat it is stable intelligence intellectually perceiving the multiform causes of beings. For intellect is always united to the intelligible, and is filled with its own intelligibles. And in a similar manner it is intellect in energy, and intelligible. For at one and the same time, it intellectually perceives and is perceived, discovers itself, entering into itself, and the reasoning also finds what this intelligence is, but not according to transition. For the intelligence of the Gods is eternal. And invention with them is not the discovery of that which h absent; for all things are always present to the intellect of the Gods. The intelligible likewise there is not separated from intellect. The conversion, therefore, of intellect to itself may be called reasoning; but the being filled from intelligibles invention. And intelligibles themselves may be denominated things visible according to nature. For because Tim sens had denominated the unadorned subject of bodies when it was vanquished by the obscure vestiges of forms, visible, hence, I think, ho calls intelligibles visible according to nature. For it is according to nature, to intellect to look to these, and not to things subordinate to these. As, therefore, he says, that intellect itself sees intelligibles, after the same manner also he calls intelligibles things naturally visible, and converts intellect to the intelligible, as that which sees to that which is seen. If, therefore, intellect sees animal itself, and assimilates to it the whole world, it may be said that animal itself is

CHAP. XVIH. OF PLATO. 357

visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most splendid of intelligibles subsists ; and this is that which we before demonstrated, when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, wbieh Socrates, in the Phsednts, denominates splendid and fulgid.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Such therefore are the conceptions which are to be assumed of the demiurgic cause, and from these things they are to be derived.

that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, wbieh Socrates, in the Phsednts, denominates splendid and fulgid.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Such therefore are the conceptions which are to be assumed of the demiurgic cause, and from these things they are to be derived. We shall however obtain one perfection of the summit of the dogmas concerning it, if we are able to survey the words which this cause extends to the junior demiurgi, and to unfold the concealed meaning of them. This, therefore, we shall also do, establishing the following principle of the explanation of them : The energies and powers of the Gods are twofold. And some indeed abide in, and energize about them, and have for their end one hypostasis, and which is united to essence. But others proceed from them, exhibit an efficacious power about secondary natures, and coexist with the multitude of their recipients, and with the peculiarity of essence. These, however, being twofold, the secondary are suspended from those that are prior to them, are defined about them, and receive their proper hyparxis according to them. For it is every where necessary that externally proceeding should be the images of internal energies, evolving the at-once-collected nature of their indivisibility ; multiplying that in them which is united, and dividing their impartibility.

According to this reasoning, therefore, the energy of nature is also twofold, one being that which abides in it, according to which it connects itself, and the reasons it contains, but the other proceeding from it,p. 358 through which also bodies are filled with these physical powers, which being moved by nature, act on each other, and physically suffer by each other. Again, the motion of the soul likewise is twofold. And the one indeed is self-motive, is converted to itself, is of itself, concurs with the life of the soul, and is without any difference with respect to it. But the other is incumbent on alter-motive natures, moves these, and about these extends the power of itself. The energy of intellect, therefore, is likewise twofold. And one indeed is intellectual, is united to true beings, and is impartible, being co-existent with the intelligible itself of intellect, or rather being the intelligible itself, and intellect. For intellect is not of itself in capacity, and afterwards receiving energy, intellectually perceives the intelligible ; but it is one simple energy. For the multitude of it is unical, and its energy is directed to itself.