The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

distinction between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has parts, and that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not be the same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the

CHAP. XX.

OF PLATO.

p. 197

all-perfect. For that which ii perfectly divided, and is connective of many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirely one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of multitude, is in its own nature exempt from the one being, proceeding in the demonstration of this through three arguments. And at one time indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at another from all. It is better however to hear the words themselves of Plato. That the one therefore, is not the same with the one being, he proves through the following words. " But what with respect to those who assert that the universe is one ? Must we not enquire to the utmost of our power what they say being is? Certainly. To this question therefore they may answer : Do you say there is one thing alone ? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner? They will. What then, do you call being any tiling ? Yes. Do you call it the owe, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say ? What will be their answer after this O guest ?' Through this therefore, Plato separating the one and being from each other, and showing that the conception of the one is different from that of being, and that these are not the same with each other, evinces that the most proper and primary one is exempt from the one being. For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxis void of multitude and possessing the form of one. But the one itst/fn exempt from every addition. For by whatever you may add to it, you will diminish its supreme and ineffahle union. Hence it is necessary to arrange the one prior to the one being, and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone. For if the one and the one being were the same, and it made no difference to say one and being (since it' they differed, the one would a <rHm be changed from the one being,) if therefore the one differs in no respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things, lest there should be two things, the thing and the name.

d from the one being,) if therefore the one differs in no respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things, lest there should be two things, the thing and the name. For being exempt from all multitude, and all division, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear to be the same with the thiug. And neither will a name be the name of a thing,

p. 198

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK III

but a name will be die name of a name, if a thing is the same with a name, and a name is the same with a thing,' and a tiling will be the thing of a thing. For all things will exist about a thing the same as about a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If theretore, these things are absurd, and theone is, and also being, and being participates of the one, the one and the one being are not the same.

But that whole also is not the same with the one, Plato afterwards demonstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: " What then? Will they say that whole is different from the one being, or that it is the same with it? Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore whole is, as Parmenides says, " that which is every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this :" — if this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and extremities. And having these, there is every necessity that it should have parts. Or how shall we say? Just so. Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one. Undoubtedly. But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be the one f Why ? Because according to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely without parts. It must indeed necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts would not accord with the one'' Through these things therefore, the Elean guest arguing from wholeness after the one being, and also from the division of the parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will not be theone. Vox the one is impartible ; but whole possesses parts. Whole therefore is not the one itself.

he parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will not be theone. Vox the one is impartible ; but whole possesses parts. Whole therefore is not the one itself. For that transcends all things and wholeness ; but whole is passive to the one. Hence also it is denominated whole ; for it is not the one itself. Hence all things are not one void of separation and multiplication.

Moreover, the all is comprehensive of many parts. For whole indeed,

' lojteid of to rpayna r<f *np*rt, it it Decenary to read t» «*>i« r<y wpoyn-orri.

CHAP. XX. OF PLATO. I99

consists at first of two parts ; but the all possesses a multitude of parts, and participating of wholeness at the same time is all, as being perfectly distributed into parts. This therefore is not the one itself, but is passive to the one. For the one itself \s impartible. But it is impartible in such a manner as to be exempt from all parts. Hence the all is not the same with the one. We therefore, have divided whole and the all, but Plato conjoins them, when he says : " Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one." At the same time however, they are divided after the above mentioned manner. From these three arguments therefore, the Elean guest separates the one from the participants of the one, and doubts against those who assert all things to begone, viz. the one being, whole and the all ; of which the all indeed participates of whole, and is a self-perfect multitude, consisting of many parts ; but whole participates of being. For being is not whole, as Parmenides testifies. These therefore, having such an order as this, is it not necessary that the arguments of Plato should be made conformably to the three intelligible ' triads ? For it was requisite, since Parmenides defined the one being in intelligibles, that Plato should from thence derive his demonstrations of the distinction between the one prior to intelligibles, and the one which is in intelligibles. For the doubts against Parmenides, evince in many places that tlie one which is participated derives its subsistence from the im participate union. The one * therefore is not in these triads, but the one being and whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the extremity of the intelligible order.