The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

e* itself prior to other things to the bound of the whole triad.

CHAPTER XXII.

Moft£OT£m, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the third triad of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed, the lovely, the delicate, and the splendid. The lovely therefore, being arranged analogous to the desirable, pertains to bound. But the delicate being coordinate to the sufficient, pertains to the infinite power which is in the beautiful. And the splendid is of an intellectual peculiarity. For this is the beautiful of beauty ; is that which illuminates all things, and astonishes those that are able to behold it. And as apparent beauty shining most manifestly, is seen through the clearest of the senses (for the objects of this sense have many differences according to Aristotle* and this sense pervades farther than the rest) so likewise intelligible beauty appears to the intellect of the soul shiuiug intelligibly. For it is an intelligible form. And on this account the splendor of beauty is apparent to iutellect. Splendid beauty therefore, us Socrates calls it, shines forth at the extremity of die intelligible order. For this is the most splendid of intelligibles, is intelligible intellect, and is that which emits the intelligible light, that when it appeared astonished the intellectual Gods, and made them admire their father* as Orpheus says. Such tlierefore is the preparation to the science of the intelligible Gods which may from these tilings, be assumed. And now it will appear how beauty is indeed occultly in.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK 111.

the end of the first intelligible triad, but subsists in the third triad so as to have manifestly proceeded into light. For in the former it subsists according to one form only ; but in the latter it subsists triadically. It is also evident how each of the triads is at one and the same time a monad and a triad. For the first triad being characterized according to the good,derives its completion from the three elements of the good. But the second being characterized by the wise is contained in the triad of wisdom. And the third subsisting according to the beautiful, is all-perfect through the triad of beauty. If however the beautiful is occultly in the first triad, and shines forth triadically in the third, it is evident that intelligible intellect loves the first triad, and has love conjoined with its beauty. And this is the intelligible love of the first beauty. From these therefore, intellectual love proceeds, together with faith and truth, as we have before observed.

evident that intelligible intellect loves the first triad, and has love conjoined with its beauty. And this is the intelligible love of the first beauty. From these therefore, intellectual love proceeds, together with faith and truth, as we have before observed. For the three intelligible monads, the good, the wise and the beautiful, constitute three powers which lead upwards all other things, and prior to other things the intellectual Gods. Concerning these things however, we shall speak hereafter.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Let us now then direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides. But I wish again to remind the reader of what we have before demonstrated. It has been shown therefore, that it is necessary to divide the second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one being ; and that this hypothesis is nothing else than the generation and progression of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union of intelligible* as far as to a deified essence. For the discussion is not, as some say it is, in the first hypothesis, concerning God and the Gods. For it was not lawful to Parmenides to conjoin multitude with the one, and the one with mulp. 207titude. For the first God is perfectly exempt from the whole of things. But in the first hypothesis essence, and even the one itself, are taken away from the first God. That such an ablation, however, as this is not adapted to the other Gods is evident to every one. Moreover, neither does Parmenides in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as they say he does ; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods, because they are conjoined with the one, and in simplicity and union precede ' all thedivine genera. For how can the similar or the dissimilar, or contact and the privation of contact, and all the other particulars which are denied of the one, be inherent in the intelligible Gods ? They appear indeed to me to be right in asserting that the things which are taken away are similitudes of the Gods ; but they do not speak rightly when they say that all of them are similitudes of the intelligible Gods. To which it may be added, in opposition to this assertion, that the discussion is again concerning the intelligible Gods in the second hypothesis. For the things which are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with reference to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of causes and effects.

nd hypothesis. For the things which are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with reference to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of causes and effects. It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the beginning, we should adapt the first conclusions to the first orders, the middle conclusions to the middle orders, and the last conclusions k> the hist orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions arc asked, us there are progressions of the divine orders. .And in the first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak ; since Plato speaks about these in many places, partly indicating, and partly clearly untbldinghis meaning.

It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper now to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following in so doing thedivine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus]. For wealsa

• For ff«x«iTi{ it it neccwary to reid xgo^omf.

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through his assistance have with a divine head pursued these sacred paths about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated with a divine fury, and wakened as from a profound sleep to this arcane mystic discipline. And thus much concerning the mode of tl»e whole of the conclusions. But from hence I shall pass to the narration of the things proposed.

The first and im participate one therefore, which preexists beyond the whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate, but also those that are participated, is celebrated through the first hypothesis, being demonstrated to be the cause of ull things ineffably, but not being defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any power or peculiarity of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after this [imparticipable one,] that which is aloae supercssential and surpassing, and unmingled with all hyparxis, is a unity participated by being, and constituting about itself the first essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming more redundant than that which is primarily one. This however is a superesscntial hyparxis, and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad. As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz.