The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

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oontadt, thus mingling affirmations with negations. For this order is a medium between the intelligible Gods and the first intellectual divine orders, containing the bond of both. And it guards indeed intellectual!/, according to a uniform and unknown transcendency, but transmits the plenitudes of intelligibles as far as to the last of things. It likewise derates all things at once, according to one common union, as fa r as to the intelligible father, and generates and produces them as far as to matter. Being therefore established between the unical and the multiplied Gods, it « unfolded, negatively indeed, through the unknown manner in which it transcends secondary natures, but affirmatively through its participation of the first natures. For the first demiurgus is called in the Timsus fabricator and father, and good, and all such names, so far as he participates of preexistent causes; but so far as he is the monad of all fabrication, Plato leaves him unknown and ineffable, exempt from all the fabricators of things. For he says, " it is difficult to discover him, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." Thus therefore Plato unfolds the supercelestial place, affirmatively indeed, as being filled from the first causes, at one time indeed calling it essence* which truly is, at another the plain of truth, and at another, something else of this kind; but' so far as it transcends the intellectual Gods, and •o far as -it is supreme and unical, he celebrates it negatively, in the same manner as the principle which is exempt from all things.

CHAPTER XII.

It follows therefore, in the next place, that we should consider what the negations are, and from what orders they are generated. In the Parmenides then, the negations of the one are produced from all the

• 8. i» omitted in the original, which the vme eridently require, to be inawttA

CHAP. XII.

OF PLATO.

p. 249

divine orders, because the me is die cause of all of them. And every thing divine- according to the hypavxis of itself participates of the first principle ; and the one in consequence of transcending these is in a much greater degfee exempt from the natures posterior to these. For from these all things proceed; since they receive partibly the peculiarities of these. This however iB evident from (he otter hypotheses* in which Che same conclusions are again1 eircalated, at one time being connected together negatively, and *t anotlier affirmatively.

these all things proceed; since they receive partibly the peculiarities of these. This however iB evident from (he otter hypotheses* in which Che same conclusions are again1 eircalated, at one time being connected together negatively, and *t anotlier affirmatively. For what is* there wlrichr could be able to subsist, unless it was- antecedently comprehended according Vo cause in wholes ? But in the Pined r us, the things which are denied of the intelligible summit of air intellectuals are the natures whieb am proximately established after this summit, vis. the sacred genera; the connective, tike perfective, and the' paternal of what are" properly called' intellectuals For this summit being exempt front these, it also, transcends all the intellectual Gods. For what every genus of the Gods is to Me one, that the three orders posterior to this* summit, arettr it- Plato therefore denominates the cctestia* order which connectedly contains wholes, and illuminates them with intelligible light, colour ; because likewise the apparent beauty of this sensible heaven is resplendent' with; all various colours, and with light. Hence he calls that heaven intellectual colour, and light For the light proceeding from the good is [in the orders] above [the heaven] unknown and occult, abiding in- the adyta of the Gods ; but it shines forth in this order, and from being unapparent becomes manifest. Hence it is assimilated to colour the offspring of light.

Farther still, if the heaven is sight beholding the things above, the intelligible of it may very properly be called colour which is- conjoined1 with the sight. The cause therefore of the intelligibles in the heaven iswithout colour, but is exempt from tfiem ; fbr sensible colour is the offspri ng of the solar light. But Plato denominates the order which proximately subsists after the celestial order, and which' we have called- the subcelestiat arch, figure. For the arch itself is the' name of a figure. And in short, in this order, Parmenides also places intellectual figure. But Plato first attributes contact to the summit of intellectuals, as is Froc. Vol. I. 2 1

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evident from the conclusions of the Parmenides. For in the first hypothesis taking away figure from the one, he uses this as a medium, viz. that the one does not touch itself. " But the one" says he, " does not touch itself." And the conclusion is evident. Here therefore contact first subsists, and subsists according to cause.

hesis taking away figure from the one, he uses this as a medium, viz. that the one does not touch itself. " But the one" says he, " does not touch itself." And the conclusion is evident. Here therefore contact first subsists, and subsists according to cause. For of those things of which the deraiurgus is proximately the cause, the father who is prior to him is paradigmatically the cause. In this order therefore, contact is the paradigm of the liberated Gods. Hence these three orders are successive, viz. colour, figure, and contact. And fromt hese the super, celestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is without colour, without figure, and without contact. Nor does it transcend these three priva.- tively, but according to causal excellence. For it imparts to colour from intelligibles the participation of light ; on figure it confers by illumination intellectual bound ; and in contact it supernally inserts union and continuity, and perfects all things by its power, things which are touched indeed, through union, those that are figured, through the participation of bound, and those that are coloured, through the illumination of light. But it draws upward, and allures to itself every thing ineffably, and through intelligible impressions, and fills every thing with unieai goods.

. If therefore, we assert these things rightly, we must not admit the interpretHtion of those who are busily occupied in sensible colours, and contacts, and figures, and who assert that the supercclestia) place is exempt from these. For these are trifling, and by no means adapted to that place. For even nature, not only that which exists as a whole* but that also which \& partial, is exempt from sensible colours, from apparent figures, and from corporeal contact. What therefore is there venerable in this, if it is also present to natures themselves? But it is necessary to extend colours, and figures, and contacts, from on high as far as to the last of things, and to evince that the supercclestial place, is similarly exempt from all these. For soul also and intellect participate of figure; and contact is frequently in incorporeal natures, according to the communion of first with secondary beings, and it is usual to call these communications contacts, and to denominate the touchings of

CHAP. XIII.

OF PLATO.

p. 251

intellectual perceptions adhesions. We should not therefore be carried from things first to things last, nor compare the highest order of intellectuals with the last of beings, above which both soul and nature are established.