The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

s, being vivified indeed from the psychical gods, and circulating according to temporal periods ; and participating of sameness and at the same time a stable condition of forms from the intellectual gods ;' but receiving into themselves the presence of union, of measure, and of the distribution of good from the first Gods. It is necessary, therefore, either that the Gods should know that a providential care of their own offspring is natural to them, and should not only give subsistence to secondary beings, and supply them with life, essence and union, but also previously comprehend in themselves the primary cause of the goods they contain, or, which it is not lawful to assert, that being Gods, they are igooraut of what is proper and fit.

For what ignorance can there be of beautiful things, with those who are the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those who are allotted an hyparxis defined by the nature of the goodf But if they are ignorant, neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect, nor are intellects carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to these do the unities of the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves all know-

1 It is necessary here to »udt>1t the words, ex ru> vhcm; $r*v.

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ledge, which we have acknowledged they do through the former demonstrations. If, therefore, they are not deprived of knowledge, being the fathers, leaders and governors of every thing in the world, and' to them as being, such a providential care of the things governed by, and following them, and generated by them, pertains, whether shall we say that they knowing the law which is according to nature, accomplish this law, or that through imbecility they arc depri\ed of a providential attention to their possessions or progeny, for it is of no consequence as to the present discussion which of these two appellations you are willing to adopt? For if through want of power they neglect the superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of this want of power ? For they do not move things externally, nor are other tilings indeed the causes of essence, but they assume the government of the things they have produced, but they rule over all things as if from the stern of a ship, themselves supplying being* themselves containing the measures of life, and themselves distributing to things their respective energies.

but they assume the government of the things they have produced, but they rule over all things as if from the stern of a ship, themselves supplying being* themselves containing the measures of life, and themselves distributing to things their respective energies.

W hether also, are they unable to provide at once for all things, or they do not leave each of the parts destitute of their providential care ? And if they are not curators of every thing in the world, whether do they providentially superintend greater things, but neglect such as are less ? Or do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take care of the greater ? For if we deprive them of a providential attention to all things similarly y through the want of power, how, while we attribute to them a greater thing, viz. the production of all things, can we refuse to grant that which is naturally consequent to this, a providential attention to their productions ? For it is the province of the power which produces a greater thing, to dispose in a becoming manner that which is less. But if they are curators of less tilings, and neglect such as are greater, how can this mode of providence be right? For that which is more allied, and more similar to any thing, is more appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the participation of the good which that thing confers on it. If, however* the Gods think that the first of mundane natures deserve their providential care, and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable

■ »«• is omitted in the original.

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OF PT.ATO.

p. 51

to extend their regard to the last of things, what is it which can restrain the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things ? What is it which can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy ? How can those who are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern such as are less? Or how can those who produce the essence even of the smallest things, not be tlie lords of the perfection of them, through a privation of power? For all these things are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains, therefore, that the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and that they must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of things.

these things are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains, therefore, that the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and that they must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of things. But if they know that which is according to nature, and this to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care of all things, and an exuberance of power, — if this be the case, they are not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether, also, together with what has been said, is there a will of providence in them ? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge and power? And on this account are things deprived' of their providential care ? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able to accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their own offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish the hyparxis according to which they are essentialised. For the very being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they have their subsistence. But to provide for things of a subject nature, is to confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness? And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by the former demonstrations ? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing consequent to the very being of the Gods that they are good according to every virtue. And again, it is consequent to this that they do not withdraw themselves from a providential attention to secondary natures, either through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance. But to this I think it is also consequent that there is with

* For oTjagqrM it is requisite to read, xaj w*t«k

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them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide for the trhole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply of good.

Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established remote from mortal difficulty.