The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

rst union, and are far distant from it. But the unities of beings, since they derive their subsistence from the imparticipable unity, and which is exempt from the whole of things, are able to conjoin beings to the one, and to convert them to themselves.

It appears therefore to me, that Parmenides demonstrating these tilings through the second hypothesis, connects the one with being, surveys all things about the one, and evinces that this proceeding nature, and which extends its progressions as far as to the last of thing! is the one. For prior to true beings it was necessary to constitute the unities ; since it neither was nor is lawful, says Timaeus, for that which is the best of things to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful. But this is in a remarkable degree most similar to that which is best. To the one however, a unical multitude is most similar ; since the demiurgus of the universe also being good, constituted all things similar to himself through goodness itself. Much more therefore, does the fountain of all good produce goodnesses naturally united to itself, and establish them in beings. IJence there is one God, and many Gods, one unity and many unities prior to beings, and one goodness, and many after the one goodness, through which the demiurgic intellect is good, and every intellect is divine, whether it be an intellectual or intelligible intellect. And that which is primarily superessential is the one ; and there are many superessentials after the one. Whether therefore, is this multitude of unities imparticipable in the same manner as the one itself, or is it participated by beings, and is each unity of beings the flower as it were of a certain being, and the summit and center of it, about which each being 1 subsists ?

' For n it U oeccisary to read »y.

Proc. Vol. I. U

j54 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 111.

But if these unities also are imparticipable, in what do they differ from the one ? For each of them is one, and primarily subsists from the one. Or in what being more redundant than the first cause were they constituted by it ? For it is every where necessary that what is second being subordinate to that which is prior to itself, should fall short of the union of its producing' cause, and by the addition of a certain thing should hav e a diminution of the monadic simplicity of the first.

is every where necessary that what is second being subordinate to that which is prior to itself, should fall short of the union of its producing' cause, and by the addition of a certain thing should hav e a diminution of the monadic simplicity of the first. What addition therefore, can we adduce, or what redundancy besides the one, if each of these also is by itself one? For if each of them is one and many, we shall appear to transfer to them the peculiarity of being. But if each is one only, in the same manner as the one itself, why does this rank as the cause which is exempt from all things, but eac h of these is allotted a secondary dignity ? Neither therefore shall we. preserve the transcendency of the first with reference to the things posterior to it, nor can we admit that the unities proceeding from it are unconfuscd either with respect to themselves, or to the one principle of them.

But neither shall we be persuaded by Parmenides who produces the one together with being, and demonstrates that there are as many parts of the one as there are of being; that each being* also participates of the one, but that the one is every where consubsistent with being ; and in short, who asserts that the one of the second hypothesis participates of beings and is participated by being, the participation in each not being the same. For the one indeed participates of being, as not being primarily one, nor exempt from being, but as illuminating truly-existing essence. But being participates of the one, as that which is connected by it, and filled with divine union, and converted to the one itself which is imparticipable. For the participated monads conjoin beings to the one which is exempt from the whole of things, in the same manner as participated intellects conjoin souls to the intellect which ranks as a whole, and as participated souls conjoin bodies to the soul which ranks as a whole. For it is not possible that the dissimilar genera of secondary natures should be united without

1 For *a;wof it appears requisite to read rngxyomi.
'■ Here also for iv it is necessary to read o».

CHAP. ir.

OF PLATO.

p. 155

media to the cause which is exempt from multitude ; but it is necessary that the contact should be effected through similars. For a similar multitude, so far indeed as it is multitude, communicates with the dissimilar ; but so far as it is similar to the monad prior to itself, it is conjoined with it.

ude ; but it is necessary that the contact should be effected through similars. For a similar multitude, so far indeed as it is multitude, communicates with the dissimilar ; but so far as it is similar to the monad prior to itself, it is conjoined with it. Being established therefore, in the middle of both, it is united to the whole, and to the one which is prior to multitude. But it contains in itself remote progressions, and which are of themselves dissimilar to the one. Through itself also, it converts all things to that one, and thus all things are extended to the first cause of the whole of things, dissimilars indeed through similars,' but similars through themselves. For similitude itself by itself conducts and binds the many to the one, and converts secondary natures to the monads prior to them. For the very being of similars so far as they are similars is derived from the one. Hence, it conjoins multitude to that from which it is allotted its progression. And on this account similitude is that which it is, causing many things to be allied, to possess sympathy with themselves, and friendship with each other and the one.

CHAPTER II.

If however it be requisite, not only by employing the intellectual projections of Parmenides to unfold the multitude of Gods participated by beings, but also concisely to demonstrate the theory of Socrates about these particulars, we must recollect what is written in the Republic, where » he says that the light proceeding from the good is unific of intellect and of beings. For through these things the good is demonstrated to be exempt from being and essence, in the same manner as the sun is exempt from visible natures. But this light being in intelligibles illuminates them, in the same manner as the solar-form light which is iu visible na-

' For «m>/uu»> it U necessary to lead tp>tm.

p. 156

O.N THE THEOLOGY

BOOK III.

tures. For visible natures no otherwise become apparent, and known to the sight, than through the light which is ingenerated in them. All intelligibles therefore become boniform through the participation of light, and through this light, every true * being is most similar to the good. If, therefore, it makes no difference to speak of this light, or of the one (for this light conjoins intelligibles, and causes them to be one, as deriving its subsistence from the one) if this be the case, the deity proceeding from the first is participable, and all the multitude of unities is participable. And that indeed which is truly supercssential is the one.