Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former. — In the second place the person rising from sleep is the same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day before ; for what one man sees another cannot remember. And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of personal identity (atmanusmara;/a) expressed in the words, ' I am the same I was before,' would not be possible. — In the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the same person rises again, ' He hastens back again as he came, to the place from which he started, to be awake ' {Brt. Up. IV, 3, 16) ; ' All these creatures go day after day into the Brahma- world and yet do not discover it ' (K/i. Up. VIII, 3, 2) ; 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again and again ' (K^. Up. VI, 10, 2). These and similar passages met with in the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper sense only if the same soul rises again. — In the fourth place we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the injunctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period, and of knowledge ? — Moreover on the hypothesis of another person rising from sleep, that other person would either be a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal life in another body; in that case it would follow that the practical existence carried on by means of that body would be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B would rise in A's body and A in B's body), we reply that that would be an altogether useless hypothesis ; for what advantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in another ? — Or else the soul rising (in A's body) would be
2one which had obtained final release, and that would imply that final release can have an end. But it is impossible that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience. — Further, on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited for what they have done. — From all this it follows that the person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.— Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from the mass of water into which it had been poured. We admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge (of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not analogous. — Further, we point out that the flamingo, e. g. is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of distinguishing. — Moreover, what is called individual soul is not really different from the highest Self, so that it might be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop of water from the mass of water ; but, as we have explained repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts. Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep as well as of waking ; in the former it is like a seed, in the latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.
3There now arises the question of what kind that state is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned. Here the purvapakshin maintains that we know only of three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body, viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep ; to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul's passing out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from ^ruti nor Smr/ti ; hence what is called fainting must be one of the four states mentioned. — To this we make the following reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be said to be awake ; for he does not perceive external objects by means of his senses. — But, it might be objected, may not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker? Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else ; so the man also who is stunned^, e.g. by a blow, may be awake, but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time perceive anything else. — No, we reply, the case is different, on account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker says, ' For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but the arrow ; ' the man, on the other hand, who returns to consciousness from a swoon, says, ' For such a length of time I was shut up in blind darkness ; I was conscious of nothing.' — A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright ; while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake. — Nor, in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is altogether unconscious. — Nor, in the third place, is he dead ; for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former. — In the second place the person rising from sleep is the same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day before ; for what one man sees another cannot remember. And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of personal identity (atmanusmara;/a) expressed in the words, ' I am the same I was before,' would not be possible. — In the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the same person rises again, ' He hastens back again as he came, to the place from which he started, to be awake ' {Brt. Up. IV, 3, 16) ; ' All these creatures go day after day into the Brahma- world and yet do not discover it ' (K/i. Up. VIII, 3, 2) ; 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again and again ' (K^. Up. VI, 10, 2). These and similar passages met with in the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper sense only if the same soul rises again. — In the fourth place we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the injunctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period, and of knowledge ? — Moreover on the hypothesis of another person rising from sleep, that other person would either be a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal life in another body; in that case it would follow that the practical existence carried on by means of that body would be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B would rise in A's body and A in B's body), we reply that that would be an altogether useless hypothesis ; for what advantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in another ? — Or else the soul rising (in A's body) would be
2one which had obtained final release, and that would imply that final release can have an end. But it is impossible that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience. — Further, on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited for what they have done. — From all this it follows that the person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.— Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from the mass of water into which it had been poured. We admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge (of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not analogous. — Further, we point out that the flamingo, e. g. is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of distinguishing. — Moreover, what is called individual soul is not really different from the highest Self, so that it might be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop of water from the mass of water ; but, as we have explained repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts. Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep as well as of waking ; in the former it is like a seed, in the latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.
3There now arises the question of what kind that state is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned. Here the purvapakshin maintains that we know only of three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body, viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep ; to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul's passing out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from ^ruti nor Smr/ti ; hence what is called fainting must be one of the four states mentioned. — To this we make the following reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be said to be awake ; for he does not perceive external objects by means of his senses. — But, it might be objected, may not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker? Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else ; so the man also who is stunned^, e.g. by a blow, may be awake, but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time perceive anything else. — No, we reply, the case is different, on account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker says, ' For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but the arrow ; ' the man, on the other hand, who returns to consciousness from a swoon, says, ' For such a length of time I was shut up in blind darkness ; I was conscious of nothing.' — A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright ; while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake. — Nor, in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is altogether unconscious. — Nor, in the third place, is he dead ; for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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