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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1^ The purvapakshin (see next Sutra) maintains that the knowledge of the Self is subordinate to (sacrificial) action through the mediation of the agent, i. e. in so far as it imparts to the agent a certain qualification. 2 86 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are arthavadas, as in other cases, thus G'aimini opines. As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the Self also is connected with action through the mediation of its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the rice-grains with water ; hence as the purpose of the knowledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere arthavadas. Such is the opinion of the teacher 6"aimini^ The case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to the fruits of certain materials, sa;;/skaras and works ; which statements have likewise to be understood as arthavadas. Cp. the passage, ' He whose sacrificial ladle is made of par;za-wood hears no evil sound ; ' ' By anointing his eye he wards off the eye of the enemy ; ' ' By making the praya^a and anuya^a-oblations he makes an armour for the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he overcomes his enemies".' — But how can it be supposed that
2^ The contention of the purvapakshin — (xaimini — is that the knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This relation is mediated by the Self — the object of knowledge — which is the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled with water ; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modifiication (or purification, saz^^skara) they become fit to be used in the sacrifice. — As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and consequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as ' injunctions of fruits,' but merely as arthavadas, making some additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary. ^ The material, i. e. the ladle made of par«a-wood, is auxiliary to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz. hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 287
3the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of the means of proof — general subject-matter and so on — which determine such subordinate relation ? — The purvapakshin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent, on the ground of the means of proof called vakya (sentence ; syntactical unity) ^ But this we deny because in the present case ' sentence ' has no force to teach the application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacrifices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things which the text states under no particular heading may indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of ' sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not of too wide an application " ; but the agent is an intermediate link of too wide an application, since it is common to all action whether worldly or based on the Veda. The agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with the sacrifice. — Your objection is not valid, the purvapakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be guided by visible purposes ; with reference to Vedic works, on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only after the death of this body no activity would be possible
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1^ The purvapakshin (see next Sutra) maintains that the knowledge of the Self is subordinate to (sacrificial) action through the mediation of the agent, i. e. in so far as it imparts to the agent a certain qualification. 2 86 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are arthavadas, as in other cases, thus G'aimini opines. As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the Self also is connected with action through the mediation of its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the rice-grains with water ; hence as the purpose of the knowledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere arthavadas. Such is the opinion of the teacher 6"aimini^ The case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to the fruits of certain materials, sa;;/skaras and works ; which statements have likewise to be understood as arthavadas. Cp. the passage, ' He whose sacrificial ladle is made of par;za-wood hears no evil sound ; ' ' By anointing his eye he wards off the eye of the enemy ; ' ' By making the praya^a and anuya^a-oblations he makes an armour for the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he overcomes his enemies".' — But how can it be supposed that
2^ The contention of the purvapakshin — (xaimini — is that the knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This relation is mediated by the Self — the object of knowledge — which is the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled with water ; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modifiication (or purification, saz^^skara) they become fit to be used in the sacrifice. — As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and consequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as ' injunctions of fruits,' but merely as arthavadas, making some additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary. ^ The material, i. e. the ladle made of par«a-wood, is auxiliary to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz. hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 287
3the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of the means of proof — general subject-matter and so on — which determine such subordinate relation ? — The purvapakshin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent, on the ground of the means of proof called vakya (sentence ; syntactical unity) ^ But this we deny because in the present case ' sentence ' has no force to teach the application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacrifices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things which the text states under no particular heading may indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of ' sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not of too wide an application " ; but the agent is an intermediate link of too wide an application, since it is common to all action whether worldly or based on the Veda. The agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with the sacrifice. — Your objection is not valid, the purvapakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be guided by visible purposes ; with reference to Vedic works, on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only after the death of this body no activity would be possible
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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