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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1That the soul although atomic produces efifects extending over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the chamber. — This Sutra has the purpose of removing the doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment, because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles ; that, however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the whole body. — But how can a quality extend beyond that in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere ? We certainly do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp; for that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a substance. The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its particles crowded close to one another ; the light diffused from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin and scattered. — The reply to this objection is given in the next Sutra. 26- The extending beyond is as in the case of odour.
2Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the odorous substance — as appears from the fact of our perceiving odour even without actually grasping flowers which are the seat of odour — so the quality of intelligence also may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic. It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it is a quality ; for we see that odour although a mere quality does separate itself from its substratum. — The objection that odour also separates itself from its substance II ADIIYAYA, 3 PADA, 27. 4 1
3only with the substance (i. e. parts of the substance) we do not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away of the fundamental substance from which the separation of parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away, we conclude from its remaining in its former condition ; otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities belonging to it in its former state. — Well, but perhaps the separation of the particles in which odour resides is not noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce the sensation of smell. — This we cannot admit, because the atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for instance, from the blossoms of the nagakei-ara-tree, a very strong odour is perceived ^. Accoi'ding to the generally prevailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell the odour only. — The objection that, because we do not perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their substratum, we have no right to assume that odour does so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that conclusion-, on account of the (actually existing) perception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance). Logicians must shape their inferences in such a way as to make them agree with ordinary obser\'ation, not in any other way. For, to quote another instance, the circumstance that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general inference that colour and the other qualities also are perceived by means of the tongue.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1That the soul although atomic produces efifects extending over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the chamber. — This Sutra has the purpose of removing the doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment, because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles ; that, however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the whole body. — But how can a quality extend beyond that in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere ? We certainly do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp; for that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a substance. The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its particles crowded close to one another ; the light diffused from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin and scattered. — The reply to this objection is given in the next Sutra. 26- The extending beyond is as in the case of odour.
2Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the odorous substance — as appears from the fact of our perceiving odour even without actually grasping flowers which are the seat of odour — so the quality of intelligence also may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic. It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it is a quality ; for we see that odour although a mere quality does separate itself from its substratum. — The objection that odour also separates itself from its substance II ADIIYAYA, 3 PADA, 27. 4 1
3only with the substance (i. e. parts of the substance) we do not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away of the fundamental substance from which the separation of parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away, we conclude from its remaining in its former condition ; otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities belonging to it in its former state. — Well, but perhaps the separation of the particles in which odour resides is not noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce the sensation of smell. — This we cannot admit, because the atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for instance, from the blossoms of the nagakei-ara-tree, a very strong odour is perceived ^. Accoi'ding to the generally prevailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell the odour only. — The objection that, because we do not perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their substratum, we have no right to assume that odour does so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that conclusion-, on account of the (actually existing) perception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance). Logicians must shape their inferences in such a way as to make them agree with ordinary obser\'ation, not in any other way. For, to quote another instance, the circumstance that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general inference that colour and the other qualities also are perceived by means of the tongue.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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