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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this conclusion we reply, ' Separate,^ &c. Although the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be considered as separate ' on account of the difference of words and the like.' — For the text exhibits a difference of words such as 'he knows,' 'let him meditate,' 'let him form the idea' (cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, i). And difference of terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts, according to Purva Mimawsa-sutras II, 2, i. — The clause 'and the like' in the Sutra intimates that also qualities and so on may be employed, according to circumstances, as reasons for the separateness of acts. — But, an objection is raised, from passages such as ' he knows ' and so on we indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such clauses as ' he sacrifices ' and the like (ya^ate, ^uhoti, dadati). For all these words (viz. veda, upasita, &c.) denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind, and another meaning is not possible in their case ^. How then does difference of vidya follow from difference of words? — This objection is without force, we reply; for although all those words equally denote a certain activity of the mind only, yet a difference of vidya may result from a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according to its general purport each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord ; and similarly, although one and the same Prawa is the object of meditation in the other series
2of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated upon in one place and another in another place. From difference of connexion there thus follows difference of injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separateness of the vidyas. Nor can it be maintained (as the purvapakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction of the vidya itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities; for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidyavidhi and which the gu«avidhis), and as in each passage more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a vidya established elsewhere ^. Nor should, in the case of the purvapakshin's view being the true one, the qualities which are common to several passages, such as ' having true wishes,' be repeated more than once. Nor can the different sections be combined into one syntactical whole, because in each one a certain kind of meditation is enjoined on those who have a certain wish, whence we understand that the passage is complete in itself^. Nor is there in the present case an additional injunction of a meditation on something whole — such as there is in the case of the cognition of the Vaii-vanara — owing to the force of which the meditations on the single parts which are contained in each section would combine themselves into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cognition being one we should admit unity of vidya without any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether impossible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere in the Upanishads). The Sutra therefore rightly declares the separateness of the vidyas. — The present adhikarawa being thus settled, the first Sutra of the pada has now to be considered ^
3^ For to enjoin in one passage several qualities — none of which is established already — would involve an objectionable vakyabheda. ^ A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but evince an akahksha, a desire of complementation. ^ I.e. the present adhikarawa ought in reality to head the entire pada. 2 8o vedanta-sCtras. 59. There is (restriction to) option (between the vidyas), on account of their having non-differing results.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this conclusion we reply, ' Separate,^ &c. Although the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be considered as separate ' on account of the difference of words and the like.' — For the text exhibits a difference of words such as 'he knows,' 'let him meditate,' 'let him form the idea' (cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, i). And difference of terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts, according to Purva Mimawsa-sutras II, 2, i. — The clause 'and the like' in the Sutra intimates that also qualities and so on may be employed, according to circumstances, as reasons for the separateness of acts. — But, an objection is raised, from passages such as ' he knows ' and so on we indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such clauses as ' he sacrifices ' and the like (ya^ate, ^uhoti, dadati). For all these words (viz. veda, upasita, &c.) denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind, and another meaning is not possible in their case ^. How then does difference of vidya follow from difference of words? — This objection is without force, we reply; for although all those words equally denote a certain activity of the mind only, yet a difference of vidya may result from a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according to its general purport each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord ; and similarly, although one and the same Prawa is the object of meditation in the other series
2of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated upon in one place and another in another place. From difference of connexion there thus follows difference of injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separateness of the vidyas. Nor can it be maintained (as the purvapakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction of the vidya itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities; for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidyavidhi and which the gu«avidhis), and as in each passage more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a vidya established elsewhere ^. Nor should, in the case of the purvapakshin's view being the true one, the qualities which are common to several passages, such as ' having true wishes,' be repeated more than once. Nor can the different sections be combined into one syntactical whole, because in each one a certain kind of meditation is enjoined on those who have a certain wish, whence we understand that the passage is complete in itself^. Nor is there in the present case an additional injunction of a meditation on something whole — such as there is in the case of the cognition of the Vaii-vanara — owing to the force of which the meditations on the single parts which are contained in each section would combine themselves into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cognition being one we should admit unity of vidya without any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether impossible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere in the Upanishads). The Sutra therefore rightly declares the separateness of the vidyas. — The present adhikarawa being thus settled, the first Sutra of the pada has now to be considered ^
3^ For to enjoin in one passage several qualities — none of which is established already — would involve an objectionable vakyabheda. ^ A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but evince an akahksha, a desire of complementation. ^ I.e. the present adhikarawa ought in reality to head the entire pada. 2 8o vedanta-sCtras. 59. There is (restriction to) option (between the vidyas), on account of their having non-differing results.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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