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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In all the Vedanta-texts we meet with promissory statements of the following nature : — ' That by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not known' {Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) ; 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known ' (Brz. Up. IV, ^,^)\ ' Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known? ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 3) ; ' Outside that which is there is no knowledge.' These promissory statements are not abandoned, i. e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of knowledge ; for if there were any difference, the affirmation that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known, would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things originates from the one Brahman. And we understand from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be established only through the theory of the non-difference of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation contained in the clause ' That by which we hear what is not heard,' &c., is proved by the analogous instances of clay, &c., which all aim at showing the identity of effect and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent clauses also (' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second ; it thought ; it sent forth fire,' &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman, viz. from the passage ' In it all that exists has its Self (VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the prapa//^aka. — If, now, the ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not be known by Brahman being known, and that would involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation ; an
2alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable. — Similarly in all the Vedanta-texts certain passages are to be found which, by means of various instances, make the same affirmation, so e. g. ' This everything, all is that Self ' {Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is that Immortal before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, ii). — Hence, like fire and the other substances, the ether also is a product. — The averment made by the purvapakshin that on account of the absence of scriptural statements the ether is not a product is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. ' from that Self sprang ether.' — True, — the purvapakshin may reply, — such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but it is contradicted by another statement, viz. ' It sent forth fire,' &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no contradiction, because all scriptural passages form one whole, the reply is that all non-contradictory passages form a whole ; in the present case, however, a contradiction has been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned only once, cannot be connected with two things created ; because two things cannot both be created first ; and because an option is, in that case, inadmissible ^. — This reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it is impossible to explain the passage of the Taittiriyaka in any modified sense ; for it distinctly declares that fire was produced in the third place, ' From that Self sprang the ether, from ether air, from air fire.' But, on the other hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage from the K/iandogya., which may be explained to mean that ' Brahman, after having created ether and air, created fire.' For as the purport of this passage is to relate the origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the account of the origin of ether given in another passage ; according to the principle that to one and the same sentence a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the
3^ For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the other was created first. II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6. II other hand, one creator may successively create more than one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scriptural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator mentioned only once is to be connected with two created things ; for the other (second) created thing is supplied from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced from Brahman — which is stated directly in the passage ' Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as beginning, ending and breathing in it' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, i) — does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to begin with fire ; so also the statement as to fire being produced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to begin with ether.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In all the Vedanta-texts we meet with promissory statements of the following nature : — ' That by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not known' {Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) ; 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known ' (Brz. Up. IV, ^,^)\ ' Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known? ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 3) ; ' Outside that which is there is no knowledge.' These promissory statements are not abandoned, i. e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of knowledge ; for if there were any difference, the affirmation that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known, would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things originates from the one Brahman. And we understand from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be established only through the theory of the non-difference of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation contained in the clause ' That by which we hear what is not heard,' &c., is proved by the analogous instances of clay, &c., which all aim at showing the identity of effect and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent clauses also (' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second ; it thought ; it sent forth fire,' &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman, viz. from the passage ' In it all that exists has its Self (VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the prapa//^aka. — If, now, the ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not be known by Brahman being known, and that would involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation ; an
2alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable. — Similarly in all the Vedanta-texts certain passages are to be found which, by means of various instances, make the same affirmation, so e. g. ' This everything, all is that Self ' {Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is that Immortal before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, ii). — Hence, like fire and the other substances, the ether also is a product. — The averment made by the purvapakshin that on account of the absence of scriptural statements the ether is not a product is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. ' from that Self sprang ether.' — True, — the purvapakshin may reply, — such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but it is contradicted by another statement, viz. ' It sent forth fire,' &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no contradiction, because all scriptural passages form one whole, the reply is that all non-contradictory passages form a whole ; in the present case, however, a contradiction has been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned only once, cannot be connected with two things created ; because two things cannot both be created first ; and because an option is, in that case, inadmissible ^. — This reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it is impossible to explain the passage of the Taittiriyaka in any modified sense ; for it distinctly declares that fire was produced in the third place, ' From that Self sprang the ether, from ether air, from air fire.' But, on the other hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage from the K/iandogya., which may be explained to mean that ' Brahman, after having created ether and air, created fire.' For as the purport of this passage is to relate the origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the account of the origin of ether given in another passage ; according to the principle that to one and the same sentence a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the
3^ For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the other was created first. II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6. II other hand, one creator may successively create more than one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scriptural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator mentioned only once is to be connected with two created things ; for the other (second) created thing is supplied from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced from Brahman — which is stated directly in the passage ' Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as beginning, ending and breathing in it' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, i) — does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to begin with fire ; so also the statement as to fire being produced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to begin with ether.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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