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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The preceding demonstration that the texts calling Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally, and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality must be accepted as they stand, moreover, serves to prove that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited. — That the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts proclaiming its extent, &c., cp. iiT/z. Up. VIII, i, 3, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart ; ' ' Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal ; ' * He is greater than the sky, greater than the ether' (5at. Br. X, 6, 3, 2) ; ' He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable ' (Bha. Gita II, 24) ; and other similar passages from .Sruti and Smr/ti. 38. From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the fruit (of works) ; for (that only) is possible. We now turn to another characteristic belonging to Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of his rule. — There arises the question whether the threefold fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 39. 181
2sa;«sara-state — viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the two — spring from the actions themselves or come from the Lord. — The Sutrakara embraces the latter alternative, on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsistence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of effecting all those modes of requital which are in accordance with the merit of the agents ; actions, on the other hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of bringing about results at some future time, since nothing can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be overcome by the assumption that an action passes away only after having produced some result according to its nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such only through being enjoyed by the agent ; only at the moment when some pleasure or some pain— the result of some deed — is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people understand it to be a ' fruit.' — Nor, in the second place, have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous principle (apurva), which itself is supposed to be a direct result of the deed ; for that so-called supersensuous principle is something of non-intelligent nature, comparable to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an apurva. — But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are actually requited ? — By no means, we reply ; for the fact of requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.
339. And because it is declareci by scripture. We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions, not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but also because we have direct scriptural statement on our side. Cp. e.g. the passage, ' This indeed is the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth ' {Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24). 1 82 vedanta-sOtras. 40. 6^aimini (thinks) for the same reasons that rehgioLis merit (is what brings about the fruits of actions).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The preceding demonstration that the texts calling Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally, and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality must be accepted as they stand, moreover, serves to prove that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited. — That the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts proclaiming its extent, &c., cp. iiT/z. Up. VIII, i, 3, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart ; ' ' Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal ; ' * He is greater than the sky, greater than the ether' (5at. Br. X, 6, 3, 2) ; ' He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable ' (Bha. Gita II, 24) ; and other similar passages from .Sruti and Smr/ti. 38. From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the fruit (of works) ; for (that only) is possible. We now turn to another characteristic belonging to Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of his rule. — There arises the question whether the threefold fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 39. 181
2sa;«sara-state — viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the two — spring from the actions themselves or come from the Lord. — The Sutrakara embraces the latter alternative, on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsistence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of effecting all those modes of requital which are in accordance with the merit of the agents ; actions, on the other hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of bringing about results at some future time, since nothing can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be overcome by the assumption that an action passes away only after having produced some result according to its nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such only through being enjoyed by the agent ; only at the moment when some pleasure or some pain— the result of some deed — is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people understand it to be a ' fruit.' — Nor, in the second place, have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous principle (apurva), which itself is supposed to be a direct result of the deed ; for that so-called supersensuous principle is something of non-intelligent nature, comparable to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an apurva. — But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are actually requited ? — By no means, we reply ; for the fact of requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.
339. And because it is declareci by scripture. We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions, not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but also because we have direct scriptural statement on our side. Cp. e.g. the passage, ' This indeed is the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth ' {Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24). 1 82 vedanta-sOtras. 40. 6^aimini (thinks) for the same reasons that rehgioLis merit (is what brings about the fruits of actions).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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