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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this w^e make the following reply. As both texts equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be taken as constituting' one vidya only. In both passages question and answer equally refer to a Self which is within everything. For in one body there cannot be two Selfs, each of which is inside everything else. One Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything, but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any more than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the element of fire within the element of water ; but each of these elements is ' within all ' in a relative sense only, not in the literal sense of the phrase. — Or else the ' like the aggregate of the elements (or beings) ' of the Sutra has to be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. Sve. Up. VI, II, ' He is the one god, hidden in all beings, allpervading, the Self within all beings.' As this mantra records that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings, Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 36. 243 the same holds good with regard to the two Brahmawapassages. And the object of knowledge being one, the vidya also is one only. 36. If it be said that otherwise the separation (of the statements) cannot be accounted for ; we reply that it is (here) as in the case of other instructions.
2We yet have to refute the remark made by the purvapakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyas be admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases. In the sixth prapa//zaka of the upanishad of the TziJidlns the instruction conveyed in the words, ' That is the Self, thou art that, O .Svetaketu,'' is repeated nine times, and yet the one vidya is not thereby split into many. Similarly in our case. — But how do you know that the vidya remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repetition ? — Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding clauses show that all those passages have the same sense. For the repeated request on the part of vSvetaketu, ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' shows that one and the same matter is again and again proposed for further discussion, and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two introductory questions and the equality of the concluding clauses, ' Everything else is of evil,' show that both sections refer to one and the same matter. — Moreover, in the second question the text adds the word ' just ' (eva), ' Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., which shows that the second question refers to the same matter as the first one. That the matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish by pointing out that the former section declares the existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends all the attributes of the Sa;;zsa.ra state, such as hunger, thirst, and so on. — The two, sections, therefore, form one vidya only.
3R 2 244 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 37. There is exchange (of meditation), for the texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other cases. The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in the sun, ' What I am, that is he ; what he is, that am I ' (Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6). And the Gkhk\a.s say, ' I am thou indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.' — The doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this text is to be a double one 'by means of exchange' (i.e. whether the soul is to be meditated upon as iditya and ^ditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being meditated upon as aditya). The purvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says, the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul's being the Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord's being the Self of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness of the Self.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this w^e make the following reply. As both texts equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be taken as constituting' one vidya only. In both passages question and answer equally refer to a Self which is within everything. For in one body there cannot be two Selfs, each of which is inside everything else. One Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything, but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any more than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the element of fire within the element of water ; but each of these elements is ' within all ' in a relative sense only, not in the literal sense of the phrase. — Or else the ' like the aggregate of the elements (or beings) ' of the Sutra has to be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. Sve. Up. VI, II, ' He is the one god, hidden in all beings, allpervading, the Self within all beings.' As this mantra records that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings, Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 36. 243 the same holds good with regard to the two Brahmawapassages. And the object of knowledge being one, the vidya also is one only. 36. If it be said that otherwise the separation (of the statements) cannot be accounted for ; we reply that it is (here) as in the case of other instructions.
2We yet have to refute the remark made by the purvapakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyas be admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases. In the sixth prapa//zaka of the upanishad of the TziJidlns the instruction conveyed in the words, ' That is the Self, thou art that, O .Svetaketu,'' is repeated nine times, and yet the one vidya is not thereby split into many. Similarly in our case. — But how do you know that the vidya remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repetition ? — Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding clauses show that all those passages have the same sense. For the repeated request on the part of vSvetaketu, ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' shows that one and the same matter is again and again proposed for further discussion, and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two introductory questions and the equality of the concluding clauses, ' Everything else is of evil,' show that both sections refer to one and the same matter. — Moreover, in the second question the text adds the word ' just ' (eva), ' Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., which shows that the second question refers to the same matter as the first one. That the matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish by pointing out that the former section declares the existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends all the attributes of the Sa;;zsa.ra state, such as hunger, thirst, and so on. — The two, sections, therefore, form one vidya only.
3R 2 244 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 37. There is exchange (of meditation), for the texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other cases. The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in the sun, ' What I am, that is he ; what he is, that am I ' (Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6). And the Gkhk\a.s say, ' I am thou indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.' — The doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this text is to be a double one 'by means of exchange' (i.e. whether the soul is to be meditated upon as iditya and ^ditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being meditated upon as aditya). The purvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says, the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul's being the Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord's being the Self of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness of the Self.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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