The Vedânta-Sûtras, Part II, with the Commentary by Sankarâkârya — SBE Vol. 38
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The translator’s English as printed (George Thibaut). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
In connexion with the doctrine that the soul possesses for its essence the qualities of the buddhi, another attribute of the soul is set forth. — The individual soul is an agent, because thus scripture has a purport. For only on that assumption scriptural injunctions (such as ' He is to sacrifice,' ' He is to make an oblation into the fire.' ' He is to give,' &c.) acquire a purport ; otherwise they would be purportless. For they all teach special acts to be done by agents ; which would not be possible if the soul did not possess the quality of being an agent. — On that supposition a meaning belongs to the following passage also, ' For it is he who sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he the person whose Self is knowledge ' (Pr. Up. IV, 9).
34. And on account of (the text) teaching its wandering about.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the soul for that reason also, that, in a chapter treating of the soul, the text declares it to wander about in the state of sleep, ' The immortal one goes wherever he likes ' (Brz. Up.
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50 vedanta-sOtras.
IV, 3, 1 2) ; and again, ' He moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body' (Bri. Up. II, r, 18).
35. On account of its taking.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the soul for that reason also that in the same chapter treating of the soul the text speaks of the soul taking its instruments, ' Having taken, through the intelligence of the senses, intelligence/ and ' having taken the senses ' (Brz. Up. II, I, 18; 17).
36. (The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to actions ; if it were not such, there would be a change of designation.
The quality of being an agent belongs to the soul for that reason also that the sacred texts speak of its agency in sacred and secular actions, * Understanding performs the sacrifice, it performs all acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5). — But, an objection may here be raised, we have seen that the word ' understanding ' applies to the buddhi ; how then can it indicate the circumstance of the soul being an agent? — The soul only, we reply, is designated there, not the buddhi. If the soul were not meant to be designated, there would be a change in the designation, i. e. the passage would run, ' through understanding it performs,' &c. For we see that in another passage where the buddhi is meant the word 'understanding' is exhibited in the instrumental form, ' Having through the understanding (intelligence) of these senses taken all understanding' [Bri. Up. II, t, 17). In the passage under discussion, on the other hand, the word ' understanding ' is given in the case characteristic of the agent (viz. the nominative), and therefore indicates the Self which is distinct from the buddhi. Hence your objection is not valid. — Another objection is raised. If the soul in so far as distinct from the buddhi were the agent, it would, because it is independent, bring about exclusively what is pleasant and useful to itself, not the opposite. We, however, observe that it does bring about the opposite also. But such an unrestricted proceeding does not become
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