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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1396 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. contentment of mind ; and from the fact that scripture blames the false notion of (the reaHty of) effects, 'From death to death goes he who sees here any difference ' (Ka. Up. II, 4, lo). The texts negativing all difference cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the origination of the world and so on have no similar power of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire. At the same time it is manifest that they have another (than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having said at first, ' Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot be without a root' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end that Being which is the root of the world is the only object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. Ill, i, ' That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know that ; that is Brahman." As thus the passages about origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self, Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers, and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going. — And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text Br?'. Up. IV, 4, 6 (' Of him the pra;zas do not depart ; being Brahman he goes to Brahman '), denies any going to the highest Brahman.
2Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes, i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from Brahman ; for if the two were absolutely identical no going could take place. — Well, what then ? — We reply as follows. If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be without parts. — The same objection lies against the hypothesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman ; for also that which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from the clay which constitutes its Self; were it so apart it would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to IV ADIIYAYA, 5 PAD A, 1 4. 397
3which the parts or the effects would belong, i. e. Brahman is altogether unchanging, its entering into the Sawsara state could not be accounted for. — Let then, in the third place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for. The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this work (II, 3, 19 ff.). And from the soul's being different from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such texts as 'Thou art that' are futile. This latter objection also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different from the whole and the causal substance ; for that kind of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense. — From all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the soul cannot obtain final release, because its Sawsara condition could never come to an end. Or else, if that condition should come to an end, it would follow that the very essence of the soul perishes ; for those theories do not admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1396 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. contentment of mind ; and from the fact that scripture blames the false notion of (the reaHty of) effects, 'From death to death goes he who sees here any difference ' (Ka. Up. II, 4, lo). The texts negativing all difference cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the origination of the world and so on have no similar power of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire. At the same time it is manifest that they have another (than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having said at first, ' Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot be without a root' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end that Being which is the root of the world is the only object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. Ill, i, ' That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know that ; that is Brahman." As thus the passages about origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self, Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers, and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going. — And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text Br?'. Up. IV, 4, 6 (' Of him the pra;zas do not depart ; being Brahman he goes to Brahman '), denies any going to the highest Brahman.
2Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes, i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from Brahman ; for if the two were absolutely identical no going could take place. — Well, what then ? — We reply as follows. If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be without parts. — The same objection lies against the hypothesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman ; for also that which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from the clay which constitutes its Self; were it so apart it would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to IV ADIIYAYA, 5 PAD A, 1 4. 397
3which the parts or the effects would belong, i. e. Brahman is altogether unchanging, its entering into the Sawsara state could not be accounted for. — Let then, in the third place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for. The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this work (II, 3, 19 ff.). And from the soul's being different from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such texts as 'Thou art that' are futile. This latter objection also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different from the whole and the causal substance ; for that kind of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense. — From all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the soul cannot obtain final release, because its Sawsara condition could never come to an end. Or else, if that condition should come to an end, it would follow that the very essence of the soul perishes ; for those theories do not admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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