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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Now similar differences of form are met with in the Vedanta-texts ; the followers of one 6"akha, e. g. mention, in the chapter called ' the knowledge of the five fires,' a sixth fire, while other 5akhas mention five only ; and in the colloquy of the prawas some texts mention a lesser, others a greater number of organs and powers of the body. — In the third place differences in qualifying particulars (dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts ; only in the Mu;/^aka-Upanishad. e. g. it is said that the science of Brahman must be imparted to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, lo). — In the same way the other reasons which are admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repetition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to the different Vedanta-texts also. — We therefore maintain that each separate Vedanta-text teaches a different cognition of Brahman.
2To this argumentation of the purvapakshin we make the following reply.— The cognitions enjoined by all the Vedanta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference of injunction and so on. The ' and so on ' refers to the other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are enumerated in the Siddhanta-sutra of the adhikara;?a treating of the different 5akhas (Pu. Mi. II, 4, 9, ' (the act) is one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form, of injunction, and of name '). Thus, as the agnihotra though described in different 5akhas is yet one, the same kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of the words, ' He is to offer ; ' so the injunction met with in the text of the V%-asaneyins (Br/. Up. VI, i, i), ' He who knows the oldest and the best,' &c., is the same as that which occurs in the text of the K/iandogas, 'He who knows the first and the best' {K/i. Up. V, i, 1). The connexion of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the same in both texts, 'He becomes the first and best among his people.' In both texts again the cognition enjoined has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge is the true nature of the pra;^a which is characterised by Ill ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, 2. 1 87
3certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name, viz. the knowledge of the pra«a. — For these reasons we declare that the different Vedanta-texts enjoin identical cognitions. — A similar line of reasoning applies to other cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedantatext, so e. g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the knowledge of Vaijvanara, the knowledge of Sa^idilya. and so on. — Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the purvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the Purva Mima;;2sa-sutras II, 4, 10 ff. The next Sutra disposes of a doubt which may remain even after the preceding discussion. 2. (If it be said that the vidyas are separate) on account of the difference (of secondary matters), we deny that, since even in one and the same vidya (different secondary matters may find place).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Now similar differences of form are met with in the Vedanta-texts ; the followers of one 6"akha, e. g. mention, in the chapter called ' the knowledge of the five fires,' a sixth fire, while other 5akhas mention five only ; and in the colloquy of the prawas some texts mention a lesser, others a greater number of organs and powers of the body. — In the third place differences in qualifying particulars (dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts ; only in the Mu;/^aka-Upanishad. e. g. it is said that the science of Brahman must be imparted to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, lo). — In the same way the other reasons which are admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repetition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to the different Vedanta-texts also. — We therefore maintain that each separate Vedanta-text teaches a different cognition of Brahman.
2To this argumentation of the purvapakshin we make the following reply.— The cognitions enjoined by all the Vedanta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference of injunction and so on. The ' and so on ' refers to the other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are enumerated in the Siddhanta-sutra of the adhikara;?a treating of the different 5akhas (Pu. Mi. II, 4, 9, ' (the act) is one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form, of injunction, and of name '). Thus, as the agnihotra though described in different 5akhas is yet one, the same kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of the words, ' He is to offer ; ' so the injunction met with in the text of the V%-asaneyins (Br/. Up. VI, i, i), ' He who knows the oldest and the best,' &c., is the same as that which occurs in the text of the K/iandogas, 'He who knows the first and the best' {K/i. Up. V, i, 1). The connexion of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the same in both texts, 'He becomes the first and best among his people.' In both texts again the cognition enjoined has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge is the true nature of the pra;^a which is characterised by Ill ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, 2. 1 87
3certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name, viz. the knowledge of the pra«a. — For these reasons we declare that the different Vedanta-texts enjoin identical cognitions. — A similar line of reasoning applies to other cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedantatext, so e. g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the knowledge of Vaijvanara, the knowledge of Sa^idilya. and so on. — Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the purvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the Purva Mima;;2sa-sutras II, 4, 10 ff. The next Sutra disposes of a doubt which may remain even after the preceding discussion. 2. (If it be said that the vidyas are separate) on account of the difference (of secondary matters), we deny that, since even in one and the same vidya (different secondary matters may find place).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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