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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these two words stand to each other is the relation of superimposition (adhyasa) or sublation (apavada) or unity (ekatva) or specification (vij-esha;^a) ; for prima facie each of these relations may present itself to the mind. — Adhyasa takes place when the idea of one of two things not being dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is superimposed on that of the first thing ; so that together with the superimposed idea the former idea remains attached to the thing on which the second idea is superimposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the superimposition of the idea of the god Vishwu on a statue of Vish;^u. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea of the udgitha may be superimposed on the omkara or the idea of the omkara on the udgitha. — We, in the second place, have apavada when an idea previously attached to some object is recognised as false and driven out by the true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later — and expressed by judgments such as 'Thou art that' — that the idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgitha may drive out the idea of the omkara or vice versa. — The relation would, in the third place, be that of ' unity ' if the terms ' omkara ' and ' udgitha ' were co-extensive in meaning ; just as the terms, ' the Best of the Twice-born,' ' the Brahma/za,' ' the god among men,' all denote an individual of the noblest caste. — The relation will, finally, be that of specification if, there being a possibility of our understanding the omkara in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas, the term 'udgitha' calls up the idea of the sphere of action of the udgatrz. The passage would then mean, ' Let a man meditate on that omkara which is the udgitha,' and would
21 98 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. be analogous to an injunction such as ' Let him bring that lotus-flower which is blue.' All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the question must remain an unsettled one. To this purvapaksha-view the Sutra replies, 'And on account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate.'
3The word ' and ' stands here in place of ' but,' and is meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable ; the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be adopted. — The objections lying against the first three alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyasa we should have to admit that the word which expresses the idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense, but in an implied sense ^ ; and we should moreover have to imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind ^. Nor can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as scripture itself mentions it in the passage, 'He becomes indeed a fulfiUer of desires' (I, i, 7); for this passage indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the udgitha on the omkara, but of the meditation in which the omkara is viewed as the fulfilment of desires. — Against the hypothesis of an apavada there likewise lies the objection that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong knowledge can certainly not be alleged as such ; for we see no reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkara is udgitha and not omkara or vice versa should be beneficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other is moreover not even possible in our case ; for to the omkara the idea of the omkara remains always attached, and so to the udgitha the idea of the udgitha. The passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these two words stand to each other is the relation of superimposition (adhyasa) or sublation (apavada) or unity (ekatva) or specification (vij-esha;^a) ; for prima facie each of these relations may present itself to the mind. — Adhyasa takes place when the idea of one of two things not being dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is superimposed on that of the first thing ; so that together with the superimposed idea the former idea remains attached to the thing on which the second idea is superimposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the superimposition of the idea of the god Vishwu on a statue of Vish;^u. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea of the udgitha may be superimposed on the omkara or the idea of the omkara on the udgitha. — We, in the second place, have apavada when an idea previously attached to some object is recognised as false and driven out by the true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later — and expressed by judgments such as 'Thou art that' — that the idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgitha may drive out the idea of the omkara or vice versa. — The relation would, in the third place, be that of ' unity ' if the terms ' omkara ' and ' udgitha ' were co-extensive in meaning ; just as the terms, ' the Best of the Twice-born,' ' the Brahma/za,' ' the god among men,' all denote an individual of the noblest caste. — The relation will, finally, be that of specification if, there being a possibility of our understanding the omkara in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas, the term 'udgitha' calls up the idea of the sphere of action of the udgatrz. The passage would then mean, ' Let a man meditate on that omkara which is the udgitha,' and would
21 98 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. be analogous to an injunction such as ' Let him bring that lotus-flower which is blue.' All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the question must remain an unsettled one. To this purvapaksha-view the Sutra replies, 'And on account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate.'
3The word ' and ' stands here in place of ' but,' and is meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable ; the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be adopted. — The objections lying against the first three alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyasa we should have to admit that the word which expresses the idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense, but in an implied sense ^ ; and we should moreover have to imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind ^. Nor can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as scripture itself mentions it in the passage, 'He becomes indeed a fulfiUer of desires' (I, i, 7); for this passage indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the udgitha on the omkara, but of the meditation in which the omkara is viewed as the fulfilment of desires. — Against the hypothesis of an apavada there likewise lies the objection that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong knowledge can certainly not be alleged as such ; for we see no reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkara is udgitha and not omkara or vice versa should be beneficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other is moreover not even possible in our case ; for to the omkara the idea of the omkara remains always attached, and so to the udgitha the idea of the udgitha. The passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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