The Vedânta-Sûtras, Part II, with the Commentary by Sankarâkârya — SBE Vol. 38

This we deny, on account of the non-difference (of the organs from the elements). If the organs themselves are of the nature of the elements, their origination and retractation are the same as those of the elements, and we therefore have not to look out in their case for a different order. And that the organs are of the nature of the elements^ for that we have inferential marks, in passages such as the following, ' for mind, my child, consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire ' (K/i. Up. VI, 6, 5). That the organs (although in reality belonging to the elements) are sometimes mentioned separately from them, is to be understood in the same way as when the Parivra^akas (mendicant Brahma/zas) are spoken of separately from the Br^hmawas. And supposing even that the organs are not of the nature of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements

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would not be interfered with by the organs ; for we might assume either that the organs are produced first and the elements last ; or else that the elements are produced first and the organs last. In the Atharva/^a-upanishad quoted above we have merely a serial enumeration of the organs and the elements, not a statement as to the order of their origination. Similarly in other places also the series of the organs is recorded apart from the series of the elements ; so, for instance, in the following passage, ' Pra^apati indeed was all this in the beginning, he reflected on himself; he sent forth mind ; there was mind only ; mind reflected on itself ; it sent forth speech,' &c. — Hence the origination of the organs does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the elements.

1 6. But the designation (as being born and dying) abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and nonmoving ; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends on the existence of that (i.e. the body).

On account of certain popular modes of expression such as ' Devadatta is born,' ' Devadatta has died," and the like, and on account of certain ceremonies such as the Catakakarman, some people might fall into the error of thinking that the individual soul has a beginning, and in the end undergoes destruction. This error we are going to dispel. — The individual soul has no beginning and is not subject to dissolution, since thus only it can be connected with the results of actions, as the vS'astra teaches. If the individual soul perished after the body, there would be no sense in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant things in another body (another birth). And scripture says, ' This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the living soul does not die' {Kh. Up. VI, ii, 3). — But it has been pointed out above that ordinary language speaks of the birth and the death of the individual soul ! — True ; but the terms ' birth ' and ' death,' if applied to the soul, have to

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