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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacrificial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of bricks (as was asserted by the purvapakshin in Sutra 45). For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial action by means of those energies with which the original agni assists it, viz. by bearing theahavaniya fire and so on. — The assertion, again, made by the purvapakshin (Sutra 46) that 'transference' strengthens his view in so far as transference is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted by the remark that also on our view transference is possible, since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so far as both are fire-altars. — And that direct enunciation and so on favour our conclusion has been shown. — From connexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent. — ' As in the case of the separateness of other cognitions.' As other cognitions, such as e. g. the SandWya-vidya, which have each their own particular connexion, separate themselves from works and other cognitions and are independent ; so it is in our case also. — Moreover 'there is seen' an analogous case of independence from the leading subject-matter. The offering called avesh/i which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of the ra^asuya-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the ra^asuya can be offered by a member of the warrior caste only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in the Purva Mim^;«sa-sutras).
251. Not also on account of its resembling (the manasa cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an action); for it is observed (on the ground of ^'ruti, &c., that they are independent); as in the case of death ; for the world does not become (a fire) (because it resembles a fire in some points). Against the allegation made by the purvapakshin that the present case is analogous to that of the manasa cup, we Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 52. 267 remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they may resemble the manasa cup, since on the ground of direct enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action). Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or other ; but in spite of that there remains the individual dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case is analogous to that of death. In the passages, 'The man in that orb is death indeed' (.Sat. Bra. X, 5, 2, 3), and 'Agni indeed is death ' (Taitt. Sawh. V, i, 10, 3), the term 'death ' is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun ; all the same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if the text says in another place, ' This world is a fire indeed, O Gotama ; the sun is its fuel,' &c. {Kh. Up.V, 4, i), it does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case.
352. And from the subsequent (Brahma/^a) it follows that being of that kind (i.e. injunction of a mere vidya) (is the aim) of the text. The connexion (of the fanciful agnis with the real one) is due to the plurality (of details of the real agni which are imaginatively connected with the vidya). With regard to a subsequent Brdhmawa also, viz. the one beginning, 'That piled agni is this world indeed,' we apprehend that what is the purpose of the text is ' being of that kind,' i.e. injunction of a mere vidya, not injunction of the member of a mere action. For we meet there with the following j-loka, ' By knowledge they ascend there where all wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there, nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.' This verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former Brahmawa also, viz. the one beginning, ' What that orb leads' (6"at. Bra. X, 5, 2, 23), concludes with a statement of the fruit of knowledge ( 'Immortal becomes he whose Self is death '), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief thing. — The text connects the vidya (of the agnis built of 2 68 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those agnis are members of the act of building the real agni, but because many of the elements of the real agni are imaginatively combined with the vidya. All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidya.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacrificial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of bricks (as was asserted by the purvapakshin in Sutra 45). For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial action by means of those energies with which the original agni assists it, viz. by bearing theahavaniya fire and so on. — The assertion, again, made by the purvapakshin (Sutra 46) that 'transference' strengthens his view in so far as transference is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted by the remark that also on our view transference is possible, since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so far as both are fire-altars. — And that direct enunciation and so on favour our conclusion has been shown. — From connexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent. — ' As in the case of the separateness of other cognitions.' As other cognitions, such as e. g. the SandWya-vidya, which have each their own particular connexion, separate themselves from works and other cognitions and are independent ; so it is in our case also. — Moreover 'there is seen' an analogous case of independence from the leading subject-matter. The offering called avesh/i which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of the ra^asuya-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the ra^asuya can be offered by a member of the warrior caste only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in the Purva Mim^;«sa-sutras).
251. Not also on account of its resembling (the manasa cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an action); for it is observed (on the ground of ^'ruti, &c., that they are independent); as in the case of death ; for the world does not become (a fire) (because it resembles a fire in some points). Against the allegation made by the purvapakshin that the present case is analogous to that of the manasa cup, we Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 52. 267 remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they may resemble the manasa cup, since on the ground of direct enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action). Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or other ; but in spite of that there remains the individual dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case is analogous to that of death. In the passages, 'The man in that orb is death indeed' (.Sat. Bra. X, 5, 2, 3), and 'Agni indeed is death ' (Taitt. Sawh. V, i, 10, 3), the term 'death ' is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun ; all the same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if the text says in another place, ' This world is a fire indeed, O Gotama ; the sun is its fuel,' &c. {Kh. Up.V, 4, i), it does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case.
352. And from the subsequent (Brahma/^a) it follows that being of that kind (i.e. injunction of a mere vidya) (is the aim) of the text. The connexion (of the fanciful agnis with the real one) is due to the plurality (of details of the real agni which are imaginatively connected with the vidya). With regard to a subsequent Brdhmawa also, viz. the one beginning, 'That piled agni is this world indeed,' we apprehend that what is the purpose of the text is ' being of that kind,' i.e. injunction of a mere vidya, not injunction of the member of a mere action. For we meet there with the following j-loka, ' By knowledge they ascend there where all wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there, nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.' This verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former Brahmawa also, viz. the one beginning, ' What that orb leads' (6"at. Bra. X, 5, 2, 23), concludes with a statement of the fruit of knowledge ( 'Immortal becomes he whose Self is death '), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief thing. — The text connects the vidya (of the agnis built of 2 68 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those agnis are members of the act of building the real agni, but because many of the elements of the real agni are imaginatively combined with the vidya. All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidya.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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