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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1^ Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self. '^ I. e. without a material cause. II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 1 5 (in the future) the nearer and the remoter future.' Here the object of knowledge changes according as it is something past or something future or something present ; but the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the body is reduced to ashes ; nay we cannot even conceive that it ever should become something different from what it is. — It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the other hand, falls under the category of effected things.
2To the objection, raised above by the purvapakshin, that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an absolute law that effects should originate only from things belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunctions of threads ^ do not belong to the same genus, the former being admitted to belong to the genus ' substance,' the latter to the genus ' quality.' Nor again is there a binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle, the loom and so on should belong to the same genus. — Well then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to the other causes ^. — But here also there is no absolute rule. For we see that one and the same rope is made of things belonging to different genera, such as threads and cowhair, and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable thread and wool. — If it were assumed that the postulate of the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c., the rule would be a superfluous one ; for in that sense every inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other ^'. ^ Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth ; the conjunction of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause ; the loom, shuttle, &c. are the operative causes.
3— Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate an efifect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the mind (manas) originate their first activity ; i. e. one atom by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their primary actions, without being in conjunction with other substances. — And, should it be said that there is an absolute rule as to several causes only having originating power in the case of the origination of substances only (not in the case of the origination of actions, &c.), we again deny that, because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change (transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by you, would exist if substances did originate other substances, only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same substance, when passing over into a different state distinguished by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and earth ; in other cases one substance only changes, as when milk turns into curds. — In short it is none of the Lord's laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scripture, that the entire world has sprung from the one Brahman, ether being produced first and later on the other elements in due succession. A statement to that effect has already been made above (II, i, 24).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1^ Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self. '^ I. e. without a material cause. II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 1 5 (in the future) the nearer and the remoter future.' Here the object of knowledge changes according as it is something past or something future or something present ; but the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the body is reduced to ashes ; nay we cannot even conceive that it ever should become something different from what it is. — It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the other hand, falls under the category of effected things.
2To the objection, raised above by the purvapakshin, that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an absolute law that effects should originate only from things belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunctions of threads ^ do not belong to the same genus, the former being admitted to belong to the genus ' substance,' the latter to the genus ' quality.' Nor again is there a binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle, the loom and so on should belong to the same genus. — Well then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to the other causes ^. — But here also there is no absolute rule. For we see that one and the same rope is made of things belonging to different genera, such as threads and cowhair, and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable thread and wool. — If it were assumed that the postulate of the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c., the rule would be a superfluous one ; for in that sense every inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other ^'. ^ Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth ; the conjunction of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause ; the loom, shuttle, &c. are the operative causes.
3— Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate an efifect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the mind (manas) originate their first activity ; i. e. one atom by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their primary actions, without being in conjunction with other substances. — And, should it be said that there is an absolute rule as to several causes only having originating power in the case of the origination of substances only (not in the case of the origination of actions, &c.), we again deny that, because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change (transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by you, would exist if substances did originate other substances, only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same substance, when passing over into a different state distinguished by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and earth ; in other cases one substance only changes, as when milk turns into curds. — In short it is none of the Lord's laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scripture, that the entire world has sprung from the one Brahman, ether being produced first and later on the other elements in due succession. A statement to that effect has already been made above (II, i, 24).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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