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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge^. Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, untruth, and deceit ^. And we should do violence to the emphatic assertion made in the passage ' one only, without a second,' if we explained it according to the analogy of milk mixed with water. — Nor must we explain the cognition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is said about clay and the like is not something altogether new and independent ; but has to be understood in connexion with the previous passage ' vSVetaketu, as you are so conceited/ &c. We therefore must conclude that the ' knowledge of everything ' has all things whatever for its objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that everything is the effect of Brahman. The next Sutra replies to the assertion, made by the purvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin). 7. But wherever there are effects, there is division ; as in ordinary life.
2The conjunction ' but ' is meant to exclude the suspicion of impossibility. — We must not imagine the origin of ether to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects (modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns, or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and swords, we also obsei've division ; while, on the other hand. ^ For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it. 2 But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning. 14 vedanta-sOtras. nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided ^ Now, we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on ; hence ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circumstance of their being divided) place (dis), time, mind (manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects.
3But — an objection may be raised — the Self also is divided from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an effect like jars and the like. — This objection we refute by pointing to the scriptural statement that ' ether sprang from the Self (Taitt. Up. II, i). For if the Self also were a mere modification (of something else), it would follow that all effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self - ; for scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect. And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general void (jimyavada). Just because it is the Self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any person's case, adventitious, not established through the socalled means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established. The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously non-established objects of knowledge ; for nobody assumes such things as ether and so on to be self-established independently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self, as being the abode of the energy that acts through the means of right know^ledge, is itself established previously to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the essential nature (of him who attempts the refutation) ; for it is the essential nature of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e. sublated) by the fire itself. — Let us further consider the relation expressed in the following clauses : ' I know at the present moment whatever is present ; I knew (at former moments) the nearer and the remoter past ; I shall know
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge^. Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, untruth, and deceit ^. And we should do violence to the emphatic assertion made in the passage ' one only, without a second,' if we explained it according to the analogy of milk mixed with water. — Nor must we explain the cognition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is said about clay and the like is not something altogether new and independent ; but has to be understood in connexion with the previous passage ' vSVetaketu, as you are so conceited/ &c. We therefore must conclude that the ' knowledge of everything ' has all things whatever for its objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that everything is the effect of Brahman. The next Sutra replies to the assertion, made by the purvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin). 7. But wherever there are effects, there is division ; as in ordinary life.
2The conjunction ' but ' is meant to exclude the suspicion of impossibility. — We must not imagine the origin of ether to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects (modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns, or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and swords, we also obsei've division ; while, on the other hand. ^ For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it. 2 But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning. 14 vedanta-sOtras. nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided ^ Now, we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on ; hence ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circumstance of their being divided) place (dis), time, mind (manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects.
3But — an objection may be raised — the Self also is divided from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an effect like jars and the like. — This objection we refute by pointing to the scriptural statement that ' ether sprang from the Self (Taitt. Up. II, i). For if the Self also were a mere modification (of something else), it would follow that all effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self - ; for scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect. And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general void (jimyavada). Just because it is the Self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any person's case, adventitious, not established through the socalled means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established. The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously non-established objects of knowledge ; for nobody assumes such things as ether and so on to be self-established independently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self, as being the abode of the energy that acts through the means of right know^ledge, is itself established previously to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the essential nature (of him who attempts the refutation) ; for it is the essential nature of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e. sublated) by the fire itself. — Let us further consider the relation expressed in the following clauses : ' I know at the present moment whatever is present ; I knew (at former moments) the nearer and the remoter past ; I shall know
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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