Fetching
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One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of the sentence ' Thou art that' on its first enunciation even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance ; so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged. — All this might be so — an objection is raised — if cognition did spring up in any mind in the way described. (But this is not the case) ; for the cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all absence of pain and so on. — This objection, we reply, is without force ; for it can be shown that the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less than the conceit of the body being the Self For we clearly obser\'e that when the body is cut or burned a wrong notion springs up, ' I am being cut,' ' I am being burned ;' and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c. — who are even more external to the Self than one's own body — suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the Self Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c. ; for like the body and so on, the condition of being subject to pain is observed as something external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and the like ; while scripture expressly declares that in deep
2sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, ' And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing,' &c. (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 22). Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge, ' My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.' For him who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work. Thus scripture says, ' What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world ' {Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22). And Smrz'ti also says, ' But that man who loves the Self, is satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the Self only, for him there is no further work-* (Bha. Gita III, 12). — For him, on the other hand, who does not reach that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order that the desired intuition may be brought about. He also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the teaching, ' Thou art that.' In the mind of one on whom repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as ' I have a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent ; this is to be done by me^.' But if a learner, naturally slowminded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the understanding of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts relative to repetition and so on. — All this establishes the conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition may be repeated.
33. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us comprehend (the Lord). The Sutrak^ra now considers the question whether the highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is ^ Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end aimed at, i. e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is identical with Brahman's Self, to which no nodons of duty or acdon apply. [38] Z 338 vedanta-sCtras. to be understood as the ' I ' or as different from me. — But how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits the term ' Self whose sphere is the inward Self? — This term 'Self — a reply maybe given — ^may be taken in its primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual soul and the Lord as non-different ; but in the other case the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only^.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of the sentence ' Thou art that' on its first enunciation even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance ; so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged. — All this might be so — an objection is raised — if cognition did spring up in any mind in the way described. (But this is not the case) ; for the cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all absence of pain and so on. — This objection, we reply, is without force ; for it can be shown that the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less than the conceit of the body being the Self For we clearly obser\'e that when the body is cut or burned a wrong notion springs up, ' I am being cut,' ' I am being burned ;' and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c. — who are even more external to the Self than one's own body — suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the Self Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c. ; for like the body and so on, the condition of being subject to pain is observed as something external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and the like ; while scripture expressly declares that in deep
2sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, ' And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing,' &c. (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 22). Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge, ' My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.' For him who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work. Thus scripture says, ' What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world ' {Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22). And Smrz'ti also says, ' But that man who loves the Self, is satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the Self only, for him there is no further work-* (Bha. Gita III, 12). — For him, on the other hand, who does not reach that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order that the desired intuition may be brought about. He also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the teaching, ' Thou art that.' In the mind of one on whom repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as ' I have a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent ; this is to be done by me^.' But if a learner, naturally slowminded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the understanding of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts relative to repetition and so on. — All this establishes the conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition may be repeated.
33. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us comprehend (the Lord). The Sutrak^ra now considers the question whether the highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is ^ Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end aimed at, i. e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is identical with Brahman's Self, to which no nodons of duty or acdon apply. [38] Z 338 vedanta-sCtras. to be understood as the ' I ' or as different from me. — But how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits the term ' Self whose sphere is the inward Self? — This term 'Self — a reply maybe given — ^may be taken in its primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual soul and the Lord as non-different ; but in the other case the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only^.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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