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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoining the rinsing of the mouth, the Ka/^vas (in their recension of the Br/. Up.) conchide the chapter with the clause, ' They think,' &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the Madhyandinas, 'Therefore a man,' &c. From this we have to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Madhyandinas also is ' the knowledge of that,' i. e. the knowledge of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned pra;/a. — Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place (i.e. the M^dhyandina-jakha) the rinsing of the mouth is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water as the dress of pra;/a ; for the introductory passage, ' Water is the dress,' is the same everywhere. — We are therefore entitled to conclude that w^hat is enjoined in all vSakhas is the cognition of water being the dress of the prawa. 19. In the same (^'akha also) it is thus (i.e. there is unity of vidya), on account of the non-difference (of the object of meditation).
2In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Va^asaneyi-j-akha there is a vidya called the 6'a;/^ilya- vidya, in which we meet with the following statement of particulars, ' Let him meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the prawa for its body and light for its form,' &c. — In the Brihad-ara;/yaka again, which belongs to the same .Sakha, we read (V, 10, 6), ' That person consisting of mind, whose being is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all — he rules all this whatsoever exists.' — A doubt here presents itself whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidya in which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be combined or not. The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate vidyas whose particulars cannot be combined. For Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 215
3Otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do with texts belonging to different 5akhas we can rebut the charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the texts are read and known by separate classes of men ; we can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned in the others ; so e.g. in the colloquy of the pra/zas. On the other hand, texts belonging to one and the same 5akha cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same persons study and know them, and passages occurring in different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidya. Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one text to enjoin the vidya and that of the other to enjoin the particulars of the vidya. For in that case each of the two passages would mention only such particulars as are not mentioned in the other one ; while as a matter of fact particulars common to both as well as not common to both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the one passage are not to be combined with those of the other. To this we make the following reply. Just as passages met with in different vSakhas form one vidya in which the different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages under discussion also, although belonging to one and the same 6"akha, constitute one vidya only, since the object of meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes the character of a meditation ; as long as there is no difference of character we cannot determine difference of vidya ; and if there is no difference of vidya the particulars mentioned in different places cannot be held apart. — But has it not been demonstrated above that the vidyas have to be held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise ? — Tautology does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them enjoining the vidya, and the other the particulars of the vidya. — But in that case the Br/had-ara;/yaka ought to
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoining the rinsing of the mouth, the Ka/^vas (in their recension of the Br/. Up.) conchide the chapter with the clause, ' They think,' &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the Madhyandinas, 'Therefore a man,' &c. From this we have to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Madhyandinas also is ' the knowledge of that,' i. e. the knowledge of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned pra;/a. — Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place (i.e. the M^dhyandina-jakha) the rinsing of the mouth is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water as the dress of pra;/a ; for the introductory passage, ' Water is the dress,' is the same everywhere. — We are therefore entitled to conclude that w^hat is enjoined in all vSakhas is the cognition of water being the dress of the prawa. 19. In the same (^'akha also) it is thus (i.e. there is unity of vidya), on account of the non-difference (of the object of meditation).
2In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Va^asaneyi-j-akha there is a vidya called the 6'a;/^ilya- vidya, in which we meet with the following statement of particulars, ' Let him meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the prawa for its body and light for its form,' &c. — In the Brihad-ara;/yaka again, which belongs to the same .Sakha, we read (V, 10, 6), ' That person consisting of mind, whose being is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all — he rules all this whatsoever exists.' — A doubt here presents itself whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidya in which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be combined or not. The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate vidyas whose particulars cannot be combined. For Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 215
3Otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do with texts belonging to different 5akhas we can rebut the charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the texts are read and known by separate classes of men ; we can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned in the others ; so e.g. in the colloquy of the pra/zas. On the other hand, texts belonging to one and the same 5akha cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same persons study and know them, and passages occurring in different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidya. Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one text to enjoin the vidya and that of the other to enjoin the particulars of the vidya. For in that case each of the two passages would mention only such particulars as are not mentioned in the other one ; while as a matter of fact particulars common to both as well as not common to both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the one passage are not to be combined with those of the other. To this we make the following reply. Just as passages met with in different vSakhas form one vidya in which the different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages under discussion also, although belonging to one and the same 6"akha, constitute one vidya only, since the object of meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes the character of a meditation ; as long as there is no difference of character we cannot determine difference of vidya ; and if there is no difference of vidya the particulars mentioned in different places cannot be held apart. — But has it not been demonstrated above that the vidyas have to be held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise ? — Tautology does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them enjoining the vidya, and the other the particulars of the vidya. — But in that case the Br/had-ara;/yaka ought to
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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