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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 38. the independent Self. — To this objection the following Sutra replies. -^j. The absence of restriction is as in the case of perception. Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception, yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant. — The objection that in the act of perception also the soul is not free because it depends on the employment of the causes of perception (i.e.. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely to present the objects of perception, that however in the act of perception the soul because endowed with intelligence does not depend on anything else ^. — Moreover in actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance. A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a plurality of co-operating factors is therefore not opposed to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant results. ;^8. On account of the reversal of power.
2The soul distinct from 'understanding' has to be viewed as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi which is denoted by the term 'understanding' were the agent, there would take place a reversal of power, i. e. the instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious- ^ A^'akshuradinaTO vishayopanayakatvat tadupalabdhau ^atmanaj- ^etanatvena svatantryad udaharawasiddhir ity aha neti. An. Gi. E 2 52 VEDAXTA-SUTRAS. ness (ahampratyaya) ^, since we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness, ' /go, / come, / eat, / drink,' &c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it another instrument by means of which it effects everything. For we see that agents although themselves capable of acting yet become really active only through making use of instruments. — Hence the whole dispute is about a name only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that which is different from the instrument of action is admitted to be the agent. 39. And on account of the impossibility of meditation (samadhi).
3Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedanta-texts, whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent ^. Compare the following passages. 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked ' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self we must seek out, we must try to understand' [Kh. Up. VIII, 7, i); 'Meditate on the Self as Om ' (Mu. Up. 11, 2, 6). — Therefrom also it follows that the Self is an agent. 40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion. That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sutra '^0^, &c. We now have to consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts. — If here it be maintained that for the same reasons uhich were employed to prove the Self's being an agent its agency must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the contrary, we reply as follows. ' And that would virtually identify the buddhi wiih tlie g\\d., the individual soul. ^ The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about final release. II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 4O. 53
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 38. the independent Self. — To this objection the following Sutra replies. -^j. The absence of restriction is as in the case of perception. Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception, yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant. — The objection that in the act of perception also the soul is not free because it depends on the employment of the causes of perception (i.e.. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely to present the objects of perception, that however in the act of perception the soul because endowed with intelligence does not depend on anything else ^. — Moreover in actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance. A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a plurality of co-operating factors is therefore not opposed to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant results. ;^8. On account of the reversal of power.
2The soul distinct from 'understanding' has to be viewed as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi which is denoted by the term 'understanding' were the agent, there would take place a reversal of power, i. e. the instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious- ^ A^'akshuradinaTO vishayopanayakatvat tadupalabdhau ^atmanaj- ^etanatvena svatantryad udaharawasiddhir ity aha neti. An. Gi. E 2 52 VEDAXTA-SUTRAS. ness (ahampratyaya) ^, since we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness, ' /go, / come, / eat, / drink,' &c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it another instrument by means of which it effects everything. For we see that agents although themselves capable of acting yet become really active only through making use of instruments. — Hence the whole dispute is about a name only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that which is different from the instrument of action is admitted to be the agent. 39. And on account of the impossibility of meditation (samadhi).
3Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedanta-texts, whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent ^. Compare the following passages. 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked ' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self we must seek out, we must try to understand' [Kh. Up. VIII, 7, i); 'Meditate on the Self as Om ' (Mu. Up. 11, 2, 6). — Therefrom also it follows that the Self is an agent. 40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion. That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sutra '^0^, &c. We now have to consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts. — If here it be maintained that for the same reasons uhich were employed to prove the Self's being an agent its agency must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the contrary, we reply as follows. ' And that would virtually identify the buddhi wiih tlie g\\d., the individual soul. ^ The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about final release. II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 4O. 53
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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