The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

Open to allVarious; see each volume678 segments · 226 pp

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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.

A37'

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THE

ENGLISH AND FOREIGN

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.

THE

WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA

BT

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

VOLUME II.

THE

WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA.

BY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY K. B. HALDANE, MA

AND

JOHN KEMP, MA VOL. IL

CONTAINING THE CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY,

AND THE SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FIRST AND PART

OF THE SECOND BOOK OF VOL. I.

"Paucis natua est, qui populum tetatis suae cogitat."

Sen.

SIXTH EDITION.

LONDON: KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRttBNER & CO. L*

p. 1909

B £SHZ

584273

2.1. 5". 54

The rights of trantlation and of reprodtiction are rtterved.

CONTENTS.

APPENDIX.

PAGE

Obitioism of the Kantian Philosophy ..... i

SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FIRST BOOK.

FIRST HALF. The Doctrine of the Idea op Perception.

OTA P.

I. The Standpoint of Idealism 163

IL The Doctrine of Perception, ob Knowledge of the

Understanding 184

III. On the Senses 193

IV. On Knowledge a priori 201

SECOND HALF.

The Doctrine op the Abstract Idea, or op Thinking.

V. On the Irrational Intellect 228

VL The Doctrine of Arstract or Rational Knowledge . 234 VII. On the Relation of the Concrete Knowledge of

Perception to Arstract Knowledge . . . 244

VIII. On the Theory of the Ludicrous .... 270

IX. On Logic in General 285 viii CONTENTS.

OH A P. FAQ*

X. On the Syllogism 292

XL On Rhetoric 305

XII. On the Doctrine of Science 307

XIII. On the Methods of Mathematics 321

XIV. On the Association of Ideas 324

XV. On the Essential Imperfections of the Intellect . 330

XVL On the Practical Use of Reason and on Stoicism . 345

XVLL On Man's Need of Metaphysics 359

SUPPLEMENTS TO THE SECOND BOOK.

XVIII. On the PossD3n.nr of Knowlno the Thing in Itself 399

XIX On the Primacy of the Will in Self-Consciousness 411

XX. Objeotifioation of the Will in the Animal Organism 468

&ppentitx.

CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

C'est le privilege du vrai g^nie, et surtout du g^nie qui ouvre une carrifere, de faire impunement de grandes fautes. — Voltaire.

VOL. II

It is much easier to point out the faults and errors in tne work of a great mind than to give a distinct and full exposition of its value. . For the faults are particular and finite, and can therefore be fully comprehended ; while, on the contrary, the very stamp which genius impresses upon its works is that their excellence is unfathomable and inexhaustible, Therefore they do not grow old, but become the instructor of many succeeding centuries. The perfected masterpiece of a truly great mind will always produce a deep and powerful effect upon the whole human race, so much so that it is impossible to calculate to what distant centuries and lands its enlightening influence may extend. This is always the case ; for however cultivated and rich the age may be in which such a masterpiece appears, genius always rises like a palm-tree above the soil in which it is rooted.

But a deep-reaching and widespread effect of this kind cannot take place suddenly, because of the great difference between the genius and ordinary men. The knowledge which that one man in one lifetime drew directly from life and the world, won and presented to others as won and arranged, cannot yet at once become the possession of mankind ; for mankind has not so much power to receive as the genius has power to give. But even after a successful battle with unworthy opponents, who at its very birth contest the life of what is immortal and desire to nip in the bud the salvation of man (like the serpents in the cradle of Hercules), that knowledge must then traverse the circuitous paths of innumerable false constructions and distorted applications, must overcome the

p. 4

Commentary
page 1 ·
Historical§001

This volume states its own contents precisely, and they are not a continuation: “CONTAINING THE CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY, AND THE SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FIRST AND PART OF THE SECOND BOOK OF VOL. I.” So the second half of Schopenhauer’s book is an appendix on Kant plus supplements to the first — which is why Kant’s Critique, held on this same shelf in Max Müller’s translation, is the volume to read beside it.

presupposes Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller