The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
It is astonishing how Kant, without further reflection, pursues his way, following his symmetry, ordering everything in accordance with it, without ever taking one of the subjects so handled into consideration on its own account. I will explain myself more fully. After he has considered intuitive knowledge in a mathematical reference only, he neglects altogether the rest of knowledge of perception in which the world lies before us, and confines himself entirely to abstract thinking, although this receives the whole of its significance and value from the world of perception alone, which is infinitely more significant, generally present, and rich in content than the abstract part of our knowledge. Indeed, and this is an important point, he has nowhere clearly distinguished perception from abstract knowledge, and just on this account, as we shall afterwards see, he becomes involved in irresolvable I contradictions with himself. After he has disposed of the whole sensible world with the meaningless " it is given," he makes, as we have said, the logical table of judgments the foundation-stone of his building. But here asain he
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does not reflect for a moment upon that which really lies before him. These forms of judgment are indeed words and combinations of words; yet it ought first to have been asked what these directly denote : it would have been found that they denote conceptions. The next question would then have been as to the nature of conceptions.
It would have appeared from the answer what relation these have to the ideas of perception in which the world exists ; for perception and reflection would have been distinguished. It would now have become necessary to examine, not merely how pure and merely formal intuition or perception a priori, but also how its content, the empirical perception, comes into consciousness.
But then it would have become apparent what part the understanding has in this, and thus also in general what the understanding is, and, on the other hand, what the reason properly is, the critique of which is being written.
It is most remarkable that he does not once properly and adequately define the latter, but merely gives incidentally, and as the context in each case demands, incomplete and inaccurate explanations of it, in direct contradiction to the rule of Descartes given above.1 For example, at p. 1 1 ; V. 24, of the " Critique of Pure Reason," it is the faculty of principles a priori; but at p. 299; V.
356, it is said that reason is the faculty of principles, and it is opposed to the understanding, which is the faculty of rules ! One would now think that there must be a very wide difference between principles and rules, since it entitles us to assume a special faculty of knowledge for each of them.
But this great distinction is made to lie merely in this, that what is known a priori through pure perception or through the forms of the understanding is a rule, and only what results from mere the " Kritik der reinen Vernunft " fifth edition, preceded by a V. ; all according to the paging of the first the other editions, from the second edition, for in Rosenkranz's edition onwards, are the same as the fifth, of Kant's collected works this pag- and so also is their paging, ing is always given in addition. Be26 CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.
1 Observe here that I always quote sides this, I add the paging of the
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