The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

The content of the absolute ought, the fundamental principle of the practical reason, is the famous : " So act that the maxim of your will might always be also valid as the principle of a universal legislation." This principle presents to him who desires a rule for his own will the task of seeking such a rule for the wills of all. Then the question arises how such a rule is to be found. Clearly, in order to discover the rule of my conduct, I ought not to have regard to myself alone, but to the sum of all individuals. Then, instead of my own well-being, the wellbeing of all without distinction becomes my aim. Yei the aim still always remains well-being. I find, then, tha' all can be equally well off only if each limits his owi egoism by that of others. From this it certainly follow; that I must injure no one, because, since this principle i il

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assumed to be universal, I also will not be injured. This, however, is the sole ground on account of which I, who do not yet possess a moral principle, but am only seeking one, can wish ,this to be a universal law. But clearly in this way the desire of well-being, i.e., egoism, remains the source of this ethical principle. As the basis of politics it would be excellent, as the basis of ethics it is worthless.

For he who seeks to establish a rule for the wills of all, as is demanded by that moral principle, necessarily stands in need of a rule himself ; otherwise everything would be alike to him.

But this rule can only be his own egoism, since it is only this that is affected by the conduct of others ; and therefore it is only by means of this egoism, and with reference to it, that each one can have a will concerniug the conduct of others, and that it is not a matter of indifference to him.

Kant himself very naively intimates this (p. 123 of the "Critique of Practical Keason ; ' Eosenkranz's edition, p. 192), where he thus prosecutes the search for maxims for the will : " If every one regarded the need of others with complete indifference, and thou also didst belong to such an order of things, wouldst thou consent thereto ? " Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam ! would be the rule of the consent inquired after.

So also in the " Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals" (p. 56 of the third, and p. 50 of Eosenkranz's, edition) : " A will which resolved to assist no one in distress would contradict itself, for cases might arise in which it required the love and sympathy of others" &c. &c.

This principle of ethics, which when light is thrown upon it is therefore nothing else than an indirect and disguised expression of the old, simple principle, " Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris," is related first and directly to passivity, suffering, and then only by means of this to action.

Therefore, as we have said, it would be thoroughly serviceable as a guide for the constitution of the State, which aims at the prevention of the suffering of wrong, and also desires to procure for all and each the

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greatest sum of well-being. But in ethics, where the objed of investigation is action as action, and in its direct significance for the actor — not its consequences, suffering, or its relation to others — in this reference, I say, it is altogethe inadmissible, because at bottom it really amounts to i principle of happiness, thus to egoism.

We cannot, therefore, share Kant's satisfaction that his principle of ethics is not a material one, t.e., one whie sets up an object as a motive, but merely formal, whereb; it corresponds symmetrically to the formal laws with whi the " Critique of Pure Eeason " has made us familii Certainly it is, instead of a law, merely a formula for fin ing such a law. But, in the first place, we had t formula already more briefly and clearly in the " Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri nefeceris ; " and, secondly, the analysis of this formula shows that it is simply and solely the reference to one's own happiness that gives it content* and therefore it can only be serviceable to a rational egoism, to which also every legal constitution owes its origin.