The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
The logical rule that, as regards quantity, singular judg ments, that is, judgments which have a singular conceptio (notio singularis) for their subject, are to be treated a universal judgments, depends upon the circumstance tha they are in fact universal judgments, which have merel the peculiarity that their subject is a conception whic can only be supported by a single real object, and then fore only contains a single real object under it ; as whe the conception is denoted by a proper name. This, ho? ever, has really only to be considered when we procet from the abstract idea to the concrete or perceptible, thi seek to realise the conceptions. In thinking itself,p. 289 operating with judgments, this makes no difference, simply because between singular and universal conceptions there is no logical difference. " Immanuel Kant " signifies logically, "all Immanuel Kant." Accordingly the quantity of judgments is really only of two kinds — universal and particular. An individual idea cannot be the subject of a judgment, because it is not an abstraction, it is not something thought, but something perceived. Every conception, on the other hand, is essentially universal, and every judgment must have a conception as its subject.
The difference between particular judgments (jproposi-
%ones particulares) and universal judgments often depends nerely on the external and contingent circumstance that
;he language has no word to express by itself the part hat is here to be separated from the general conception vhich forms the subject of such a judgment If there vere such a word many a particular judgment would be miversaL For example, the particular judgment, " Some rees bear gall-nuts," becomes a universal judgment, beause for this part of the conception, " tree," we have a pecial word, " All oaks bear gall-nuts." In the same way
3 the judgment, " Some men are black," related to the idgment, " All negroes are black." Or else this differnce depends upon the fact that in the mind of him who ldges the conception which he makes the subject of the articular judgment has not become clearly separated om the general conception as a part of which he defines i ; otherwise he could have expressed a universal instead
I a particular judgment. For example, instead of the idgment, " Some ruminants have upper incisors," this,
All unhorned ruminants have upper incisors."
The hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are assertions i to the relation of two (in the case of the disjunctive dgment even several) categorical judgments to each other.
he hypothetical judgment asserts that the truth of the cond of the two categorical judgments here linked tosther depends upon the truth of the first, and the,
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falseness of the first depends upon the falseuess of the second; thus that these two propositions stand in direct community as regards truth and falseness. The disjunctive judgment, on the other hand, asserts that upon the truth of one of the categorical judgments here linked together depends the falseness of the others, and conversely ; thus that these propositions are in conflict as regards truth and falseness.
The question is a judgment, one of whose three parts is left open : thus either the copula, " Is Caius a Eoman — or not ? " or the predicate, " Is Caius a Roman — or something else ? " or the subject, " Is Caius a Roman— or is it some one else who is a Roman ? " The place of the conception which is left open may also remain quite empty ; for example, " What is Caius ? " — " Who is a Roman ? "
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